Wood v. Stephens, 11-70018
| Decision Date | 29 July 2015 |
| Docket Number | No. 11-70018,11-70018 |
| Parties | JEFFERY LEE WOOD, Petitioner-Appellant, v. WILLIAM STEPHENS, DIRECTOR, TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTIONS DIVISIONS Respondent-Appellee. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit |
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas
Before HIGGINBOTHAM, DENNIS, and SOUTHWICK, Circuit Judges.
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After the district court denied death-row prisoner Jeffrey Wood's petition for habeas corpus relief, we granted in part and denied in part a certificate of appealability (COA) to review whether Wood had been denied a fair evidentiary hearing on his Panetti claim. In Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930 (2007), the Supreme Court held that the Eighth Amendment prohibits a prisoner from being executed if he is suffering from a mental illness that prevents him from rationally comprehending that the gravity of his crime is soserious that he must suffer the ultimate penalty for the purpose of the vindication of the community. Id. at 958. Following an evidentiary hearing on Wood's Panetti claim, the district court concluded that Wood had failed to prove that he suffered from a mental illness that made him incompetent for execution under the Panetti standard. Wood contends that the hearing was unfair and lacking in due process because the district court improperly took judicial notice, based on its own judicial experience, of the fact that many prisoners believe they have been unjustly persecuted by judges and prosecutors. After considering the parties' written and oral arguments and the record of the district court proceedings, we conclude that Wood was not denied a fair hearing by improper judicial notice of facts or in violation of due process. The district court fairly based its conclusion that Wood is competent for execution on the evidence in the record, consisting principally of the testimony and opinions of the parties' respective expert witnesses in psychology. The district court did state that the Director's expert's testimony that prisoners commonly believe that they are victims of official persecution was consistent with the judge's own judicial experience and observations. However, this statement did not constitute improper judicial notice of an adjudicative fact in the case; rather, the district court properly and fairly based its ultimate decision on the adjudicative facts it found from the evidence presented by the parties, including the Director's expert witness's testimony regarding her extensive qualifications in forensic psychology and experience in the examination and evaluation of prisoners' mental health.
A Texas jury convicted Wood of capital murder in 1998, and the state trial court thereafter sentenced him to death. After Wood's conviction and sentence were upheld on both direct appeal and in state habeas proceedings,Wood filed his first 28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas petition in federal district court, which was denied, Wood v. Dretke, 386 F. Supp. 2d 820 (W.D. Tex. 2005), and subsequently affirmed by this court, Wood v. Quarterman, 491 F.3d 196 (5th Cir. 2007).
Wood then filed a motion in state trial court requesting appointment of counsel and appointment of a mental health expert to assist him in investigating, developing, and presenting evidence supporting a claim that he is currently incompetent to be executed and, therefore, exempt from the death penalty pursuant to the Supreme Court's decisions in Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930 (2007) and Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986). The state court denied Wood's motion, and the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed. Wood v. State, AP-75970, 2008 WL 3855534 (Tex. Crim. App. Aug. 19, 2008) (unpublished).
Wood thereafter filed in federal district court a motion for a stay of execution and motions for appointment of counsel and for funding of a mental health expert in order to pursue his Panetti claim in federal district court, which were granted. Wood v. Quarterman, 572 F. Supp. 2d 814 (W.D. Tex. 2008). Wood subsequently filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, contending that he lacked a "rational understanding" of his death sentence due to his "delusional belief system" and therefore was exempt from execution pursuant to the Supreme Court's decision in Panetti. In support of his claim, Wood presented the expert report of Dr. Michael Roman who opined that Wood suffered from a delusional disorder as defined by the DSM-IV-TR. More specifically, Dr. Roman, based on his examination of Wood, concluded that Wood held a persecutory delusion that his death sentence was the direct result of corruption within the Texas judicial system and a conspiracy between the assistant district attorney who prosecuted him and the judge who presidedover his trial. According to Dr. Roman, "[b]ecause of [Wood's] strongly entrenched delusional belief system, [he] appears incapable of linking his execution with the robbery and murder" of which he was convicted. In response, the Director submitted the expert report and testimony of Dr. Mary Alice Conroy who opined, after examining Wood, that he rationally understands the reason he is to be executed and the connection between his crime and his sentence; and that Wood does not suffer from a delusional disorder or any other mental illness for which delusions would be a symptom. In addition, the parties submitted a voluminous amount of documentary evidence addressing Wood's Panetti claim, including recordings of phone conversations between Wood and his family, Wood's medical and mental health records from his incarceration, correspondence by Wood while incarcerated, and records from the state court proceedings, which included Wood's school and medical and mental health records. The district court also held a two-day evidentiary hearing at which it received evidence and heard the competing testimony of Wood's and the Director's respective experts.
