Woodcock v. State

Decision Date28 January 2021
Docket NumberCourt of Appeals Case No. 20A-CR-432
Citation163 N.E.3d 863
Parties John WOODCOCK, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff
CourtIndiana Appellate Court

Attorney for Appellant: Matthew D. Anglemeyer, Marion County Public Defender, Indianapolis, Indiana

Attorneys for Appellee: Theodore E. Rokita, Attorney General of Indiana, Josiah Swinney, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, Indiana

Robb, Judge.

Case Summary and Issues

[1] Following a jury trial, John Woodcock was convicted of murder, a felony, and battery by means of a deadly weapon, a Level 5 felony. He was sentenced to fifty-nine years for the murder conviction, to be served consecutively to three years for the battery conviction. Woodcock now appeals, raising three issues for our review: 1) whether his convictions for both murder and battery violate the prohibition against double jeopardy; 2) if not, whether sufficient evidence supports his conviction of battery; and 3) whether his sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of his offenses and his character. Concluding Woodcock's convictions do not violate the principles of substantive double jeopardy, his conviction for battery is supported by sufficient evidence, and his sentence is not inappropriate, we affirm his convictions and sentence.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] On July 8, 2018, Woodcock used methamphetamine twice at Tammy Baker's house – once with his friend Michael Packard, who goes by "Grim," and once with Jackie Dotts. In the early morning hours of July 9, Baker sent Woodcock and Dotts to Packard's house to collect some money. Adam Walls and his girlfriend, Heather Mandujano, also lived there.

[3] Woodcock and Dotts rode bicycles to Packard's house and Woodcock got there first. When Dotts arrived, he saw Packard asleep in his truck that was parked in front of the house. He saw Woodcock's bike in the bed of the truck but did not immediately see Woodcock himself. Dotts stopped to talk to Packard.

[4] In the meantime, Walls was asleep in his room with Mandujano when someone knocked on the window. Walls asked who it was, and the reply was "Grim[.]" Transcript, Volume II at 148. Assuming Packard needed to be let into the house, Walls got up, unlocked the back door, and then went back to bed. Another knock on his window brought Walls to the back door again. Finding no one at the door, Walls walked around the outside of the house and saw Woodcock on the porch and Packard in his truck in front of the house. Woodcock started talking to Walls, "saying that we had a problem and that he needed to talk with me.... [He] came down the steps and kinda got personal with me, like, up close and whatnot, and ... I didn't know what was goin’ on." Id. at 151. With Woodcock "acting weird and crazy[,]" Walls went to talk to Packard because Woodcock and Packard "are better friends and I figured ... he could figure out what's goin’ on, maybe help the situation." Id.

[5] Walls told Packard and Dotts that Woodcock was mad at him for some reason, and the three men walked toward the house, but Woodcock was "nowhere in sight[.]" Id. at 152. They walked around the house and entered through the back door because the front door was boarded up and screwed shut. When they entered the house, they found Woodcock standing in the kitchen. Walls’ bedroom opened directly onto the kitchen and Walls explained that as he tried to walk past Woodcock to go back to his room, "that's when [Woodcock] grabbed me by the head, spun me around and pointed the gun at my head, which I was then able kinda to deflect him by pushing him away, and ... I went into the bedroom." Id. at 153. Awakened by the commotion, Mandujano went to the bedroom door "and that's when [Woodcock] was trying to ... come into the room and [Mandujano] went to push him and at that time, [Woodcock] just shot." Id. at 154. Walls testified that Woodcock raised his arm and with the gun mere inches away from Mandujano, shot her in the forehead. Walls was standing behind Mandujano and the bullet traveled "front to back, right to left and slightly downward" through Mandujano's head and into Walls’ left bicep. Id. at 191. Woodcock walked away from the bedroom in the direction of the front door, but a minute or two later, he came back to the bedroom doorway. While Walls crouched on the floor next to Mandujano, Woodcock pointed the gun at Walls, who was saying, "No, no, no." Id. at 156. Woodcock told Walls, "This is all your fault. You're the reason this happened." Id. He then left the house through the back door.

[6] Packard testified that when he entered the house, Woodcock had a gun in his hand and "[s]eemed to be excessively serious." Id. at 213. Packard told him to put the gun away and went into the Jack-and-Jill bathroom that Walls and Mandujano's bedroom shared with another bedroom. While in the bathroom, Packard heard one gunshot. Dotts testified that as he entered the house, he saw Woodcock standing in the kitchen in front of Walls’ room, where the two were "just havin’ words back and forth." Id. at 108. Dotts heard Woodcock say "he was gonna teach the guy a lesson for puttin’ his hands on a woman" and then heard one gunshot. Id.

