Woodhouse v. Woodhouse

• Decision Date: 14 February 1955
• Docket Number: No. A--79,A--79
• Parties: Genevieve T. WOODHOUSE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Richard P. WOODHOUSE, Defendant-Respondent.
• Court: New Jersey Supreme Court

Page 409

17 N.J. 409

111 A.2d 631

Genevieve T. WOODHOUSE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Richard P. WOODHOUSE, Defendant-Respondent.

No. A--79.

Supreme Court of New Jersey.

Argued Jan. 10, 1955.

Decided Feb. 14, 1955.

Charles H. Roemer, Paterson, for appellant (Manuel Korn, Paterson, on the brief).

John J. Connell, Trenton, for respondent.

The opinion of the court was delivered by

OLIPHANT, J.

This is an appeal in a matrimonial action from a judgment of the Appellate Division which affirmed a judgment of the Superior Court, Chancery Division, which had dismissed the appellant's complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the subject matter. The appeal was certified by this court pursuant to R.R. 1:10--2(d)(e).

The complaint invoked the jurisdiction of the Superior Court, Chancery Division, in reliance on N.J.S. 2A:34--23, N.J.S.A., which provides as follows:

'Alimony; maintenance; custody and maintenance of children; security; failure to obey order; sequestration; receiver; modification of orders

'Pending any matrimonial action Brought in this state or elsewhere, or after judgment of divorce or maintenance, Whether obtained in this state or elsewhere, the court may make such order as to the alimony or maintenance of the wife, and also as to the care, custody, education and maintenance of the children, or any of them, As the circumstances of the parties and the nature of the case shall render fit, reasonable and just, and require reasonable security for the due observance of such orders. Upon neglect or refusal to give such reasonable security, as shall be required, or upon default in complying with any such order, the court may award and issue process for the immediate sequestration of the personal estate, and the rents and profits of the real estate of the party so charged, and appoint a receiver thereof, and cause such personal estate and the rents and profits of such real estate, or so much thereof as shall be necessary, to be applied toward such alimony and maintenance as to the said court shall from time to time seem reasonable and just; Or the performance of the said orders may be enforced by other ways according to the practice of the court. Orders so made may be revised and altered by the court from time to time as circumstances may require.' (Italics supplied.)

In so invoking the jurisdiction the plaintiff-appellant sought to enforce the provisions relating to alimony and support contained in a decree of divorce A vinculo obtained by her in the Second Judicial District Court of Washoe County, State of Nevada, on the ground of extreme cruelty, and entered on March 26, 1948. A separation agreement which had been voluntarily entered into between the parties prior thereto on February 4, 1948, in New York, New York, was, in the words of the decree, 'adopted, ratified and approved and made a part of this (the) decree by reference thereto.' The Nevada proceeding was a full adversary proceeding in which the defendant-respondent filed an answer, appeared through his own counsel and fully contested the action.

As is usual in this type of case the parties availed themselves of the Nevada jurisdiction by meeting the requirements of that state as to residence an submitted proofs to satisfactorily create a legal fiction of domicile. Then following the usual flight pattern of such migrants they almost immediately left the State of Nevada. The respondent returned East and on May 6, 1948 re-married in Yardley, Pa., and lived there until May 1951, when he took up residence in Stockton, N.J., where he now lives with his second wife.

The respondent complied with the terms of the decree relative to alimony until March 1950, when he reduced the payments without the consent of the appellant and later, on or about June 22, 1951, he entirely stopped the payments. Since 1950 he has resolutely and without scruple ignored these provisions of the Nevada judgment and with diligence and ingenuity has resisted the enforcement of his obligations under the decree in actions brought in this State.

In the first action the wife sued at law for the past due installments accrued under the Nevada decree. To this action the respondent set up six separate defenses: (1) the alimony agreement was void as against public policy; (2) that it acquired no validity from its inclusion in the Nevada decree; (3) that the divorce decree is void as having been made without jurisdiction of the subject matter; (4) or of the parties; (5) was a fraud upon the courts of Nevada and New Jersey; and (6) the decree being void it could not serve as a basis upon which an action could be based in this State.

In that action the Appellate Division affirmed a judgment in favor of the wife, 20 N.J.Super. 229, 89 A.2d 707 (App.Div.1952), which judgment was affirmed by this court in 11 N.J. 225, 94 A.2d 301 (1953), where we held that since the respondent had entered a general appearance and actually appeared through counsel in the Nevada proceeding, such decree was entitled under the Federal Constitution to full faith and credit in the courts of this State, citing the cases in 11 N.J. at page 228, 94 A.2d 301 of the opinion. And we stated it was offensive to common decency for one who voluntarily appeared as a party to an action for divorce and raised no objection to the disposition of the case and subsequently re-married in reliance upon the decree, to thereafter attempt to have it declared void for lack of jurisdiction.

On remand a final judgment was entered in the case establishing the arrears due and owing at $8,047.63. The respondent immediately attacked this judgment on the grounds that under the terms of the separation agreement he was entitled to credit for 'any income from any source whatsoever other than from the first party hereto.' The trial court construed the agreement that wages earned by the plaintiff and made necessary for her support by his deliquency, were not to be construed 'as income' within the import of the decree and the agreement, and on appeal the Appellate Division remanded the cause on the ground that such wages constituted income within the meaning of the decree and the agreement. 28 N.J.Super. 63, 100 A.2d 211 (App.Div. 1953).

The court granted certification from the Appellate Division, 14 N.J. 463, 102 A.2d 693 (1954), and we held since the agreement was incorporated in the decree, 'The dispute between the parties concerning the amounts of the installments past due, therefore, must be determined upon the contractual plant so solemnified.' 15 N.J. 550, at page 555, 105 A.2d 517, at page 520 (1954). We further held that the provisions of the contract were bilateral in nature and that the respondent's right to enforce the plaintiff's promise to submit to a reduction of the installments under the decree or agreement when she earned income, must give way before the principles of justice that inhibit the enforcement of a promise where the counter-promise has been broken; therefore by his delinquency he was deprived of his right to claim a reduction in past due payments.

The relief sought by the complaint in this case is: (1) that the Superior Court, Chancery Division, exercise its jurisdiction and order the defendant to pay such alimony as the court shall fix; (2) that the defendant be compelled to post security for the payment of such alimony; and (3) that he pay a proper amount of counsel fees and costs and that the plaintiff may have such other relief as the circumstances and her case require.

At the trial on a motion to dismiss the complaint the trial court dismissed it for lack of jurisdiction because, as it stated, there was no reservation in the decree permitting its modification, that it was a final judgment and was protected by the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the Constitution. It reached this conclusion despite the fact that the plaintiff contended she did not seek a modification of the Nevada decree.

On the appeal to the Appellate Division that court concurred in the result below and affirmed the judgment, holding that the courts of New Jersey are precluded from making an independent ascertainment of alimony in a new proceeding based upon its own findings of what is fit, reasonable and just in accordance with the present circumstances of the party and the nature of the case, and it further held that the statute, N.J.S. 2A:34--23, N.J.S.A., does not specifically give our courts the power to specifically perform the alimony provisions of the Nevada decree regardless of its own findings and therefore the court did not have jurisdiction.

With these conclusions we are not in agreement as they apply to the facts and circumstances in this case.

The appellant has done her utmost to compel the defendant to comply with the divorce decree of the State of...