Woodham v. Atlanta Dev. Auth.

Decision Date05 November 2015
Docket NumberA15A1035.,Nos. A15A1034,s. A15A1034
Citation335 Ga.App. 126,779 S.E.2d 116
Parties WOODHAM v. ATLANTA DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY. Woodham, et al. v. Atlanta Development Authority.
CourtGeorgia Court of Appeals

John Floyd Woodham, Atlanta, for Appellant.

James E. Dearing Jr., Atlanta, for Appellee.

McFADDEN, Judge.

These related appeals arise from an attempt by Atlanta Development Authority (the Authority) to conduct discovery in connection with collecting a judgment against attorney John F. Woodham and Citizens for Ethics in Government, LLC ("Citizens"). Woodham represents himself pro se and also represents Citizens.

Woodham is the sole appellant in Case No. A15A1034. He challenges the trial court's denial of his motion to recuse, but his motion did not meet the threshold requirements of Uniform Superior Court Rule 25.3 ; accordingly, we affirm that ruling. He also challenges the trial court's authority to compel post-judgment discovery from him, but he waived appellate review of that challenge by consenting to the discovery. And he challenges the trial court's order finding him in contempt for wilfully failing to comply with two post-judgment discovery orders. The evidence supports the finding of contempt, which we affirm. However, we reverse as an improper penalty that portion of the contempt order requiring Woodham to pay legal fees and costs to purge the contempt, because the fees and costs were not part of a previously-ordered award.

Woodham and Citizens are both appellants in Case No. A15A1035. They challenge the trial court's order requiring a supersedeas bond in the amount of the legal fees and costs ordered for Woodham to purge the contempt. Because we have reversed that portion of the contempt order, we also reverse the supersedeas bond order. We also reverse the imposition of a supersedeas bond upon Citizens, because Citizens has not appealed from the contempt order.

1. Procedural history.

The background of this case is set forth in our decision in an earlier appeal, Citizens for Ethics in Government, LLC v. Atlanta Development Auth., 303 Ga.App. 724, 694 S.E.2d 680 (2010). In summary, Woodham and Citizens intervened in a bond validation proceeding in 2008. Id. at 724, 694 S.E.2d 680. Their conduct in that proceeding led the trial court to issue an order that, among other things, required them to pay $303,141.89 in attorney fees and expenses to the Authority, which was one of the parties to the bond validation proceeding. Id. at 731, 694 S.E.2d 680. Woodham and Citizens appealed, and we vacated "the portion of [that order] awarding attorney fees and remand[ed] for an explanation of the statutory basis for the award and any findings necessary to support it." Id. at 738 –739(5), 694 S.E.2d 680 (citations, punctuation and footnote omitted). On remand, the trial court issued an interlocutory order from which Woodham and Citizens improperly attempted to appeal, leading this court to assess a frivolous appeal penalty of $2,500 against each of them. Subsequently, the trial court entered a new order again requiring them to pay the Authority $303,141.89 in attorney fees and expenses.

In an attempt to collect on these awards, in April 2014 the Authority sought post-judgment discovery from Woodham and Citizens and noticed Woodham's deposition. Woodham and Citizens filed an objection, arguing that the judgment was not enforceable or collectible because the Authority had not yet filed a civil case disposition form pursuant to OCGA § 9–11–58(b). (In his appellate brief in Case No. A15A1034, Woodham states that the Authority filed the disposition form the following month.) Nonetheless, Woodham appeared at the deposition but refused to answer most of the questions asked. The Authority moved to compel discovery from Woodham and Citizens, and on June 13, 2014, after a hearing, the trial court granted the motion and, among other things, ordered Woodham to appear at court on June 27, 2014, for his deposition. After the entry of that order but before the scheduled deposition date, Woodham moved to recuse the trial judge based on alleged inappropriate conduct at the hearing, and the trial judge voluntarily recused.

Woodham did not appear for the court-ordered deposition or comply with the other directives of the June 13 order, and he rebuffed an attempt by the Authority's counsel to resolve the discovery dispute. On July 16, 2014, the Authority filed a motion for contempt against Woodham and Citizens, and on July 24, 2014, after a hearing, a new trial judge found them in contempt of the June 13 order and ordered them to give depositions instanter. Woodham's deposition began that day, and the next day, July 25, 2014, the Authority and Woodham consented to an order requiring Woodham to produce certain documents by 5:00 p.m. that day, to provide written interrogatory responses by 10:00 a.m. on July 28, and to continue to appear for deposition until the deposition was complete.

