Wood v. Reynolds
| Decision Date | 13 April 2021 |
| Docket Number | No. 2020-CA-00099-COA,2020-CA-00099-COA |
| Citation | 316 So.3d 208 |
| Parties | Michael W. WOOD, Appellant, v. George REYNOLDS, M.D., and Township TC Heart, LLC, Appellees. |
| Court | Mississippi Court of Appeals |
¶1. Michael Wood filed a lawsuit against Dr. George Reynolds and TrustCare Clinics LLC alleging that he had been billed for a nuclear stress test that was not administered to him. Township TC Heart, LLC was substituted for TrustCare Clinics LLC as the proper defendant. Then Township TC Heart, LLC filed a motion for summary judgment, which Dr. Reynolds joined. The Madison County Circuit Court granted the motion for summary judgment. Finding that a genuine issue of material fact existed, we reverse and remand for further proceedings.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
¶2. On April 18, 2019, Wood filed a complaint against Dr. Reynolds and TrustCare Clinics LLC. Wood alleged that on October 3, 2017, Dr. Reynolds performed one or more diagnostic heart tests on him. According to Wood, Dr. Reynolds called him a day or two later to discuss the results and recommended that he undergo further testing. But according to Wood, he declined and did not return to the clinic. Wood claimed that Dr. Reynolds and TrustCare Clinics LLC "intentionally fabricated [his] medical records" to show that he had submitted to further testing on October 13, 2017. Then they assigned a bill in the amount of $1,030 to a debt collector, which damaged his credit.
¶3. TrustCare Clinics LLC filed an answer and a counterclaim. According to TrustCare Clinics LLC, after Wood's initial visit on October 3, 2017, he was scheduled for additional testing, including a nuclear stress test ("Lexiscan"), and the Lexiscan and other diagnostic tests were administered to Wood on October 13, 2017. However, TrustCare Clinics LLC maintained that when Wood attempted to pay his bill, his credit card was declined.
Accordingly, TrustCare Clinics LLC requested attorney's fees and costs of litigation.
¶5. Subsequently, the parties entered an agreed order to substitute Township TC Heart, LLC ("TC Heart") for TrustCare Clinics LLC as the proper defendant. Thereafter, TC Heart filed a motion for summary judgment and requested attorney's fees and costs. Attached to the motion for summary judgment were Exhibits A through H.
¶6. Exhibit A contained Dr. Reynolds' notes from October 3, 2017, which indicated that Wood had a "significantly abnormal ECG" and that he would "arrange for a Lexiscan in the near future." Exhibit A also contained an instruction form for the Lexiscan, which provided in part, The form appears to have been signed by Wood on October 3, 2017.
¶7. Exhibit B contained Dr. Reynold's notes from October 13, 2017, which stated, "Patient comes in today for a Nuclear Scan." Exhibit B also contained a consent form, a completed questionnaire, electrocardiogram results, and the Lexiscan results. Exhibit G is a screenshot of TC Heart's billing system, which indicates that Wood's card was declined on October 13, 2017.
¶8. In Exhibit D (Dana Croxale's affidavit) Nurse Croxale stated that on October 3, 2017, Dr. Reynolds ordered the Lexiscan, and it was scheduled for October 13, 2017. She stated that she provided an instruction form to Wood with a 24-hour notice requirement for cancellation, and Wood signed the form in her presence.
¶9. In Exhibit E (Jenny Bullock's affidavit) Bullock stated that she administered the Lexiscan to Wood on October 13, 2017. She stated that prior to the test, Wood signed the consent form in her presence, and then she asked him a series of questions and completed a questionnaire. She also stated that radioactive medicine was given to Wood at 8:25 a.m. and 9:50 a.m.
¶10. In Exhibit F (Dr. Reynold's affidavit) Dr. Reynolds stated that Wood's electrocardiogram
results were abnormal on October 3, 2017, so he recommended that Wood return for a Lexiscan. He stated that the Lexiscan was administered to Wood on October 13, 2017. After he reviewed the results, he called Wood and recommended that he return for a follow-up appointment in November 2017. However, Wood cancelled the appointment. In Exhibit C, Dr. Reynolds noted that Wood cancelled his follow-up appointment on November 13, 2017.
