Wood v. Wood

• Decision Date: 30 June 1947
• Docket Number: 15604.
• Citation: 183 P.2d 889,116 Colo. 593
• Parties: WOOD v. WOOD.
• Court: Colorado Supreme Court

183 P.2d 889

116 Colo. 593

WOOD v. WOOD.

No. 15604.

Supreme Court of Colorado, in Department.

June 30, 1947

Error to District Court, Logan County; H. E. Munson, Judge.

Suit by Joseph G. Wood against Mary A. Wood to determine ownership of a corn crop standing on land at time of transfer of realty by warranty deed without reservations, wherein the defendant filed a counterclaim. To review a judgment for plaintiff defendant brings error.

Affirmed.

Where wife had paid taxes on land conveyed to her by husband in settlement of her suit against him which husband should have paid under the law, but wife had collected government conservation payment which belonged to husband and which was more than amount of taxes she paid, wife could not complain of refusal to allow her counter-claim for the taxes.

T. E Munson, of Sterling, for plaintiff in error.

Austin & Konkel, of Sterling, for defendant in error.

LUXFORD Justice.

This is a proceeding to determine the ownership of a corn crop standing on land at the time of transfer of the realty by warranty deed without reservations. The parties are here in reverse order of their appearance in the trial court and we hereinafter refer to them as plaintiff and defendant.

Plaintiff and defendant are husband and wife, but for some time prior to this proceeding had not been living together. In settlement of a suit brought by her against him, he gave her a warranty deed to a half section of land, less a reserved strip. The deed was executed and delivered on the 28th day of September, 1943. It contained no reservations, except as above noted, and the land was represented as free and clear. At the time the deed was executed and delivered there was a corn crop standing on the land which had been raised by renters under a crop payment plan of one-third of the crop to the landlord. Defendant took the one-third share, sold it and received $491 therefor. Plaintiff, claiming it belonged to him, brought this suit, recovered judgment for $491 against defendant and she brings the case here urging as points for reversal that: (1) The findings and judgment are contrary to the law and the evidence; (2) the court erred in entering judgment for the plaintiff and against defendant; (3) the court erred in not rendering judgment for defendant on her counterclaim; and (4) the court erroneously held that a corn crop became personal property and does not pass with a deed to the land as soon as the corn ceases to draw substance from the ground, although the corn may not be ready to harvest or to gather and crib, and that the court should have held that the corn crop is a part of the real estate until it has been severed from the ground on which it was growing, and the landlord's share passes to the grantee of a deed unless reserved. The first two and the last points will be considered together.

1. Does a deed of land carry with it unharvested crops standing on the land at the time the deed is executed? On this question there is a sharp conflict of authority. It is conceded to be the general rule that growing crops pass with a deed to the land. Some authorities hold that, 'Until a crop is severed from the land on which it is grown it is such a part of the real estate as will pass by a conveyance or devise of the land, unless reservation thereof is made, notwithstanding the fact that the crop may be fully matured at the date of the conveyance.' 8 R.C.L., p. 360, § 6. And it is said in 66 Corpus Juris, page 1038, section 790, that: 'Unless they are reserved or excepted, crops attached to the land at the time of a sale or conveyance of the land so far partake of the nature of realty that they pass to the purchaser by the sale or conveyance as appurtenant to the land. The rule applies regardless of whether the crops are unripe or matured, so long as there has not been a severance, actual or constructive, of such crops from the land.' It also was held in Firebaugh v. Divan, 207 Ill, 287, 69 N.E 924, 925, that: 'The law in this state is well settled that, as between vendor and vendee, growing crops produced by annual planting and cultivation are real estate, and pass to the vendee, unless they are reserved in the deed or by other writing executed simultaneously with the deed. This is conceded by the appellant to be the general rule, but it is contended, where the crops are fully matured at the time of the execution of the deed, and are ready to be severed from the soil, they do not pass...