[7] Mandujano died from her gunshot wound. The bullet that struck both her and Walls remains lodged in Walls’ arm. The State charged Woodcock with one count of murder, a felony, and one count of battery committed by means of a deadly weapon, a Level 5 felony. A jury found Woodcock guilty of both charges, and the trial court entered judgment of conviction on both counts and sentenced him to consecutive terms of fifty-nine years for murder and three years for battery. Woodcock now appeals.

Discussion and Decision
I. Double Jeopardy

[8] Woodcock first argues that his convictions for murder and Level 5 felony battery with a deadly weapon violate Indiana's prohibition against double jeopardy. Until recently, claims of both procedural double jeopardy – barring subsequent prosecution for the same offense, whether after acquittal or conviction – and substantive double jeopardy – barring multiple convictions or punishments for the same offense in a single trial – were treated with "equal reverence under the Indiana Constitution" by the "comprehensive analytical framework" established in Richardson v. State , 717 N.E.2d 32 (Ind. 1999). Wadle v. State , 151 N.E.3d 227, 235 (Ind. 2020). Following Richardson , procedural and substantive double jeopardy claims were analyzed under the "statutory elements" and "actual evidence" constitutional tests or under a variety of statutory and common-law rules "that are often described as double jeopardy, but are not governed by the constitutional test set forth in Richardson ." Pierce v. State , 761 N.E.2d 826, 830 (Ind. 2002). The common law rules were summarized by Justice Sullivan in his concurrence in Richardson , 717 N.E.2d at 55, and later acknowledged and employed by the full court, see Guyton v. State , 771 N.E.2d 1141, 1143 (Ind. 2002). When Woodcock filed his Brief of Appellant on July 1, 2020, he relied on one of those common law rules for his argument that principles of double jeopardy preclude his two convictions: that "[c]onviction and punishment for a crime which consists of the very same act as another crime for which the defendant has been convicted and punished" is prohibited. Richardson , 717 N.E.2d at 55 (emphasis added).

[9] After Woodcock filed his brief, the Indiana Supreme Court "expressly overrule[d] the Richardson constitutional tests in resolving claims of substantive double jeopardy" and adopted an analytical framework that applies the statutory rules of double jeopardy where a defendant's "single criminal act or transaction violates multiple statutes with common elements and harms one or more victims." Wadle , 151 N.E.3d at 235, 247.1 The State thereafter filed its Appellee's Brief and argued exclusively that under the Wadle analysis, Woodcock had no substantive double jeopardy protection.

[10] In his reply brief, Woodcock acknowledged the Wadle decision, but argued that 1) the five Richardson common law rules, including the "very same act" rule, survived the decision and may continue to be independently applied and 2) if not, the Wadle decision should not be applied retroactively. We address these two arguments first, as they impact the analysis to be applied to Woodcock's claims.

A. Does the "Very Same Act" Rule Survive Wadle ?

[11] In Hill v. State , we held that the five protections identified by Justice Sullivan in Richardson , and specifically, the "very same act" rule, did not survive Wadle / Powell because it is clear from reading Wadle and Powell in conjunction that the Court's intent "was to do away with all existing rules and tests for substantive double jeopardy ... and start from scratch with new tests." 157 N.E.3d 1225, 1229 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020), trans. not sought.2 Jones v. State followed suit, holding, "These new tests incorporate principles of statutory interpretation and common law, supplanting both." 159 N.E.3d 55, 62 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020), trans. pending; see also Diaz v. State , 158 N.E.3d 363, 368 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020) ("We reiterate that Wadle did away with the ‘old law’ on claims of substantive double jeopardy, including the Richardson constitutional tests and all common-law rules like the continuous-crime doctrine."), trans. not sought.

[12] At least two panels of this court have decided otherwise. In Shepherd v. State , 155 N.E.3d 1227, 1240 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020), trans. denied , the court stated that "it is our understanding that Wadle left Indiana's common law double jeopardy jurisprudence intact" and in Rowland v. State , 155 N.E.3d 637, 640 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020), trans. not sought , we noted that "the Wadle Court appears to have left undisturbed" the Richardson common law rules.

[13] Having considered both positions, the argument Woodcock has made for continuing to apply the common law rules in double jeopardy analysis, and the text of the Wadle ...

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