Woodcock v. Board of Education of Salt Lake City

• Decision Date: 13 January 1920
• Docket Number: 3409
• Court: Utah Supreme Court
• Parties: WOODCOCK v. BOARD OF EDUCATION OF SALT LAKE CITY et al

187 P. 181

55 Utah 458

WOODCOCK v. BOARD OF EDUCATION OF SALT LAKE CITY et al

No. 3409

Supreme Court of Utah

January 13, 1920

Proceeding in mandamus by Rae E. Woodcock against the Board of Education of Salt Lake City and others to compel payment of compensation awarded under the Workmen's Compensation Act.

WRIT DENIED.

Dan B Shields, Atty. Gen., and O. C. Dalby, Jas. H. Wolfe, and Herbert Van Dam, Jr., Asst. Attys. Gen., for plaintiff.

Cheney Jensen & Holman, of Salt Lake City, for defendants.

FRICK J. CORFMAN, C. J., and WEBER, GIDEON, and THURMAN, JJ., concur.

OPINION

FRICK, J.

The plaintiff filed an application in this court in which she prayed for an alternative writ of mandate against the defendants as officers and members constituting the board of education of Salt Lake City, and also against said board as such. In her application, after stating the necessary jurisdictional facts and the usual matters of inducement, she in substance alleges that on a certain day named she was in the employ of said board of education, hereinafter styled board merely, as a teacher in the public schools of Salt Lake City; that on a certain day she, in the course of her employment, sustained certain personal injuries; that she had duly made an application to the Industrial Commission of this state, hereinafter called commission, to be awarded compensation for the injury sustained as aforesaid; that upon due notice to said board a hearing was duly had upon her said application before said commission, which, on the 25th day of July, 1919, rendered its decision against said board awarding the plaintiff the sum of "seventy-two dollars compensation, together with one hundred and twenty-eight dollars hospital expenses, fifty dollars for medical charges and eight dollars for medicines and supplies, * * * making in all the sum of two hundred and fifty-eight dollars"; that the time for an appeal from said decision and award has elapsed and no appeal has been taken by said board; that a demand for the payment of said sum of two hundred and fifty-eight dollars has been duly made on said board, which has refused and still refuses to pay the same. The facts respecting the making of said demand and the refusal of the board to comply therewith are fully stated in the application. It is further alleged that the plaintiff has no remedy by which payment of said award may be enforced except the writ of mandate, and therefore she prays that a writ issue against said board.

An alternative writ was duly issued, to which the board has filed both a special and a general demurrer, and at the same time also filed an answer. We remark that there were two separate demurrers filed; one on behalf of the individual officers and members composing the board of education, and one on behalf of the board as such. In this opinion we shall consider only the demurrers and answers filed on behalf of the board. We do so for the reason that nothing could either be gained or lost by referring specially to the demurrers and answers filed on behalf of the officers and individuals composing the board.

In the answer of the board the facts alleged in the application are practically all admitted. The answer, however, sets forth with much particularity and detail the duties and powers of the board, and states what, in the judgment of the board, constitutes good and sufficient legal reasons why the amount awarded to plaintiff has not been paid and why the board refuses to pay the same. In view of the conclusions reached by us, the particulars of the foregoing answer are of no special significance and hence we omit further reference thereto. The board in its answer, however, also avers "that the board of education of Salt Lake City has no moneys nor funds out of which plaintiff's claim may be paid." That averment is supplemented by others to the effect that the board did not have timely notice of plaintiff's claim to make provision for its payment, etc. We remark that the plaintiff omitted to state in her application that the board had money or funds on hand with which to pay the amount awarded to her by the commission. The Attorney General, who represents plaintiff in this court, took the position at the hearing that such an averment was not necessary. In view that it is more convenient for us, we shall defer consideration of that phase of the case until later on in the opinion, and will now refer to the special demurrer filed on behalf of the board.

The grounds of special demurrer are to the effect that the plaintiff lacks legal capacity to sue and that there is a defect of parties, in that the state of Utah is not named as a party plaintiff, etc. The arguments respecting those grounds blend and overlap, and hence both may be considered together.

Counsel for the board insist that in view that in the original act (Comp. Laws Utah 1917, section 3130), creating the commission and providing for the payment of compensation to injured employes, it is provided that, in the event any employer shall fail to pay the compensation awarded to an injured employe within the time specified in section 3130, the compensation awarded "may be recovered in an action in the name of the state for the benefit of the person * * * entitled to the same," therefore the plaintiff should at least have joined the state with her as a party plaintiff. After considering all the provisions of the act in connection with other statutory provisions, we are of the opinion that it was not the intent or purpose of the Legislature to prevent the injured employe from prosecuting an action or proceeding in his own name if he felt so disposed. The language quoted from the section is directory rather than mandatory. There is nothing in the act which indicates that the action referred to in section 3130 was intended to be exclusive. From the language employed we are constrained to hold that the action or remedy in that section referred to was intended to be cumulative and not exclusive. This view is strengthened by the fact that under our statute, unless there is some express provision to the contrary, it is not only proper for the real party in interest, if he be competent and sui juris, to bring all actions in his own name, but the statute requires him to do so. Then again, under our statute mandamus is a special proceeding which the party beneficially interested may always institute and maintain in his own name and behalf. We are of the opinion, therefore, that while under section 3130, supra, the commission could have commenced the action in the name of the state for the benefit of plaintiff, she nevertheless had the right to bring the action or proceeding and to prosecute the same to full determination in her own name. While the action provided for in section 3130 was intended for the benefit of the injured employe and to save him harmless from costs and expenses incident to the action, there nevertheless is nothing there said or intimated which prevents such employe from suing in his own name and behalf if he elects to do so.

By what we have said we do not wish to be understood as holding that it would have been improper if an action had been commenced in the name of the state, or if the commission had been made a party plaintiff also, or if the commission had brought the action in the name of the state for the use and benefit of plaintiff. What we do hold is that such was not necessary, and that this proceeding may be maintained in the name of plaintiff alone. The special demurrer must therefore be overruled.

This brings us to the real controversy between the parties to this proceeding.

The general law of this jurisdiction, as in most other jurisdictions, does not authorize actions for damages for personal injuries against school districts. School districts are corporations with limited powers, and act merely on behalf of the state in discharging the duty of educating the children of school age in the public schools created by general laws. The act creating the commission (Comp. Laws Utah 1917, sections 3061 to 3165, inclusive), which, for the purpose of this opinion, we may and do regard as an employes' compensation act, among other things provides:

"Sec. 3110. The following shall constitute employers subject to the provisions of this title: (1) The state, and each county, city, town, and school district therein."

Then follows a designation of other employers who are subject to the provisions of the act. Section 3111 provides:

"The term 'employe,' 'workmen' and 'operative,' as used in this title, shall be construed to mean: (1) Every person in the service of the state, or of any county, city, town, or school district therein," etc.

In other sections of the act the compensation that shall be awarded by the commission under the act in case the employe is injured in the course of his employment and the manner of its payment are fully provided for. The act also provides for a state insurance fund to which all employers may contribute the rates fixed by the commission and thus insure payment of any compensation that may be awarded to the injured employe. In section 3119 it is provided that--

"Each county, city, town, or school district which is liable to its employes for compensation may insure in the state insurance fund or pay compensation direct."

As before pointed out, the act includes all school districts within its provisions and requires them to compensate their employes in case of injury, but confers the option upon them to contribute to the state insurance fund and insure the payment of compensation from that fund, or to pay the same direct to the injured employe. In case, therefore, any employe of any school district is injured and is entitled to compensation under the act, he, as...