Woodfin v. Bender
Decision Date | 31 March 2017 |
Docket Number | 1150797 |
Citation | 238 So.3d 24 |
Parties | Randall WOODFIN et al. v. General BENDER et al. |
Court | Alabama Supreme Court |
Afrika C. Parchman, Birmingham Board of Education, Birmingham; and Carl Johnson and Claire H. Puckett of Bishop, Colvin, Johnson & Kent, LLC, Birmingham, for appellants.
Jerome Tucker and Janice Pierce Groce of Law Office of Jerome Tucker, LLC, Birmingham, for appellees.
Sam Heldman of The Gardner Firm, Washington, D.C.; and Gayle H. Gear, Birmingham, for amici curiae Harrinda Smith and Marion Street, in support of the appellees.
Members of the Birmingham Board of Education and the superintendent of the Birmingham City School System (hereinafter collectively referred to as "the defendants") appeal the Jefferson Circuit Court's judgment in favor of 24 "classified employees"1 of the Birmingham Board of Education (hereinafter collectively referred to as "the plaintiffs").2 The trial court held that the plaintiffs' salaries had been miscalculated and awarded them monetary relief. The defendants argue, among other things, that they are entitled to immunity from the plaintiffs' claims. We agree that the defendants are entitled to immunity. For that reason, the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction, and its judgment is void. Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal.
On December 30, 2011, numerous classified employees of the Birmingham Board of Education ("the Board") sued the Board, the Board's members in their official capacities, and the superintendent of the Birmingham City School System, in his official capacity. The plaintiffs claimed that when the Board adopted a new salary schedule in August 2004, existing employees, including the plaintiffs, were not reassigned to the proper "steps" on the new salary schedule and, thus, that their wages were miscalculated. Specifically, in their amended complaint, the plaintiffs alleged:
It is undisputed that in August 2004 the Board implemented a new salary schedule that included multiple pay "steps." The then current employees were placed on the step of the new salary schedule that most closely approximated their then current pay, and none of those employees received a reduction in pay. The plaintiffs argued that current employees were assigned to a step on the new salary schedule that most closely corresponded to their then current rate of pay. They argued that each employee should have been assigned to the step that directly corresponded to his or her years of experience, which, they say, would have resulted in a significant pay increase for each of the plaintiffs. According to the plaintiffs, the Board's official policy stated that an employee's "step" on the new pay schedule must correspond to the employee's total years of experience. Further, according to the plaintiffs, assigning each employee to the step that corresponded with his or her years of experience was a ministerial act, and the defendants had no discretion in determining each employee's salary step. The plaintiffs contended that, because the defendants did not assign the plaintiffs to "steps" that corresponded to their years of experience, the plaintiffs' salaries were miscalculated and incorrect payments were made on their behalfs to the Retirement System of Alabama, which resulted in reduced pension benefits for the plaintiffs.
The plaintiffs' claims are based on the following language found in the "introduction" to the salary schedule that was first adopted by the Board in August 2004:
(Emphasis added.)
In their complaint, the plaintiffs requested declaratory, mandamus, and injunctive relief. Specifically, the plaintiffs requested that the defendants be directed to pay the plaintiffs at the proper rate of pay reflecting their years of experience, that the trial court "issue a declaratory judgment finding that the defendants' purported actions of inequitably paying [the plaintiffs] shall be corrected such that all employees' salaries shall be based upon their years of experience," and that the trial court "declare[ ] that the plaintiffs are entitled to back pay and adjustment of their current salary to reflect years of service." Further, the plaintiffs alleged that the "defendants' actions constitute unlawful, unreasonable, capricious, and arbitrary conduct and represent an abuse of the defendants' official power and discretion" and that "the Board's failure and refusal to establish proper salary schedules which include length of service steps for all classes of employees does not entail a discretionary act but rather is the ignoring of a duty exacted by law."
The trial court dismissed the Board from the case on the basis of State immunity but allowed the action to proceed against the defendants in their official capacities. After conducting a bench trial, the trial court found that the plaintiffs' salaries had been miscalculated and awarded them the monetary relief they requested. The defendants appealed.
On appeal, the defendants argue, among other things, that they are entitled to immunity from the plaintiffs' claims. The plaintiffs respond that Plaintiffs' brief, at 30. Further, the plaintiffs argue that "state sovereign immunity does not bar an order against official capacity defendants, regarding proper payment for work actually performed, including proper placement on the salary schedule." Id., at 34.
"[T]he State of Alabama shall never be made a defendant in any court of law or equity." Article I, § 14, Ala. Const. 1901. "Section 14 immunity is more than a defense; when applicable, it divests the trial courts of this State of subject-matter jurisdiction." Alabama State Univ. v. Danley, 212 So.3d 112, 127 (Ala. 2016).
Concerning § 14 immunity, this Court has stated:
Alabama Agric. & Mech. Univ. v. Jones, 895 So.2d 867, 872–73 (Ala. 2004).
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