Woodard v. Medseek, Inc.

Decision Date08 April 2016
Docket NumberCase No. 2:14-cv-1794-TMP
Citation178 F.Supp.3d 1188
Parties Karin Woodard, Plaintiff, v. Medseek, Inc., d/b/a Influence Health, Defendant.
CourtU.S. District Court — Northern District of Alabama

Adam M. Porter, Birmingham, AL, for Plaintiff.

Anne Knox Averitt, Anne R. Yuengert, Bradley Arant Boult Cummings, Birmingham, AL, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION and ORDER

T. MICHAEL PUTNAM, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

This cause is before the court on the motion for summary judgment filed November 5, 2015, by the defendant, Medseek, Inc., which is now known as Influence Health. Defendant seeks dismissal of all of plaintiff's claims arising from alleged discriminatory pay and from being laid off a few months after her maternity leave. This matter has been fully briefed, and the court has considered the evidence and arguments set forth by both parties. The parties have consented to the exercise of jurisdiction by the undersigned magistrate judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c).

I. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c), summary judgment is proper “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). The party asking for summary judgment “always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of ‘the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,’ which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c) ). The movant can meet this burden by presenting evidence showing there is no dispute of material fact, or by showing that the nonmoving party has failed to present evidence in support of some element of its case on which it bears the ultimate burden of proof. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322–23, 106 S.Ct. 2548. There is no requirement, however, “that the moving party support its motion with affidavits or other similar materials negating the opponent's claim.” Id. at 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548.

Once the moving party has met his burden, Rule 56(e) “requires the nonmoving party to go beyond the pleadings and by her own affidavits, or by the ‘depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions of file,’ designate ‘specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.’ Id. at 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e) ). The nonmoving party need not present evidence in a form necessary for admission at trial; however, he may not merely rest on his pleadings. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548. [T]he plain language of Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Id. at 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548.

After the plaintiff has properly responded to a proper motion for summary judgment, the court must grant the motion if there is no genuine issue of material fact, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). The substantive law will identify which facts are material and which are irrelevant. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). A dispute is genuine “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Id. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505. [T]he judge's function is not himself to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial.” Id. at 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505. His guide is the same standard necessary to direct a verdict: “whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law.” Id. at 251–52, 106 S.Ct. 2505 ; see also Bill Johnson's Restaurants, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 461 U.S. 731, 745 n. 11, 103 S.Ct. 2161, 76 L.Ed.2d 277 (1983). However, the nonmoving party “must do more than show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). If the evidence is merely colorable, or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505 (citations omitted); accord Spence v. Zimmerman, 873 F.2d 256 (11th Cir.1989). Furthermore, the court must “view the evidence presented through the prism of the substantive evidentiary burden,” so there must be sufficient evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the plaintiff. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 254, 106 S.Ct. 2505 ; Cottle v. Storer Communication, Inc., 849 F.2d 570, 575 (11th Cir.1988). Nevertheless, credibility determinations, the weighing of evidence, and the drawing of inferences from the facts are the function of the jury, and therefore the evidence of the non-movant is to be believed and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505. The non-movant need not be given the benefit of every inference but only of every reasonable inference. Brown v. City of Clewiston, 848 F.2d 1534, 1540 n. 12 (11th Cir.1988).

II. FACTS

Viewing the evidence provided by both parties in the light most favorable to the nonmoving plaintiff, the following facts are considered for purposes of the defendant's motion for summary judgment.

A. Employment History

Defendant Influence Health is a healthcare technology company that provides software and technology services to healthcare marketers and medical clinicians. Plaintiff Karin Woodard1 was hired by Influence Health on December 1, 2010, as Vice President, Information Technology/Management Information Systems, at an annual salary of $100,000. She interviewed with Don Johnson, Kevin Badger, Doug Griffin, and Rose Jolly. The defendant interviewed four other candidates for the position, and all of the other candidates were male. The position given to Woodard was primarily for management of technical employees, but also to perform technical work. In her position, Woodard was responsible for managing the Information Technology Department.

During the first several months of her employment, she reported to Don Johnson. In March 2011, she was reclassified as Vice President, Technical Services and Support. With this transition, she took on additional IT-related responsibilities. She also managed the project logistics and predictive analytics departments, and went from supervising seven employees to supervising 40.2 At that time, she began to report to Scott Cheney, Senior Vice President, Technology Services Organization.

In September 2011, Woodard began reporting to Jason Ingram, Senior Vice President, Consolidated Services. On October 1, 2011, Woodard received a pay increase to $115,000, which represented an annual salary adjustment and her increased responsibilities, and which also reflected that she had performed well. In December 2011, Ingram gave Woodard her first annual performance review. He evaluated Woodard on 48 skills, rating her “distinguished” in 11 areas, “competent” in 30, and “marginal” in 7, for an overall rating of 3.08 out of a possible 5. She asked for examples of reasons she got the low scores, but Ingram said he did not know of any. He told her that he had been told to give her that score, and that the scores were on a curve, with her score being considered a good score. Ingram noted a number of Woodard's top strengths, as well as a number of development opportunities.

In the spring of 2012, Woodard began reporting to Marc Guthrie, Senior Vice President and Chief Technology Officer. Guthrie prepared a second annual review of Woodard in the spring 2012, not long after he began supervising her. He rated Woodard as “distinguished” in three areas, “competent” in 38, and “marginal” in 7, with an overall rating of 2.90 of a possible 5. Woodard did not know about the review, and did see the review until February or March of 2013, when she told the human resources director that she had not received a review in 2012. Only at that time did the human resources director share with Woodard the review done by Guthrie a year earlier.

Woodard became pregnant in 2012, and took maternity leave in early September of 2012. She returned to work in October of 2012, and received a pay raise in December of 2012, which increased her salary to $117,300 annually. Her pay was never decreased during the time she was employed with the defendant.

In March of 2013, CEO Peter Kuhn told a group of employees at a meeting that the layoffs were over. Later that month, Woodard was laid off.

B. Employment Duties

When Woodard began work with the defendant, the company was using a software product called SiteMaker, which was built upon the Microsoft.NET technology framework and included other key party solutions such as Adobe ColdFusion. In 2010, the defendant began developing a product called Fulcrum, which is based on a Microsoft product known as SharePoint, a software platform that provides a content management system to store documents and share ideas. The defendant had been working with SharePoint for years before Woodard became employed, and employees working under her supervision continued to implement and manage SharePoint in Fulcrum and other applications. When she was hired, Woodard was told that one reason she was hired was to develop a plan for hosting Fulcrum through SharePoint. She developed the plan in its entirety.

Woodard also was given the task in 2011 of “migrating” the...

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