Woodard v. Andrus

• Decision Date: 15 January 2009
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 03-2098.
• Citation: 649 F.Supp.2d 496
• Parties: Karen WOODARD, et al. v. James ANDRUS, et al.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Louisiana

649 F.Supp.2d 496

Karen WOODARD, et al. v. James ANDRUS, et al.

Civil Action No. 03-2098.

United States District Court, W.D. Louisiana.

January 15, 2009.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Merrick J. Norman, Jr., Norman Business Law Center, Robert J. Boudreau, Woodley Williams et al., Mark A. Delphin, Lake Charles, LA, Eulis Simien, Jr., Simien & Simien, Willa Rebecca LeBlanc-Smith, McGlinchey Stafford, Baton Rouge, LA, for Karen Woodard, et al.

Michael H. Rubin, Jamie D. Seymour, Juston M. O'Brien, McGlinchey Stafford, Randy P. Zinna, Law Offices of Randy P. Zinna, E. Wade Shows, Ronnie J. Berthelot, Shows Cali et al., Baton Rouge, LA, David F. Dwight, Dwight Law Firm, Stephen Christopher Dwight, Dwight Law Firm, Winfield Earl Little, Jr., Lake Charles, LA, Harry A. Rosenberg, Phelps Dunbar et al., Ashley E. Gilbert, Nancy J. Marshall, Deutsch Kerrigan & Stiles, New Orleans, LA, Andrew M. Edwards, II, Ponchatoula, LA, for James Andrus, et al.

ORDER AND REASONS

SARAH S. VANCE, District Judge.

Before the Court are seven motions for summary judgment filed by the defendants (R. Docs. 206, 207, 208, 211, 212, 216, 217) and six cross-motions for summary judgment filed by the plaintiffs (R. Docs. 218, 219, 220, 221, 222, 223). As explained below, the motions focus on whether the fees charged by Louisiana clerks of court were authorized by state statute. In this federal due process challenge, however, the contested state law issues are irrelevant to the question of liability. The key issue is whether the clerks provided the plaintiffs with constitutionally adequate procedures, not whether the clerks followed state law. If the plaintiffs are able to establish liability, they will be entitled to nominal damages regardless of whether they can show that any of the fees violated state law. As for the constitutional adequacy of the clerks' procedures, the Court finds that the plaintiffs's motions must be DENIED and that more briefing will be required before the Court will be able to rule on the defendants' motions.

I. BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

This case presents a constitutional challenge to the fee collection procedures used by the clerks of court in each of Louisiana's sixty-four parishes. The clerks of court are elected officers in Louisiana with duties relating to the administration of the district courts and the recording of legal documents. See LA. CONST. art. V, § 28; LA.REV.STAT. § 13:751, et seq. They are authorized by law to collect certain enumerated fees for their services, see LA.REV. STAT. §§ 13:841-50, which are then deposited into a fund that is used to defray the costs of the clerks' salaries and the capital and administrative expenditures of their offices, see LA.REV.STAT. §§ 13:781-87. When a lawsuit is initiated, the clerks are required to collect an advance deposit from the plaintiff, "to be disbursed to the clerk's salary fund or to others as their fees accrue." LA.REV.STAT. § 13:842. If the money in the plaintiff's deposit account is exhausted, "the clerk may refuse to perform any further function in the proceeding until the additional costs for the function have been paid. . . ." Id. Finally, "[w]ithin 120 days after the final termination of the suit, the clerk shall either issue a refund to the plaintiff of any unused amount remaining in the cost advance or issue a demand for payment to the `party primarily liable' for any amount in excess of the cost advance." Meyers v. Basso, 398 So.2d 1026, 1028 (La.1981); see also LA.REV.STAT. § 13:843.1.

The Clerk of Court for Orleans Parish is governed by a separate statute, see LA. REV.STAT. § 13:1211, et seq., but the fees and procedures are similar to those described above. It should also be noted that the citations to the Louisiana Revised Statutes in this opinion refer to the laws in effect at the time the challenged activities took place. The Louisiana legislature has since amended many of the relevant provisions, and the fee schedule has been greatly simplified.

The named plaintiffs in this case were separately involved in litigation in the Louisiana district courts, and they paid fees to the clerks of court in the manner described above. For example, plaintiff Billy Herrmann filed an action in the First Judicial District Court, Caddo Parish, in 2005. (See R. Doc. 206-3 at 24.) Defendant Gary Loftin, Clerk of Court for Caddo Parish, collected an advance deposit of $550 from Herrmann. (See id.) As the clerk's office performed various services, Loftin deducted fees for those services from Herrmann's deposit account. (See id. at 24-25) Herrmann apparently settled his lawsuit in 2006, and Loftin refunded the balance of his account, $184.93, shortly thereafter. (See id. at 25.)

