Wood v. People of State

• Decision Date: 27 June 2011
• Docket Number: No. 09SC990.,09SC990.
• Citation: 255 P.3d 1136
• Parties: David Henry WOOD, Petitionerv.The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Respondent.
• Court: Colorado Supreme Court

255 P.3d 1136

David Henry WOOD, Petitioner

v.The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Respondent.

No. 09SC990.

Supreme Court of Colorado, En Banc.

June 27, 2011.

Saltrese, Faville & DeSeguin, LLC, Sandra Saltrese–Miller, Denver, Colorado, Law Offices of Ingrid J. DeFranco Ingrid J. DeFranco, Brighton, Colorado, Attorneys for Petitioner.John W. Suthers, Attorney General, Katherine A. Aidala, Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Justice Section, Appellate Division, Denver, Colorado, Attorneys for Respondent.Justice MÁRQUEZ delivered the Opinion of the Court.

In 2006, a jury convicted David Henry Wood of manslaughter for fatally shooting a person in his apartment during a drug transaction. On direct appeal, Wood argued that the trial court erred in denying his pretrial request for immunity from prosecution under section 18–1–704.5, C.R.S. (2010), the “make-my-day” statute. The court of appeals declined to address Wood's challenge to the trial court's pretrial order, concluding that such an order is unreviewable on appeal. People v. Wood, 230 P.3d 1223, 1225–26 (Colo.App.2009). We granted Wood's petition for a writ of certiorari to review the court of appeals' opinion, and now affirm. We hold that a trial court's pretrial ruling denying immunity from prosecution under section 18–1–704.5 may not be reviewed on appeal after trial. Rather, the proper avenue for seeking review of such a pretrial order is under C.A.R. 21.

I.

In November 2004, James Barnes and a female companion met David Wood on the street and offered to sell him crack cocaine. Wood testified that he allowed the pair inside his apartment to complete the sale. In Wood's apartment, Barnes produced a bindle of fake drugs from his mouth, placed it on the table, and demanded his money. Wood asked to sample the crack before paying for it. Barnes refused, and a scuffle ensued, culminating with Wood fatally shooting Barnes.

Denver prosecutors charged Wood with first degree murder. Wood pleaded not guilty and moved for dismissal of the charges, contending he was immune from prosecution under the “make-my-day” statute. § 18–1–704.5. The trial court denied Wood's motion, remarking, “It's not even close, in my judgment.” Wood did not seek review of this ruling under C.A.R. 21. At trial, Wood asserted both the “make-my-day” defense and self-defense. The jury ultimately acquitted Wood of first degree murder, but convicted him of manslaughter.

On direct appeal, Wood contended that the trial court erred in denying his pretrial request for immunity under the “make-my-day” statute. The court of appeals declined to review the trial court's pretrial ruling and affirmed Wood's conviction. Wood, 230 P.3d at 1223. The court reasoned that, unlike the Colorado Governmental Immunity Act, §§ 24–10–108 to –118(2.5), C.R.S. (2010), the “make-my-day” statute does not expressly authorize an appeal from a pretrial order denying immunity. Wood, 230 P.3d at 1225. It also likened the pretrial “make-my-day” immunity procedure to a preliminary hearing in a criminal case or summary judgment in a civil case, observing that orders denying dismissal of charges at a preliminary hearing or denying summary judgment are not final when pronounced and “become moot once the issues have been resolved by the fact finder.” Id. at 1225–26. The court concluded that a pretrial order denying a motion to dismiss under the “make-my-day” statute is likewise unreviewable, and that, “[a]bsent extraordinary relief under C.A.R. 21, a defendant's only recourse is to raise the issue as a defense at trial and, if unsuccessful, appeal the jury's verdict.” Id. (internal citation omitted).¹

We granted certiorari review and now affirm.²

II.

Wood argues that where a defendant meets the statutory conditions for immunity under section 18–1–704.5, the trial court has no subject matter jurisdiction to hear the case. Consequently, Wood contends, “make-my-day” immunity may be raised at any time, including for the first time on appeal. We disagree. A defendant's request for immunity under the “make-my-day” statute does not implicate a court's subject matter jurisdiction; moreover, a trial court's pretrial denial of a motion to dismiss charges on grounds of such immunity is not a final order subject to immediate appeal. A defendant may seek immediate review of such a ruling by invoking this court's original jurisdiction under C.A.R. 21; however, after trial, the jury's verdict subsumes the trial court's pretrial ruling, and the defendant's recourse is to appeal the jury's verdict.

