Wood v. Peckham

• Decision Date: 20 July 1953
• Docket Number: No. 1019,1019
• Citation: 80 R.I. 479,98 A.2d 669
• Parties: WOOD v. PECKHAM et al. M. P.
• Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court

Page 669

98 A.2d 669

80 R.I. 479

WOOD v. PECKHAM et al.

M. P. No. 1019.

Supreme Court of Rhode Island.

July 20, 1953.

Joseph J. Nicholson, Newport, for petitioner.

Burdick, Corcoran & Peckham and Patrick O'N. Hayes, Newport, for respondents.

BAKER, Justice.

This petition for a writ of certiorari was brought against the members of the town council and the town clerk of the town of Middletown in this state seeking to have this court examine and quash a decision made by such council in respect to a certain application filed with it by the petitioner. The writ was issued and in response thereto the pertinent records of the council have been duly certified to this court.

It appears from the petition and the records that Robert F. Wood, hereinafter referred to as the petitioner, is the owner of a tract of land in said town comprising about 116 acres; that on January 24, 1952 an ordinance was passed in Middletown entitled 'An Ordinance Regulating The Use And Operation Of Automobile Trailers And Tourist Camps In The Town Of Middletown'; that on July 22, 1952 petitioner filed a second application under such ordinance, an earlier one having been denied, that he be permitted to maintain and operate a trailer camp, so called, in the town; and that such second application was also denied by the town council after a hearing thereon August 4, 1952.

The town ordinance in question contains fourteen sections. In addition to certain definitions, it provides for the necessity of obtaining a permit from the town council to keep or maintain any camp ground or place of accommodation, the procedure to be followed in applying for such a permit and the giving of public notice of a hearing in respect thereto, and the amount of license fees to be charged an applicant under certain conditions. It also contains provisions dealing with cleanliness, sanitary matters, the right of inspection, the keeping by the applicant of a registration book, and penalties for the violation of the ordinance.

Section 7 thereof reads as follows: 'No application to construct, maintain and operate a camp ground shall be approved, unless in the opinion of the Town Council, the proposed location be a suitable and proper place for the keeping and maintenance of such a camp ground, and unless the camp and camp ground shall be equipped to provide running water with the usual mains and laterals incident to such service, with suitable equipment and methods for the disposal of sewage, garbage and refuse, and for the proper drainage of the camp ground area, and unless the general sanitary arrangements are suitable and proper.'

The petitioner argues that the above ordinance is void because the town of Middletown did not have the power to enact it and that in particular the latter portion of section 7 is inoperative, since it dealt with a subject already covered by a state statute of general application, namely, General Laws 1938, chapter 266, as amended by Public Laws 1950, chap. 2543. That chapter provides in part that no person shall maintain within this state any camp, bathing resort or amusement park until such person shall have obtained a license therefor from the Rhode Island department of health. The record shows that the petitioner had obtained such a license. In the act the term 'camp' is held to mean among other things any tract of land offered to the use of the public upon payment of a fee for the establishment of living quarters such as tents or trailers. It also provides that before any license is issued the director of the department shall cause the camp to be inspected to determine whether it complies with the provisions of said chapter and such regulations as the director may deem necessary regarding sanitation and aquatic safety. Regulations of the department are specific and detailed in respect to matters of drinking water, sewage, refuse disposal units, and sanitation in general.

It is declared to be a fundamental principle that municipal ordinances are inferior in status and subordinate to the laws of the state. 37 Am.Jur., Municipal Corporations, § 165, p. 787. It is also recognized in this jurisdiction that an ordinance inconsistent with a state law of general character and state-wide application is invalid. Nixon v. Malloy, 52 R.I. 430, 161 A. 135. An examination of the statute, chapter 2543, supra, and the ordinance which was enacted subsequent to the passage of that statute in our opinion shows, in so far as matters of sanitation are concerned, substantially the same general treatment, requirements and coverage. We do not have before us therefore an instance where the ordinance in respect to sanitation is of a broader scope and contains matters not covered by the provisions of the statute. In fact the latter, if anything, seems to be the more detailed and comprehensive of the two enactments.

It has been held that, where a state legislature has made provision for the regulation of conduct in a given situation and has provided punishment for the failure to comply therewith, it has shown its intention that the subject...