Woodbury v. State, SC19-8

• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Florida
• Writing for the Court: PER CURIAM.
• Citation: 320 So.3d 631
• Parties: Michael Lawrence WOODBURY, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
• Docket Number: No. SC19-8,SC19-8
• Decision Date: 15 April 2021

320 So.3d 631

Michael Lawrence WOODBURY, Appellant,
v.
STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. SC19-8

Supreme Court of Florida.

April 15, 2021

Carey Haughwout, Public Defender, Mara C. Herbert and Paul Edward Petillo, Assistant Public Defenders, Fifteenth Judicial Circuit, West Palm Beach, Florida, for Appellant

Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, and Rhonda Giger, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, Florida, for Appellee

PER CURIAM.

Michael Lawrence Woodbury appeals his conviction of first-degree murder and sentence of death. We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In March 2018, Woodbury was indicted on one count of first-degree murder for killing his cellmate, Antoneeze Haynes. At the time of the offense, Woodbury was serving life sentences for killing three people in New Hampshire during a 2007 robbery.

The evidence presented at trial showed that on September 22, 2017, Woodbury barricaded the door to the cell he shared with Haynes and then proceeded to brutally assault Haynes for hours, using his fists, boots, and makeshift weapons Woodbury had gathered in preparation for the attack. Woodbury appeared to delight in torturing Haynes, at one point telling the victim: "I know it hurts, I know. You deserved that one, you know you did. It's called torture. Welcome to the house of pain. Welcome to the house of pain. The house of pain actually exists. It's in the ninth level of hell. I used to run it." The assault lasted about four hours, and it involved what Woodbury admitted was a hostage situation, with Woodbury threatening to further harm Haynes if officers on the scene failed to meet Woodbury's demands. At one point, Woodbury instructed the correctional officers to take away medical equipment that had been brought in to treat the victim, saying: "You're probably going to need a body bag, but not medical equipment. You can take that stuff with you." Woodbury only stopped assaulting Haynes and surrendered when he realized a forcible extraction was imminent.

At his first appearance in court, Woodbury invoked his right to represent himself at trial, which prompted the court to conduct a Faretta¹ inquiry. Woodbury indicated that he understood every question asked and informed the court that he was taking medication for treatment of bipolar

320 So.3d 639

disorder. The next time Woodbury appeared in court, he remained adamant about wanting to represent himself at trial, and when the court explained the advantages of counsel and the disadvantages of self-representation, Woodbury said he understood. He expressed frustration when told to expect renewed offers of counsel and Faretta inquiries throughout the proceedings.

The court asked Woodbury about his history of bipolar disorder and Woodbury told the court that he had experienced "[m]ood swings, just stuff like that." The court also asked about the treatment Woodbury was undergoing for his disorder and asked if there were any physical issues that would impair Woodbury's ability to represent himself, and Woodbury said he had no other issues. The court granted Woodbury's request to proceed pro se, finding that Woodbury's waiver of counsel was made freely and voluntarily with a full understanding of his rights, and that Woodbury was competent to make that decision. With Woodbury's agreement, the court appointed standby counsel for Woodbury and told him that counsel would be appointed to represent him if, at any point in the proceedings, he ever decided that he wanted an attorney.

At a subsequent pretrial hearing, the trial court conducted another Faretta inquiry and again found Woodbury competent to waive counsel and that he had done so knowingly and intelligently. The State asked the court to conduct new Faretta inquiries each day of the trial to perfect the record. Woodbury objected to having to endure so many inquiries, saying he had read more than 105 cases and failure to conduct repeated Faretta inquiries was not a basis for appeal.

Woodbury's trial began on May 14, 2018. On the first day of trial, the court renewed the offer of counsel and conducted another lengthy Faretta inquiry. Woodbury maintained his decision to proceed pro se, explaining that he would want an attorney to handle his appeal if he were to be convicted but that he did not want counsel for the trial. Woodbury answered more questions about his bipolar disorder and other issues that might affect his ability to proceed pro se. The court again found that Woodbury understood the charges against him and the consequences of waiving counsel, and found that he had voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently waived his right to counsel.

During jury selection that same day, Woodbury conducted voir dire on the potential jurors and occasionally consulted with his standby counsel. The State asked for a finding on Woodbury's competence and demeanor, and the court said:

I think you've done actually very well for somebody in your circumstance with what you're charged with, the seriousness of it .... I actually will compliment you on your behavior. It's a little more laid back than an attorney is going to do, there's no question about that, you know what I mean. But overall I think you've complied with the general courtroom demeanor that's necessary and I appreciate that for what it's worth.

....

... You'd be surprised, some people come here unrepresented and you can't figure what their focus is. Yours I think is pretty clear. So I'll leave the record at that and I think it's actually ... quite impressive.

The following day, the court renewed the offer of counsel and Woodbury maintained his insistence on representing himself. The trial court found that Woodbury was competent to waive his right to counsel and that he had done so knowingly and voluntarily.

In his opening statement to the jury, Woodbury claimed that the victim had

320 So.3d 640

tried to sexually assault him and that the assault and killing of the victim was in response to that attempted sexual assault. Woodbury admitted, however, that he "went berserk" and that he kicked the victim in the face "like a 50-yard field goal that would have been good from 60."

During the State's case-in-chief, law enforcement officers and prison staff provided gruesome details about Woodbury's four-hour assault on the victim. Correctional officers testified that they were unable to enter the cell because Woodbury had barricaded the door, but that they could see Woodbury through a window and could see another inmate lying face down on a bunk with blood "all over the place." The State introduced photographs of the victim's extensive injuries, and the medical examiner testified that by the time officers got into Woodbury's cell, the victim had died from severe blunt force trauma, and that he died experiencing a "great, great, great deal of suffering."

During a brief recess to discuss time to call defense witnesses, Woodbury told the court that he was planning to change his plea to guilty. He said, "I know, it's crazy, but that's what I'm doing tomorrow. I'll be changing my plea to guilty of first-degree murder tomorrow after I get done testifying." The next day of trial, the court renewed the offer of counsel and conducted a truncated Faretta inquiry. The court stated that a full inquiry was unnecessary because one had already been conducted during the same stage of the proceeding. The State called Major Frank Gatto, who testified that Woodbury was "very malicious ... in his intent on what he was trying to do" and appeared "methodical" with his actions, which "seemed to be almost planned out, like he had a plan in mind." The State played a lengthy video recording filmed during Woodbury's assault on the victim, in which Woodbury could be heard assaulting, torturing, and tormenting the victim.

The next day of trial began with another renewed offer of counsel, and Woodbury said he understood the disadvantages of representing himself and rejected the offer. The trial court found that Woodbury was competent to waive counsel and had done so knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently. When the State rested, the court began yet another Faretta inquiry, but Woodbury objected, declaring: "I have a constitutional right to represent myself, and this has rose to the level of harassment." The court replied:

You know what. For the record, I don't disagree. I think the fact is you've understood this the multiple times I've done it. That doing it again, if an appellate court were to think that it's a good idea to do this as often as we have, I think that I would disagree with them and you'd be in agreement with me. However, the above trial level courts have a different way of viewing things. They're not as worried about practicality as they are about structural integrity of the system. So I'm going to go through them relatively quickly, you can answer them yes or no. If at any point, though, you do have a question, please let me know. So, again, I'm going to do it relatively quickly.

Woodbury asked the court: "[H]ow long do I got to answer? We're going to play the game now. ... Do I got five minutes, ten minutes? I might want to think about each question and consider it." Woodbury insisted that his right to represent himself superseded the need for constant Faretta inquiries,...