Wood v. Minneapolis & St. Louis Railroad Co.
| Citation | 161 N.W. 674,180 Iowa 223 |
| Decision Date | 12 March 1917 |
| Docket Number | 30739 |
| Parties | GEORGE WOOD, Appellant, v. MINNEAPOLIS & ST. LOUIS RAILROAD COMPANY, Appellee |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court of Iowa |
REHEARING DENIED MONDAY, JUNE 18, 1917.
Appeal from Webster District Court.--R. M. WRIGHT, Judge.
ACTION for damages for personal injuries sustained by plaintiff as a result of falling from a plank upon which he was standing while engaged with his work. At the close of plaintiff's evidence, the trial court sustained a motion for a directed verdict for the defendant. The plaintiff appeals.
Affirmed.
Maurice O'Connor, for appellant.
Burnquist & Joyce, for appellee.
The plaintiff was an experienced bridge worker, and, as such, was an employee of the defendant at the time of the accident in question. His particular work at the time of the accident was "tightening up the cord bolts." This work ordinarily required him to take a position on the cap of the bridge. From this position, he reached down to the bolts, and with a wrench tightened the burrs thereon. In this manner the plaintiff had done his work and had proceeded from the south end of the bridge and tightened every bolt up to the last bolt at the north end. In the tightening of the last bolt, he encountered some inconvenience, and conceived the idea that he could tighten it more conveniently from the under side. This idea was perhaps stimulated to some extent by the fact that there was a plank in position on the under side which would furnish him standing room and from which he could reach the bolt. It was from this plank that he fell, and suffered therefrom a sprained ankle. The circumstances attending the placing of this plank in position and the use thereof by the plaintiff are an important consideration.
The regular foreman was not present with the crew on the day of the accident. Casey, another workman, acted as vice-foreman. He also engaged in his regular work as a fellow workman with the other members of the crew. Early in the day, for his own temporary use, Casey had procured this plank and put it in position. This position was that one end thereof was allowed to rest upon the top of the bank, and the other end rested upon the timbers of the bridge. These timbers consisted of an upright piling and a diagonal brace called the sway brace. The upright piling and the diagonal brace formed an angle, and the further end of this plank rested in such angle. The plank was 12 inches wide and 3 inches thick. It was not nailed. Casey used it for a brief time until he had finished his work thereon. The plaintiff was present, and saw Casey put the plank in position and saw him use it. It was two hours thereafter that the plaintiff got upon the plank himself. He worked thereon for several minutes. In his efforts at tightening the bolt, his wrench slipped. The plank tilted on one edge, and the plaintiff went to the ground, 5 or 6 feet below.
The contention for the plaintiff is that the plank was in the nature of a scaffolding, and that it was not a safe place to work; that he was entitled to warning of the danger thereof and received none; that he was expressly directed by Casey to go upon such plank for the purpose of his work. It is contended that it was the duty of the defendant or its vice-principal to have made such plank more secure, either by the use of ropes or hangers or toenailing. The plank was not put there for the plaintiff's use. He knew that. He saw it put there by Casey, and knew that it was so put only for Casey's temporary use for his own work. He knew that it was not protected by hangers or ropes or nails. The act of Casey in putting it there was not the act of a principal or a vice-principal. Assuming that Casey was a vice-principal for some purposes, he was also a fellow workman. He used the plank for doing the work of a fellow workman only. There was no actual negligence, then, to be found in the manner in which the plank was put in position. It is urged, however, that even this did not excuse him from the duty to warn the plaintiff of the danger of using the plank. The duty to warn ordinarily pertains to unknown and nonobvious dangers, and has its most frequent application in dealing with inexperienced...
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