Woodham did not produce the documents or reappear at court for deposition the afternoon of July 25, and the Authority moved the trial court to hold Woodham (but not Citizens) in wilful contempt. On August 4, the trial court issued a rule nisi setting the hearing on the contempt motion for August 11. On August 8, 2014, Woodham moved for the recusal of the new trial judge.

Woodham did not appear at the August 11, 2014 hearing, at which the trial court heard argument from the Authority's attorney on both the recusal motion and the motion for contempt. At the end of the hearing the trial court took both matters under advisement, and later that day he issued orders denying the motion to recuse and granting the contempt motion. The trial court found Woodham intentionally failed to comply with the July 24 and July 25 orders and ordered that he be arrested and held until he purged the contempt by providing discovery responses, producing documents, and reimbursing the Authority $18,862.74, which the trial court found to be the amount of legal fees and costs the Authority had incurred in June and July 2014 due to Woodham's contempt.

The day that the trial court issued the contempt order, Woodham applied for supersedeas, which the trial court granted. On September 10, 2014, Woodham filed a notice of appeal from the contempt order. Two days later, the Authority moved for the imposition of a supersedeas bond of $18,862.74 against Woodham (but not Citizens). On October 1, 2014, the trial court entered an order requiring "that Appellants ... immediately post a supersedeas bond or other security in the amount of $18,862.74 in order to satisfy this Court's order of August 11, 2014." (Emphasis supplied.)

Case No. A15A1034

In Case Number A15A1034, Woodham challenges the denial of his motion to recuse, the trial court's authority to order the post-judgment discovery, and the contempt order.

2. Recusal.

Woodham argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to recuse. Uniform Superior Court Rule 25.3 provides that,

[w]hen a judge is presented with a motion to recuse, or disqualify, accompanied by an affidavit, the judge shall temporarily cease to act upon the merits of the matter and shall immediately determine the timeliness of the motion and the legal sufficiency of the affidavit, and make a determination, assuming any of the facts alleged in the affidavit to be true, whether recusal would be warranted.

Examining de novo the application of this rule to Woodham's motion to recuse and supporting affidavit, see Mayor & Aldermen of Savannah v. Batson–Cook Co., 291 Ga. 114, 120(2), 728 S.E.2d 189 (2012), we find no error.

In his motion and affidavit, Woodham argued that the trial judge should recuse for three reasons: because the judge did not disclose that he had received a campaign contribution from the judge who entered the June 13 order (and who later had voluntarily recused from the case); because the judge disregarded Woodham's request to postpone complying with the July 24 and July 25 discovery orders due to a "legal emergency" in another case; and because members of the judge's staff engaged in ex parte communications with the Authority's attorney about scheduling a hearing on the contempt motion.

The trial court denied the motion as untimely. This was correct only as to one of the three grounds upon which Woodham sought recusal. A motion to recuse and supporting affidavit must be filed, among other things, "not later than five (5) days after the affiant first learned of the alleged grounds for disqualification[.]" Unif. Super. Ct. R. 25.1. Woodham filed his motion and affidavit on August 8, 2014. The affidavit shows that by July 25, more than five days earlier, Woodham knew that the trial court would not excuse him from his discovery obligations based on the "legal emergency." Accordingly, his motion to recuse based on this ground was untimely. As to the other grounds, however, Woodham averred that he learned of the prior judge's campaign donation on August 7, the day before he filed his motion. And he averred that he learned of the ex parte communications on August 1, which falls within five days of Woodham's motion because the weekend days are not counted in determining the motion's timeliness. See OCGA § 1–3–1(d)(3) (excluding Saturdays and Sundays in computation of time periods of less than seven days); see also Mayor & Aldermen of Savannah, 291 Ga. at 120(2)(a), 728 S.E.2d 189.

Nevertheless, we affirm the denial of the recusal motion, because the facts alleged in the motion regarding the campaign contribution and the ex parte communications, even if true, did not warrant recusal. See Gude v. State, 289 Ga. 46, 48(2), 709 S.E.2d 206 (2011). As to the campaign contribution, our Supreme Court has held that even where the contributor to the judge was a party, the mere fact of the contribution does not warrant recusal where the contribution was not exceptionally large. See id. at 50(2)(c), 709 S.E.2d 206. Here, of course, the campaign contributor was not a party...

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