A.

The “make-my-day” statute, codified at 18–1–704.5, provides:

(1) The general assembly hereby recognizes that the citizens of Colorado have a right to expect absolute safety within their own homes.

(2) Notwithstanding the provisions of section 18–1–704 [defense of a person], any occupant of a dwelling is justified in using any degree of physical force, including deadly physical force, against another person when that other person has made an unlawful entry into the dwelling, and when the occupant has a reasonable belief that such other person has committed a crime in the dwelling in addition to the uninvited entry, or is committing or intends to commit a crime against a person or property in addition to the uninvited entry, and when the occupant reasonably believes that such other person might use any physical force, no matter how slight, against any occupant.

(3) Any occupant of a dwelling using physical force, including deadly physical force, in accordance with the provisions of subsection (2) of this section shall be immune from criminal prosecution for the use of such force.

Under these provisions, an occupant of a dwelling who uses deadly physical force against an intruder “shall be immune from criminal prosecution” where the conditions of the statute are satisfied. That is, section 18–1–704.5(3), C.R.S. (2010), establishes not merely an affirmative defense, but authorizes a court to dismiss a criminal prosecution at the pretrial stage of the case. People v. Guenther, 740 P.2d 971, 975 (Colo.1987). The statutory immunity created by section 18–1–704.5(3) is a “conditional immunity” in the sense that it applies only if certain factual elements are established. Id. at 977.

As we noted in Guenther, the protection provided in section 18–1–704.5 has “no analogue” in Colorado law. Id. at 980. A defendant may assert “make-my-day” immunity through a pretrial motion to dismiss under Crim. P. 12(b). When invoked prior to trial, the defendant must establish by a preponderance of the evidence that:

(1) another person made an unlawful entry into the defendant's dwelling; (2) the defendant had a reasonable belief that such other person had committed a crime in the dwelling in addition to the uninvited entry, or was committing or intended to commit a crime against a person or property in addition to the uninvited entry; (3) the defendant reasonably believed that such other person might use physical force, no matter how slight, against any occupant of the dwelling; and (4) the defendant used force against the person who actually made the unlawful entry into the dwelling.

Guenther, 740 P.2d at 981.

If the court determines that the defendant has not met his burden of proof and denies the motion to dismiss, the defendant may still invoke the “make-my-day” statute as an affirmative defense at trial. Id. In that event, the prosecution bears the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant's use of force did not occur under the conditions set forth in the statute. See id.; see also Janes, 982 P.2d at 302–03.

Mindful of the statute's language, purpose, and basic operation, we turn to our analysis of its reviewability.

B.

Wood argues that a trial court's denial of immunity under section 18–1–704.5 may be raised and reviewed at any time, including on direct appeal. His contention rests on the premise that a court's pretrial determination of immunity implicates the court's subject matter jurisdiction. Specifically, Wood suggests that a court's pretrial ruling that a defendant has met the statutory conditions of immunity under section 18–1–704.5 is tantamount to a conclusion that the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. Wood's argument, however, confuses “subject matter jurisdiction” with a court's general authority to act.

Subject matter jurisdiction concerns a court's authority to deal with the class of cases in which it renders judgment. See Horton v. Suthers, 43 P.3d 611, 615 (Colo.2002). A court has subject matter jurisdiction where it has been empowered to entertain the type of case before it by the sovereign from which the court derives its authority. See Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc. v. Adams, 718 P.2d 508, 513 (Colo.1986). In Colorado, district courts are courts of general jurisdiction, and have original jurisdiction in “all civil, probate, and criminal cases, except as otherwise provided” in the constitution. Colo. Const. art. VI, § 9.

Although the legislature has the power to limit courts' subject matter jurisdiction, we have held that such limitations must be explicit. In re A.W., 637 P.2d 366, 374 (Colo.1981). Moreover, the mere fact that a statute creates a mechanism for disposing of a prosecution does not necessarily mean that it implicates subject matter jurisdiction. For example, in People v. McMurtry, 122 P.3d 237 (Colo.2005), we distinguished the general term “jurisdiction,” meaning “authority or lack thereof,” from the concept of “subject matter jurisdiction” and held that the improper denial of a motion to dismiss for violation of the speedy trial statute does not divest a trial court of subject matter jurisdiction. Consequently, the defendant in that case could not appeal from the ruling on the motion to dismiss under a subject matter jurisdiction theory. Id. at 241–42.

The trial court here had subject matter jurisdiction over Wood's criminal case and its authority encompassed making pretrial “make-my...