Woodford v. State

• Decision Date: 28 October 1985
• Docket Number: No. 1083,1083
• Parties: Norman A. WOODFORD, Appellant (Petitioner Below), v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee (Respondent Below). S 349.
• Court: Indiana Supreme Court

Page 563

484 N.E.2d 563

Norman A. WOODFORD, Appellant (Petitioner Below), v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee (Respondent Below).

No. 1083 S 349.

Supreme Court of Indiana.

Oct. 28, 1985.

J. Richard Kiefer, Indianapolis, for appellant.

Linley E. Pearson, Atty. Gen., Michael Gene Worden, Deputy Atty. Gen., Indianapolis, for appellee.

PRENTICE, Justice.

Petitioner (Appellant) pled guilty to murder, Ind.Code Sec. 35-13-4-1 (Burns Code Ed.1975), and was sentenced to life imprisonment. He subsequently filed the instant petition for post-conviction relief under Ind.Rules of Procedure, Post Conviction Rule 1. Following an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction trial court denied relief on the basis of laches, and Petitioner appealed.

Because of our disposition, we address only the following two issues:

1. Whether the post-conviction trial court erred in denying relief on the basis of laches.

2. Whether the record discloses that there was a substantial factual basis for Petitioner's guilty plea.

We reverse and remand for further proceedings.

Petitioner and an accomplice were involved in the robbery of an Indianapolis drug store. During the robbery an Indianapolis Police Department officer arrived and a short gun battle ensued, during which both the accomplice and the police officer were killed. Petitioner was eventually arrested and pled guilty to one count of premeditated murder pursuant to a plea bargain.

Approximately six (6) years later Petitioner filed the instant petition for post-conviction relief which, among other contentions, challenged the factual basis for his plea of guilty to premeditated murder, and asserted that he had not been advised of various rights waived by the guilty plea. Other facts are stated below.

ISSUE I

The State generally denied the allegations of the petition and also raised the affirmative defense of laches. The evidence revealed that Petitioner had been sentenced on November 5, 1976 but did not file his petition for relief until December 20, 1982, although he had learned of the availability of post-conviction remedies more than four years earlier. Upon this evidence, the post-conviction court denied relief by reason of Petitioner's laches. In so doing, however, it apparently relied upon Stutzman v. State (1981), Ind.App., 427 N.E.2d 724 and a series of subsequent cases from our Court of Appeals which held that a post-conviction petitioner had the burden to disprove laches, once the matter was put in issue by the State. These cases were overruled by this Court in Twyman v. State (1984), Ind. 459 N.E.2d 705, 711-12 (DeBruler, J., dissenting on other grounds) and Gregory v. State (1984), Ind. 463 N.E.2d 464. Laches encompasses more than mere delay, and the burden of proving the defense rests entirely upon the State in proceedings to set aside a guilty plea. Twyman, supra.

Since our decision in Twyman the several districts of our Court of Appeals have reached varying results upon the action appropriate following a determination of error in applying the Stutzman rule, some having remanded such cases for a retrial of the laches issue and others having remanded Ordinarily, where it is determined, as a matter of law, that a party having the burden of proof failed to carry it, notwithstanding a full opportunity to do so, it is appropriate to direct a finding against him. Where as here, however, that party has been hampered by error not chargeable to him, he will be afforded a second opportunity, free from such restraint. We are cognizant of the concerns expressed by the majority opinion in Boykins and in the dissenting opinion in Ray, and they are not without merit; however, we are reluctant to hold the State accountable for a failure to carry a burden of proof which the case law, then applicable, declared was not its own. Thus, while post-conviction may not be denied to a petitioner for failure to carry a burden not chargeable to him, the State is entitled to fair notice of the burdens it must meet.

for a determination of the post-conviction petition upon its merits, i.e. without giving the State an opportunity to relitigate the laches claim. See Harrington v. State (1984), Ind.App., 466 N.E.2d 1379; Mottern v. State (1984), Ind.App., 466 N.E.2d 488; Morrison v. State (1984), Ind.App., 466 N.E.2d 783; Ray v. State (1984), Ind.App., 466 N.E.2d 1389; Boykins v. State (1984), Ind.App., 470 N.E.2d 765.

ISSUE II

Notwithstanding our reversal, we address this Issue for the guidance of the trial court on remand.

Petitioner claims that there was no adequate factual basis for the guilty plea to premeditated murder because his accomplice, not he, killed the police officer. However, the transcript of the guilty plea hearing includes substantial evidence from which the guilty plea court could have concluded that Petitioner and the accomplice acted together throughout the robbery, although the record does contain conclusive evidence that it was the accomplice who killed the police officer.

At the time this crime was committed, Ind.Code Sec. 35-1-29-1 (Burns Code Ed.,1975) provided in pertinent part:

"Every person who shall aid or abet in the commission of a felony ... may be charged by indictment or information, tried and convicted in the same manner as if he were a principal."

This statute codified the...