Woodcock v. Carlson

• Decision Date: 01 November 1889
• Citation: 41 Minn. 542,43 N.W. 479
• Parties: WOODCOCK ET AL. v CARLSON.
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

41 Minn. 542

43 N.W. 479

WOODCOCK ET AL.vCARLSON.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

Nov. 1, 1889.

(Syllabus by the Court.)

In case of a lease of a farm containing a covenant for the payment of rent by the lessee, but no provision for a re-entry for a breach of the covenant, the lessor, claiming that certain rent was due on the lease, brought an action, under Gen. St. 1878, c. 84, against the lessee to recover possession of the premises, which resulted in a judgment in his favor, from which the lessee appealed to the district court, giving the stay appeal-bond required by statute, and remaining in possession. The trial of the appeal in the district court also resulted in judgment in favor of the lessor for the restitution of the premises. After the commencement of the action, but before judgment in the district court, the lessee, while still in possession of the premises, harvested and removed therefrom a crop of grain sown by himself. Held, that the grain belonged to the lessee, and not to the lessor.

Appeal from district court, Goodhue county; MCCLUER, Judge.

J. C. McClure, for appellants.

O. M. Hall, for respondent.

MITCHELL, J.

We think it was error to order judgment for defendant on the pleadings, although it is not surprising that the court below should have been somewhat confused by the mass of immaterial history, or, at best, mere evidence, by which counsel have extended the pleadings, in a simple action of trover and conversion, to the length of nearly 60 folios. The action is for damages for the wrongful taking and conversion of a number of sacks of grain, which the plaintiffs claim by virtue of a chattel mortgage executed by one Duryea, in June, 1886, while the property was still a growing crop. The wrongful taking complained of was the seizure of the grain, after it was harvested and threshed, in August, 1886, by defendant, as sheriff, on a writ of attachment in a suit by one Raymond against Duryea for the recovery of money. The defenses of the sheriff are, in legal effect: First, that he was justified in seizing it as Duryea's property, because plaintiff's mortgage was fraudulent and void as to creditors of the mortgagor; and, second, that at the time he seized it it was in fact the property, not of Duryea, but of Greenwood.

As to the first, it is enough to say that it is not admitted in the pleadings either that the mortgage was fraudulent or that Greenwood was a creditor of Duryea, as respects the claim upon which the attachment was issued. Hence, clearly defendant was not entitled to judgment on the pleadings on the first ground.

The short facts bearing upon the second defense are that Greenwood leased to Duryea the farm on which this grain was grown for a term of five years, five and one-half months from July 15, 1885, at a stipulated annual rent of $350, payable quarter-yearly. It does not appear that this lease contained any conditions or any covenant other than for the payment of rent. Neither does it appear that there was any provision in it that a default in payment of rent should work any forfeiture of the lease, or give the lessor a right to re-enter. In May, 1886, Greenwood commenced in a justice's court an action of unlawful detainer against Duryea to recover possession of the premises, in which, on June 11, 1886, he obtained judgment of restitution, from which, on June 17th, Duryea appealed to the district court, giving the stay appeal-bond required by statute, and remaining in possession of the premises. This appeal was tried in the district court, on January 20, 1887, and resulted again in judgment in favor of Greenwood. It nowhere appears on what ground this action was brought, or the judgment of restitution rendered, unless it may be inferred from a statement in the complaint that Greenwood brought the action, claiming that there was $87.50 due on the lease; that it was brought for default in payment of rent. Neither does it appear (which perhaps is immaterial) whether the action was brought before or after the grain was sown; but, from the natural course of the seasons, it is to be assumed that the action was commenced before, but the judgment of restitution rendered after, the grain was harvested. It appears that in November, 1886, and pending the appeal, Greenwood entered and ejected Duryea, and took possession of the premises; but as this was apparently without any legal right, and as it was after the grain was severed and removed from the farm, it is unimportant in the present case.

The contention of defendant is that, upon these facts, the commencement by Greenwood, the lessor, of the action to recover possession of the demised premises terminated the estate of Duryea, the tenant, and was equivalent to a re-entry, and that the judgment of restitution subsequently rendered therein related back to the date of the action, so that all crops severed and removed from the land in the intermediate time were the property of the landlord and not of the tenant. Assuming the law to be as defendant claims, it may at least admit of doubt whether it can avail him. Conceding that, as between lessor and lessee, the grain belonged to the former, yet, as against all the rest of the world, it would belong to the tenant. Greenwood, the lessor, is not here calling in question Duryea's title, nor does it appear that he ever has, or ever will, as owner of...