Wood v. Town of Oxford

• Decision Date: 05 April 1935
• Citation: 290 Mass. 388,195 N.E. 321
• Parties: WOOD v. TOWN OF OXFORD (two cases).
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

290 Mass. 388

195 N.E. 321

WOOD v. TOWN OF OXFORD (two cases).

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Worcester.

April 5, 1935

Exceptions from Superior Court, Worcester County; W. A Burns, Judge.

Actions of tort by Henry W. Wood and his wife, Irene E. Wood respectively, against the Town of Oxford, heard together without a jury. The judge found for plaintiffs in the sums of $184 and $2,000, respectively, and defendant brings exceptions.

Exceptions in the case of plaintiff wife overruled, and exceptions sustained and entry of judgment for defendant ordered in the case of plaintiff husband.

R. B Dodge, of Worcester, for plaintiffs.

E. G. Norman and A. L. Hall, both of Worcester, for defendant.

RUGG Chief Justice.

This action of tort by Irene E. Wood, hereafter called the plaintiff, is brought to recover compensation for personal injuries sustained by her in January, 1931, while walking upon a driveway, caused by a mass of snow, ice and slate falling upon her from the roof of the townhall of the defendant. The other action by her husband is brought to recover consequential damages for medical services and other expenses paid on account of the injuries to his wife. The plaintiffs contend that these damages to them resulted from the negligence of the defendant in the construction and maintenance of its townhall. The cases were tried without a jury by a judge who took a view of the premises. The townhall was a two-story building 92 4/10 feet long and 55 feet wide. It contained five rooms, two halls and a basement. The rooms were used by the selectmen and other town officers in the conduct of the business of the town. The halls were used for town meetings and gatherings of a public nature and were rented for moving pictures, private, commercial and other purposes during 1930 for a total amount of $847, and during 1931 for a total of $494. During January, 1931, both halls were rented for a total of $82. The roof consisted of a deck or nearly flat surface covered with tin and on each side a sharp pitched surface inclined at forty-five degrees covered with slate 28 feet in width and at its lower edge there extended out about 18 inches a projection. The eaves have an overhang of 1 1/2 feet from the wall of the building and at the edge have an upward incline and are about 40 feet above the ground. On the south side of the building and adjoining it for its width extending to a driveway running westerly from the street for 118 feet to the rear of the hall and other buildings. The public had a right of ingress and egress over the driveway which was 19 feet wide and was taken care of by the town. Separating the grass plot and townhall property from the driveway was an iron rail fence 3 feet in height erected to keep persons away from the building. There were no snow guards on the roof of the building and there was no evidence that there ever had been any. The town hall and driveway have been in existence as thus described for over fifty years. There was testimony by a qualified building expert to the effect that usually snow guards or rail guards were put on a slate roof constructed as was that of the townhall and that if such contrivances had been placed upon this roof it would have been impossible for snow to have gone off in a large mass. There was evidence that the plaintiff was struck and injured by an accumulation of snow, ice and slate falling from the roof of the townhall upon her, that on previous occasions there had been similar falls of such accumulations and that the officers of the town had knowledge of such events. Seasonable notice of the time, place and cause of her injuries was given by the plaintiff to the town. G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 84, § 21. There was no evidence that a similar notice was given by her husband. The trial judge denied a motion in each case for a finding in favor of the defendant. He ruled that a requested instruction to the effect that the maintenance of a townhall by the defendant was a public function was not applicable to the facts found. He denied a requested ruling that from the mere fact that the defendant rented a portion of the townhall at times for public...