¶11. Finally, Exhibit H contained the emails from defense counsel in which counsel provided a copy of the medical and billing records to plaintiff's counsel.
¶12. After TC Heart filed its motion for summary judgment, Wood executed an affidavit. In the affidavit, Wood stated that he had an electrocardiogram
and/or stress test on October 3, 2017. He also stated that he cancelled his appointment for a myocardial nuclear scan on October 13, 2017. He maintained that the records from October 13, 2017, were fraudulent, his signature on the consent form had been forged, and his credit card would have been accepted if he had attempted to pay for the test.
¶13. Then in October 2019, Wood filed for an entry of default against Dr. Reynolds for failure to plead, answer, or otherwise defend. After default was entered, Dr. Reynolds filed a motion to set aside the entry of default. Dr. Reynolds explained that he was initially under the impression that TC Heart's counsel would represent him, and he was not aware that he needed to hire counsel. Dr. Reynolds also filed an answer to the complaint and alleged, among other things, that Wood's claims were barred by the statute of limitations. Dr. Reynolds joined TC Heart's motion for summary judgment.
¶14. At a hearing, the court set aside the entry of default against Dr. Reynolds. With respect to the motion for summary judgment, Wood argued that there was a genuine issue of material fact. Ultimately, the court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants and dismissed Wood's claims with prejudice. However, the court denied the defendants' request for attorney's fees and costs. Now Wood appeals.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶15. The grant or denial of summary judgment is reviewed de novo. Wright v. R.M. Smith Investments L.P. , 210 So. 3d 555, 557 (¶6) (Miss. Ct. App. 2016). "Summary judgment is proper if there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Id . (quoting Thrash v. Deutsch, Kerrigan & Stiles LLP , 183 So. 3d 838, 841 (¶10) (Miss. 2016) ). However, "the evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmovant." Id .
DISCUSSION
¶16. We must decide whether there was a genuine issue of material fact that precluded the circuit court from granting summary judgment.
¶17. "The party requesting summary judgment bears the burden of demonstrating that no genuine issue of material fact exists." Bolden v. Murray , 97 So. 3d 710, 714 (¶15) (Miss. Ct. App. 2012) (quoting Buckel v. Chaney , 47 So. 3d 148, 153 (¶10) (Miss. 2010) ). However, "[t]he opponent to summary judgment carries a burden of rebuttal, one which arises after the moving party has satisfied the burden of proof that no genuine issue of material fact exists." Miller v. Myers , 38 So. 3d 648, 651 (¶13) (Miss. Ct. App. 2010) (internal quotation mark omitted) (quoting Price v. Purdue Pharma Co. , 920 So. 2d 479, 485 (¶16) (Miss. 2006) ). "[A]n opponent to a motion for summary judgment ‘must rebut by producing significant probative evidence showing that there are indeed genuine issues for trial.’ " Id . (quoting McMichael v. Nu-Way Steel & Supply Inc ., 563 So. 2d 1371, 1375 (Miss. 1990) ). "A dispute is ‘genuine’ where ‘the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmovant.’ " Brown Lakeland Props. v. Renasant Bank , 243 So. 3d 784, 790 (¶17) (Miss. Ct. App. 2018) (quoting Frazier v. McDonald's Rests. of Miss. Inc ., 102 So. 3d 341, 345 (¶21) (Miss. Ct. App. 2012) ).
¶18. TC Heart attached Exhibits A through H to its motion for summary judgment. However, on rebuttal, Wood executed an affidavit stating that he had an electrocardiogram
and/or stress test on October 3, 2017. He also stated that he cancelled his appointment for a myocardial nuclear scan on October 13, 2017. And he stated that the records from October 13, 2017, were fraudulent, his signature on the consent form had been forged, and his credit card would have been accepted if he had attempted to pay for the test. Wood claims his affidavit created a genuine issue of material fact as to whether he was present at the clinic on October 13, 2017.
We agree and reverse the circuit court's grant of summary judgment.
¶19. In their brief, the Appellees claim that "some or all claims asserted in [Wood's] Complaint [were] barred by the applicable statute of limitations."1 However, the circuit court did not rule on the applicability of the...
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