On May 10, 2011, the district court issued an exhaustive memorandum opinion rejecting Wood's Panetti claim and denying his habeas petition. Wood v. Thaler, 787 F. Supp. 2d 458 (W.D. Tex. 2011). In its written reasons, the district court cited multiple reasons for rejecting Wood's claim. For example, the court rejected as incredible Wood's argument that he actually believes his death sentence stemmed from a conspiracy between the prosecutor and trial judge. Id. at 488-90, 499. Observing that "there is considerable evidence in the record suggesting [Wood's] . . . conspiracy theory is little more than a 'ruse' . . . to avoid his own execution," the court emphasized the fact that there was no indication from the voluminous records submitted to the court that Wood had ever described to anyone, aside from his lawyers and the doctors involvedin this case, his purported belief that the prosecutor and trial judge had conspired against him. Id. at 488. In this connection, the court also noted that the "timing of [Wood's] assertion of his conspiracy is likewise suspicious," given that there is "no credible evidence . . . suggesting [he] ever voiced his current conspiracy theory to anyone prior to the Supreme Court's issuance of its opinion in Panetti on June 28, 2007." Id. at 489. The court likewise found problematic "the lack of specificity underlying [Wood's] conspiracy theory." Id. In light of the foregoing, the court determined that Wood had "failed to carry his burden of proving that he does, in fact, sincerely believe his conviction resulted from a malevolent conspiracy between his prosecutor and trial judge." Id. at 490.1
In addition, the district court also credited the testimony of the Director's expert, Dr. Conroy, over that of Wood's expert, Dr. Roman, and identified numerous reasons for doing so. First, the court detailed how "Dr. Roman . . . employs the term 'delusional' in a disturbingly casual manner that appears inconsistent with the definition of that term as used in the DSM-IV-TR." Id. at 490. Emphasizing that the "DSM-IV-TR defines 'delusion' in a very specific manner," the district court observed that Dr. Roman nevertheless "employed the term 'delusional' with an extremely broad brush, applying it to almost any belief possessed by petitioner that Dr. Roman did not consider to be factually accurate or subjectively rational." Id. at 491.2 According to the districtcourt, "[f]urther diminishing the efficacy of Dr. Roman's diagnosis [was] the fact Dr. Roman appeared confused, or at least confusing, in his testimony . . . regarding whether petitioner's allegedly delusional belief system was bizarre or non-bizarre within the meaning of the DSM-IV-TR." Id. at 494. Relatedly, the district court also underscored the fact that Dr. Roman had not diagnosed Wood as having a delusional disorder when he evaluated Wood in connection with Wood's pre-trial competency hearings. Id. at 493.
As an additional reason for crediting Dr. Conroy's testimony over that of Dr. Roman, the district court emphasized the fact that Dr. Roman "expressly relied" on the Peters Delusions Inventory in determining that Wood suffers from a delusional disorder. Id. at 497-98. As the district court explained, "Dr. Conroy took exception to the use of that test instrument to help diagnose a mental disorder under the DSM-IV-TR, arguing that instrument was not designed to help diagnose mental disorders and that the term 'delusion' employed by Dr. Peters and her colleagues meant something entirely different from the meaning of that term within the DSM-IV-TR." Id. at 498. The district court also noted that Dr. Roman himself later admitted that the Peters Delusions Inventory is not a proper test for determining whether an individual suffers from a delusional disorder within the meaning of the DSM-IV-TR. Id. Evaluating Dr. Roman's expert testimony in light of this concession, the district court concluded:
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