The present action challenges the fees charged by the clerks and the procedures used to collect them. Plaintiff Karen Woodard filed the original complaint in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Louisiana in 2003, alleging that defendant James Andrus, Clerk of Court for Calcasieu Parish, had charged her, and others similarly situated, court fees that were unauthorized by state law. (See Woodard Compl., R. Doc. 1 at ¶ 25.) As amended, Woodard's complaint alleged that Andrus had violated her constitutional right of access to courts, had denied her the equal protection of the laws, and had deprived her of property without due process of law, all in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (See id. at ¶¶ 1, 31; Woodard amend. Compl., R. Doc. 27 at ¶¶ 31.1, 36.12.) Andrus filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, which the district court granted in all respects. On appeal, the Fifth Circuit upheld the district court's dismissal of Woodard's equal protection and access to courts claims, but found that she had stated a valid due process claim under § 1983. See Woodard v. Andrus, 419 F.3d 348 (5th Cir.2005). This last holding is discussed in greater detail below. See infra.

Shortly after Woodard's case was remanded to the Western District of Louisiana, plaintiff Della Gastzke and eleven other individuals filed a similar putative class action in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Louisiana. The Gastzke complaint alleged that the clerks of court for each of the sixty-four parishes in Louisiana had deprived the plaintiffs, and others similarly situated, of their property without due process of law, all in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (See Gastzke Compl., W.D. La. Civ. No. 06-0257, R. Doc. 1 at ¶ 4.) The Gastzke plaintiffs also alleged that the Louisiana Clerks of Court Association "acted in concert with the various Clerks of Court" to violate the plaintiffs' due process rights by "formulating, promulgating, implementing and overseeing the application of official policies which have resulted in a systematic overcharging of fees in civil litigation." (See id.) Gastzke and Woodard were subsequently consolidated into a single case in the Western District of Louisiana.

On December 20, 2006, 2006 WL 3792599, the district court granted two motions for partial summary judgment filed by the defendants. First, the court found that a number of the plaintiffs' claims had prescribed by the time the suit was filed. (See R. Doc. 98 at 10.) The court dismissed the plaintiffs who had asserted only prescribed claims. (See id. at 7 n. 1.) Second, the court held that the plaintiffs were not entitled to punitive damages in a section 1983 action against public officials. (See id. at 9-10.) The plaintiffs appealed, and the Fifth Circuit upheld both rulings. See Woodard v. Jones, 247 Fed.Appx. 494 (5th Cir.2007) (per curiam).

On January 2, 2008, the consolidated Woodard case, which had eight plaintiffs remaining, was transferred to this Court. The defendants have filed seven new motions for summary judgment seeking dismissal of most of the plaintiffs' claims. The defendants argue that they cannot be held liable for charging fees authorized by state law, and that the claims based on authorized charges must therefore be dismissed. In the defendants' view, the majority of the claims against the clerks of court for Caddo (R. Doc. 206), Tangipahoa (R. Doc. 207), Iberville (R. Doc. 208), East Baton Rouge (R. Doc. 211), Beauregard (R. Doc. 212), Jefferson (R. Doc. 216), and Calcasieu (R. Doc. 217) parishes must be dismissed on this basis. The plaintiffs, in turn, have filed six cross-motions for summary judgment, in which they argue that judgment should be granted in their favor with respect to the unauthorized charges by the clerks of court for East Baton Rouge (R. Doc. 218), Beauregard (R. Doc. 219), Calcasieu (R. Doc. 220), Iberville (R. Doc. 221), Tangipahoa (R. Doc. 222), and Jefferson (R. Doc. 223) parishes.

The Court heard oral argument on November 5, 2008. At the argument, it became clear that the motions for summary judgment were focused on the wrong issues. The Court therefore ordered the parties to submit supplemental memoranda addressing the nature of the alleged Due Process violations. (See R. Doc. 321 at 1-2.) The Court also ordered the parties to submit a joint stipulation detailing which of the fees charged to the named plaintiffs are in dispute. (See id. at 3-4.) The parties have now submitted all of the requested documents (see R. Docs. 325-27, 331, 333, 336), and the Court rules as follows.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is appropriate when there are no genuine issues as to any material facts, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See FED.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). A court must be satisfied that no reasonable trier of fact could find for the nonmoving party or, in other words, "that the evidence favoring the nonmoving party is insufficient to enable a reasonable jury to return a verdict in her favor." Lavespere v. Niagara Mach. & Tool Works, Inc., 910 F.2d 167, 178 (5th Cir.1990) (citing Anderson v. Liberty...