Woodfill v. Shelter Mut. Ins. Co.

• Decision Date: 22 June 1994
• Docket Number: No. 19028,19028
• Citation: 878 S.W.2d 101
• Parties: Gladys WOODFILL, Plaintiff-Respondent v. SHELTER MUTUAL INSURANCE CO., Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: Missouri Court of Appeals

Page 101

878 S.W.2d 101

Gladys WOODFILL, Plaintiff-Respondent v. SHELTER MUTUAL INSURANCE CO., Defendant-Appellant.

No. 19028.

Missouri Court of Appeals,

Southern District,

Division One.

June 22, 1994.

June Clark, Carmichael, Carlson, Gardner & Clark, Springfield, for appellant.

M. Roger Carlin, Evenson, Carlin & LePage, Pineville, for respondent.

PARRISH, Chief Judge.

Shelter Mutual Insurance Co. (Shelter) appeals a summary judgment that held a certain policy of insurance issued by Shelter provided coverage for losses from the destruction of two buildings that collapsed as a result of accumulated rain, sleet and snow. The trial court found that the policy of insurance was ambiguous and granted summary judgment in favor of the insured. This court affirms.

Gladys Woodfill (plaintiff) owned real estate near Powell, Missouri. Her residence and other buildings were on the property. She obtained a "Farmowners Insurance Policy" from Shelter that insured the residence and certain out-buildings. The policy was in effect March 5, 1989, when two of the out-buildings collapsed from accumulations of rain, sleet and snow on the buildings' rooftops.

Plaintiff filed a claim with Shelter for damages she sustained by reason of the collapse of the two buildings (referred to by plaintiff as "turkey houses"). Shelter denied the claim on the basis that the insurance policy did not cover damages caused by the weight of ice, snow or sleet. Plaintiff then filed this action seeking damages from Shelter for breach of contract (Count I) and the declaration that the policy of insurance "provided coverage for collapse of the turkey houses due to the weight of accumulation of ice, snow and sleet" (Count II).

The trial court entered summary judgment for plaintiff. ¹ It awarded damages in the amount of $60,000.

This court's review of a summary judgment "is essentially de novo." ITT Commercial Finance Corp. v. Mid-America Marine Supply Corp., 854 S.W.2d 371, 376 (Mo. banc 1993). However, "[t]he questions for decision on appeal are those stated in the points relied on." In re Matter of Trust of McDonald, 858 S.W.2d 271, 280 (Mo.App.1993). Issues considered by the trial court that are not presented in an appellant's points relied on are not for review. Id.; see also Green v. Miller, 851 S.W.2d 553, 554 (Mo.App.1993).

Shelter's first point asserts:

The trial court erred in granting summary judgment for plaintiff for the reason that, if the insurance policy in question is ambiguous, the [trial] court should have considered parol evidence and looked further than the language of the contract in making its determination as to the coverage of the policy.

Shelter relies on Moore v. Bentrup, 840 S.W.2d 295 (Mo.App.1992); Hawes v. O.K. Vacuum & Janitor Supply, 762 S.W.2d 865 (Mo.App.1989); Signature Pool & Court v. City of Manchester, 743 S.W.2d 538 (Mo.App.1987); and National Merchandising Corp. v. McAlpin, 440 S.W.2d 489 (Mo.App.1969), for the proposition that if the insurance policy was ambiguous, the trial court erred in granting summary judgment. Shelter contends the trial court should have denied summary judgment so that parol evidence could be adduced to determine the intentions and understanding of the parties as to the policy's meaning.

The cases on which Shelter relies do not involve interpretations of insurance policies. They involve questions of material facts germane to commercial contracts. There is no issue in this case over a material fact. Where there is no issue over a material fact with respect to interpretation of an insurance policy, but there is a question about the meaning of the language of the policy--whether the language affords coverage for a loss--the matter in dispute is a question of law. Moore v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 754 S.W.2d 16, 18 (Mo.App.1988). To determine whether the loss is covered by a particular policy of insurance, the language of the insurance policy is compared to the petition filed by the insured. Summary judgment is properly granted in those circumstances. Id. Point I is denied.

Shelter's second point states:

The trial court erred in granting summary judgment for plaintiff for the reason that the court specifically ruled that the policy in question provided no coverage for collapse caused by the weight of ice, sleet and snow; thus, the court was able to interpret the policy and must adhere to the terms of the policy as interpreted.

The trial court's judgment entry begins with the recital:

Court reviews insurance policy. After several reviews, Court finds that there was no coverage due to collapse by weight of ice, sleet and snow attaching to the farm structures. However, this policy is not a model of clarity. To follow the request of the defense [i.e., Shelter] requires the Court to read the policy in a highly technical manner which no reasonable person purchasing insurance would have done.

The summary judgment includes the finding, "The policy is written in such an ambiguous manner that one must prepare a chart to determine which items are excluded." The judgment entry analyzes provisions in the insurance policy. It concludes that the language is ambiguous and confusing as to whether coverage is provided for damages caused by "[w]eight of ice, snow or sleet." The judgment entry states:

Therefore, Court interprets said ambiguity strictly against the defendant [i.e., Shelter] and finds plaintiff is entitled to a Summary Judgment, awarding plaintiff $60,000.00 for destruction of the turkey poultry houses plus interest at 9% per annum from March 16, 1989 to date.

Point II questions the relationship between the trial court's judgment entry in favor of plaintiff and its recital, "After several reviews, Court finds that there was no coverage due to collapse by weight of ice, sleet and snow attaching to the farm structures." The point relied on does not assert that the summary judgment in favor of plaintiff was substantively erroneous. Rather, it challenges the operation and construction of the judgment. The question that is presented is how the judgment must be construed.

"The general rules of construction of written instruments apply to the construction of judgments." Hampton v. Hampton, 536 S.W.2d 324, 325 (Mo.App.1976). In construing a judgment, a court must examine and consider the language of the judgment in its entirety. Jeans v. Jeans, 314 S.W.2d...