Woodbury v. Porter
| Decision Date | 13 December 1946 |
| Docket Number | No. 13393.,13393. |
| Citation | 158 F.2d 194 |
| Parties | WOODBURY v. PORTER. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit |
Raymond E. Hanke and Ralph L. Powers, both of Des Moines, Iowa, for appellant.
David London, Director, Litigation Division, OPA, of Washington, D. C. (George Moncharsh, Deputy Adm'r for Enforcement, Albert M. Dreyer, Chief, Appellate Branch and Stanley B. Frosh, Atty., OPA, all of Washington, D. C., George E. Leonard, Regional Litigation Atty., of Chicago, Ill., and Mr. Allan R. Shepherd, Dist. Enforcement Atty., of Des Moines, Iowa, on the brief), for appellee.
Before GARDNER, SANBORN and WOODROUGH, Circuit Judges.
This is an appeal from the judgment in an action for damages brought under Section 205(e) of the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942 as amended, 50 U.S.C.A. Appendix, § 925(e), and the Maximum Rent Regulation 46(a). On October 26, 1945, the Administrator of the Office of Price Administration filed complaint against J. G. Woodbury, seeking to recover treble damages. The parties will be referred to as they were designated in the trial court.
The complaint alleged that defendant on or about October 21, 1942, increased the rents for all occupants of his rooming house at No. 1421 Pleasant Street, Des Moines, Iowa, and had continuously since that date charged the occupants the rents as so increased. A detailed summary of over-charges made for the period from October 28, 1944 to September 22, 1945, was attached to and made a part of the complaint. Defendant by way of answer set up a plea in bar to the effect that the case had already been adjudicated by a former proceeding instituted by plaintiff against defendant August 3, 1945; that in said former proceeding the Administrator alleged that defendant had increased the rents and was continuing to charge the increased rents as in the instant action; that in said prior action plaintiff asked a temporary and permanent injunction directing defendant to post and keep posted in his rooming house the maximum rents as provided by the regulation and to perform any and all acts, requirements and obligations of the applicable regulation; that a temporary injunction was issued which by final judgment was made permanent.
The court overruled this plea in bar and assessed damages against defendant in the sum of $965 and costs, the court finding that the facts were not in dispute and that the causes of action and claims and demands of the two suits were separate and distinct causes of action.
Defendant contended in the trial court and renews the contention here that to permit plaintiff to maintain this action against him would be to permit a splitting of one cause of action, and that plaintiff was precluded from maintaining this action by reason of the judgment in the former action. The facts are not in dispute.
A litigant cannot with impunity split up a single claim so as to make it the basis of more than one cause of action. Litigation should have an end and the law will not permit one thus unnecessarily to harass his adversary with a multitude of actions. If a person brings suit for a part only of his claim, and such suit proceeds to final judgment, he cannot thereafter maintain an action for the balance of his claim or demand. Deweese v. Smith, 8 Cir., 106 F. 438, 66 L.R.A. 971; Taylor v. Continental Supply Co., 10 Cir., 16 F.2d 578; Harrison v. Remington Paper Co., 10 Cir., 140 F. 385, 3 L.R.A.,N.S., 954, 5 Ann.Cas. 314. The rule, however, does not prevent the bringing of separate actions on separate causes of action even though they might all have been joined in a single suit. United States v. Haytian Republic, 154 U.S. 118, 14 S.Ct. 992, 38 L.Ed. 930. It is therefore necessary to consider the nature of plaintiff's claims for the purpose of determining whether they constitute a single cause of action or two separate and distinct causes of action. One...
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Van Wie v. United States
...court practice, there has been a definite trend away from the "piecemeal" presentation and determination of litigation. Woodbury v. Porter, 8 Cir., 1946, 158 F.2d 194; United States v. Sinclair Refining Co., 10 Cir., 1942, 126 F.2d 827; 4 Cyclopedia of Federal Procedure (2d Ed.) p. 488. See......
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Wischmann v. Raikes
...that purpose.' It shows that the bar of the former action relates to the 'claim or demand' and not the cause of action. Woodbury v. Porter, 8 Cir., 158 F.2d 194, 195, was an action for damages. in a former proceeding had secured an injunction. The defendant contended that there was a splitt......
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Buder v. Fiske
...does not apply where the two causes of action are separate, even though they might have been joined in a single action. Woodbury v. Porter, 8 Cir., 158 F.2d 194, 195; Chamberlain v. Missouri-Arkansas Coach Lines, 354 Mo. 461, 189 S.W.2d 538, 539, 161 A. L.R. 204. Also, "One of the tests for......
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ENVIRONMENTAL DYNAMICS v. ROBERT TYER AND ASSOC.
...added by that court, quoting Roach v. Teamsters Local Union No. 688, 595 F.2d 446, 449 (8th Cir.1979), in turn quoting Woodbury v. Porter, 158 F.2d 194, 195 (8th Cir.1946)); see also Hicks, 31 F.3d at 746 (applying South Dakota law, and finding res judicata requires the same cause of action......