Wood v. Wiggins
| Decision Date | 16 November 2021 |
| Docket Number | 01-18-00630-CV |
| Citation | 650 S.W.3d 533 |
| Parties | George WOOD, Appellant v. Matthew D. WIGGINS, Jr., Appellee |
| Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
George F. May, Twomey | May, PLLC, 1500 South Dairy Ashford Rd., Ste. 325, Houston, Texas 77077, for Appellant.
George W. Vie III, Feldman & Feldman, P.C., 3355 West Alabama St., Ste. 1220, Houston, Texas 77098, for Appellee.
Panel consists of Chief Justice Radack and Justices Rivas-Molloy and Guerra.
Appellant George Wood appeals from a judgment entered after a bench trial on Wood's and appellee Matthew D. Wiggins, Jr.'s competing claims arising out of their oral agreements to buy, fix, and sell distressed properties acquired at foreclosure or tax sales. In twelve issues on appeal, Wood argues: (1) there is no final, appealable judgment; (2) there is no basis for a partition; (3) the statute of limitations does not bar his claims; (4) the statute of frauds does not apply; (5) the trial court erred in applying laches; (6) the trial court erred in ordering a contingent remedy; (7) the doctrine of unclean hands does not bar his equitable claims; (8) the trial court erred by finding against him on his breach of contract claim; (9) the trial court erred in failing to find damages or in the amount of damages awarded; (10) there is insufficient evidence to support the trial court's finding that he had no interest in the Hidden Lake property; (11) he was entitled to attorney's fees based on Wiggins's breach of contract; and (12) the trial court abused its discretion in admitting a hearsay document related to the settlement of accounts as to six properties.
Because we hold that the trial court's judgment did not properly reimburse Wood for the $259,208.76 which the trial court found, and the parties agreed, was owed to Wood for various expenses on a number of jointly owned properties, we modify the judgment to provide that after the net proceeds from the sale of the five properties are equally divided between Wood and Wiggins, the sum of $259,208.76 should be subtracted from Wiggins's share and awarded to Wood.
We affirm the judgment as modified.
Wood and Wiggins are experienced real estate investors who met in 2004 during a foreclosure sale. Beginning in May 2006, Wood and Wiggins agreed to jointly purchase properties together, and sometimes included others in the purchases, with the intent of repairing and selling the properties "within a reasonable time." The properties were purchased at tax or foreclosure sales. Profits and losses on each property would be split according to the proportionate share of ownership. The parties had no written agreement or established policies about how to handle the property acquisition, management, rental, or sale of the jointly owned properties.
On some occasions, Wood would purchase the property to be co-owned by Wiggins (and sometimes other co-owners). On other occasions, Wiggins would purchase the property to be co-owned by Wood (and sometimes other co-owners). At some point and by some method (either repayment or offset from another property) the non-purchasing co-owner would reimburse the purchasing party for his portion of the property, which would be equally owned by all parties. Deeds would be issued to each owner to file with the respective county. There was never a particular or consistent deadline or method for repayment. Repayment could occur days, weeks, months or even years later without complaint by any owner.
Between 2006 and 2008, Wood and Wiggins bought, sometimes jointly and sometimes with other co-owners, the following properties:
[Editor's Note: The preceding image contains the reference for footnotes1 ,2 ] Many of the parties' joint properties were damaged by Hurricane Ike in September 2008. Wiggins wanted to sell all the jointly owned properties, many at a loss, but Wood wanted to keep the properties indefinitely. After Hurricane Ike, Wood and Wiggins did not jointly acquire any additional property.
In March or April 2007, Wiggins purchased three properties at a tax sale: (1) 4430 Waverly Canyon, (2) 611 Biscayne Bend, and (3) 4426 Waverly Canyon (collectively, the "Waverly Canyon Properties"). On April 4, 2007, Wood paid Wiggins $135,000—his 50 percent share of the $270,000 purchase price for the Waverly Canyon Properties. That same month, Wiggins signed deeds to Wood for a one-half interest in the Waverly Canyon Properties. Wood testified he was not able to record the deeds because they had no property descriptions. Wood did not record the deeds to the Waverly Canyon Properties until September 27, 2010.
For properties bought at a tax sale, the original owner or person who owed the back taxes has a certain amount of time—two years for homestead properties and six months or 180 days for non-homestead properties—in which to seek a redemption of the property by paying the purchase price plus a penalty. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. ("Chase") held first lien mortgages on the Waverly Canyon Properties and, as a non-homesteader, had six months in which to enforce its right to redemption of these properties.
Chase sued Wiggins in April 2008 to enforce its right to redemption. In May 2009, the trial court entered summary judgment in the redemption lawsuit in favor of Chase's successor, the Bank of New York Mellon ("BNYM"), finding that the Waverly Canyon Properties were redeemed. As a result, BNYM tendered the $348,714.17 redemption premium to Wiggins, who was the sole title holder. As Wood was not a record-title holder to the Waverly Canyon Properties, he was not made a party to the redemption lawsuit. Wiggins admitted he did not inform Wood in writing of the redemption lawsuit, or otherwise involve him in the proceedings, though he testified that Wood was aware of the lawsuit.
After receiving the redemption premium, Wiggins executed redemption deeds to the original owners. Thereafter, BNYM foreclosed its liens against the Waverly Canyon Properties, became the owners, and conveyed the properties to third parties, warranting that it was conveying a 100 percent fee-simple interest. It was not until September 27, 2010, that Wood recorded his deeds to the Waverly Canyon Properties. BNYM filed the underlying lawsuit against Wood and Wiggins, seeking a declaratory judgment as to the validity and effect of the redemption deeds and Wood's late-recorded deeds. The trial court granted BNYM summary judgment, and the case proceeded on Wood's and Wiggins's crossclaims against each other.
Wood filed his original crossclaim against Wiggins on May 11, 2011, alleging breaches of contract and fiduciary duty related to the Waverly Canyon Properties (which he referred to in his crossclaim petition as the "Subject Properties"). Wood also included breach of contract and breach of fiduciary duty claims related to what he termed "Additional Properties," which he alleged "were acquired on the same basis as described above, i.e., a contract whereby Wood and Wiggins each paid or contributed fifty percent of the purchase price of the property, with an understanding that Wood would receive fifty percent of any price, gain, profit, revenue or rentals derived from such property." Wood did not specifically identify or describe any...
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