Woodland v. Angus
| Decision Date | 15 March 1993 |
| Docket Number | No. 91-CV-1100W.,91-CV-1100W. |
| Citation | 820 F. Supp. 1497 |
| Parties | Eugene Nate WOODLAND, Plaintiff, v. Norman ANGUS, Executive Director, Utah State Department of Social Services, Paul Thorpe, Director, Division of Mental Health, Robert Verville, Superintendent, Utah State Hospital, Craig Hummel, M.D., Clinical Director, Utah State Hospital, Phil Washburn, M.D., Utah State Hospital, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Utah |
COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED
Mary A. Rudolph, Salt Lake City, UT, for plaintiff.
Linda Luinstra, Jody K. Burnett, Bruce H. Jensen, Reed M. Stringham, Salt Lake City, UT, for defendants.
This matter is before the court on plaintiff Eugene Nate Woodland's ("plaintiff") Motion for Summary Judgment and defendants Norman Angus, Paul Thorpe, Robert Verville, Craig Hummel and Phil Washburn's ("defendants") Cross Motion for Summary Judgment. Hearings on both motions were held on May 6, 1992 and January 6, 1993. Woodland was represented by Mary A. Rudolph. Defendants were represented by Jody K. Burnett, Bruce H. Jensen, and Linda Luinstra. Before the hearing, the court considered carefully the memoranda and other materials submitted by the parties. Since taking the matter under advisement, the court has further considered the law and facts relating to both motions. Now being fully advised, the court renders the following Memorandum Decision and Order.
Plaintiff is charged with second degree murder in the Third District Court in and for Salt Lake County, Utah. In these proceedings, on December 20, 1990, the Honorable Leonard H. Russon determined that plaintiff was incompetent to stand trial and ordered the plaintiff committed to the Utah State Hospital ("State Hospital"). Plaintiff has been a patient at the State Hospital since that time. Judge Russon also determined that plaintiff was incompetent to give an informed consent or refuse medical treatment and ordered the State Hospital to provide any treatment or medication it deemed necessary. Dr. Philip Washburn, plaintiff's attending physician and the Clinical Director of the State Hospital's Forensic Unit, diagnosed plaintiff as suffering from a bipolar disorder, hypomanic state, dementia, suspected to be secondary to alcoholism, and alcohol dependency. It is and was Dr. Washburn's opinion that plaintiff should be treated with medications for these behaviors. Plaintiff has consistently refused to take any such medications.
Beginning on March 13, 1991, a series of hearings on the issue of plaintiff's forced medication were held before the Honorable Anne M. Stirba in the Third District Court in and for Salt Lake County, Utah. Prior to these hearings, plaintiff had not been forcibly medicated. After considering the matter, Judge Stirba ordered the State Hospital to develop policies and procedures for the involuntary medication of patients consistent with the substantive and procedural due process requirements set forth in Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 110 S.Ct. 1028, 108 L.Ed.2d 178 (1990). In accordance with Judge Stirba's order, the State Hospital formulated a policy and set of procedures for forcibly medicating patients ("Original Section 11"). Under the Original Section 11, a patient could be medicated against his will if (1) the patient suffered from a mental illness; (2) the patient posed a threat of serious harm to himself, others, or their property; and (3) the treatment was in the patient's medical interest. Pursuant to this section, on September 5, 1991, the State Hospital held a hearing in an attempt to forcibly medicate plaintiff. The three-person administrative review committee that reviewed plaintiff's case refused to approve the forcible medication, however, because it found that plaintiff did not pose a threat of serious harm to himself, others, or their property.
A few months later, during September and October, the State Hospital revised and rewrote the policy and procedures for the involuntary medication of patients ("Revised Section 11"). The Revised Section 11 is substantially similar to the Original Section 11 with one exception: to forcibly medicate a patient under the Revised Section 11 the patient need not be dangerous to himself, others, or their property.2 Instead, the treatment need only be found in the plaintiff's medical best interest and in accordance with prevailing standards of medical practice.
On October 16, 1991, the State Hospital informed plaintiff of the new policy and that a new hearing to determine whether he should be forcibly medicated would be held the next day. Freed of the need to find plaintiff a danger to himself or others, the committee approved the involuntary medication of plaintiff under the Revised Section 11. Pursuant to the new policy, plaintiff appealed the committee's decision to the State Hospital's Medical Staff President. The President upheld the committee's decision, however, and on October 18, 1991, the State Hospital began to forcibly medicate plaintiff with serentil, an antipsychotic medication, and lithium carbonate, a mood stabilizer.
On October 22, 1991, plaintiff filed this civil rights action claiming that the Revised Section 11 violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. As defendants the plaintiff named Norman Angus, Executive Director of the Utah State Department of Social Services, Paul Thorpe, Director of the Division of Mental Health, Robert Verville, Superintendent of the State Hospital, Craig Hummel, M.D., Clinical Director of the State Hospital, and Phil Washburn, M.D., an employee of the State Hospital. On November 11, 1991, plaintiff sought this court's order for a preliminary injunction prohibiting the defendants from continuing to forcibly medicate plaintiff. After briefing and a hearing, the court granted the motion and ordered defendants to cease medicating plaintiff until the matter could be resolved at a hearing on the merits. Thereafter, on February 14, 1992, plaintiff filed a Motion for Summary Judgment, and defendants filed their Cross Motion for Summary Judgment on March 27, 1992. The parties briefed the issues and a hearing was held on May 6, 1992. At that hearing, the court determined that resolution of the motions for summary judgment required the court to decide whether plaintiff is competent to render an informed consent regarding the administration of the medication, and ordered the parties to submit supplemental evidence on this issue. Defendants filed the affidavit of Dr. Noel C. Gardner on June 5, 1992, and plaintiff filed the affidavit of Dr. Mark Rindflesh on December 3, 1992. A second hearing was held on January 6, 1993, at which the court heard testimony from Drs. Gardner and Rindflesh, and accepted the proffered testimony of Dr. Hummel. Having carefully reviewed and considered the entire file in this case, including the materials filed regarding the motion for a preliminary injunction, the court grants plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment and denies defendants Cross Motion for Summary Judgment.
Summary judgment is proper "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). In applying this standard, the court must construe all facts and reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 1356, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986); Wright v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 925 F.2d 1288, 1292 (10th Cir.1991).
Once the moving party has carried its burden, Rule 56(e) "requires the nonmoving party to go beyond the pleadings and by ... affidavits, or by the `depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,' designate `specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.'" Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2553, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); Gonzales v. Millers Casualty Ins. Co., 923 F.2d 1417, 1419 (10th Cir.1991).3 The non-moving party must "make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322, 106 S.Ct. at 2552.
In considering whether there exists a genuine issue of material fact, the court does not weigh the evidence but instead inquires whether a reasonable jury, faced with the evidence presented, could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); Clifton v. Craig, 924 F.2d 182, 183 (10th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 112 S.Ct. 97, 116 L.Ed.2d 68 (1991).4 Finally, all material facts asserted by the moving party shall be deemed admitted unless specifically controverted by the opposing party. D.Utah R. 202(b)(4).
The first issue before the court is plaintiff's competence to refuse to participate in the treatment approved by the State Hospital under Revised Section 11. In his Order Declaring Defendant Incompetent and Order of Commitment of December 20, 1990, Judge Russon committed the plaintiff to the State Hospital pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 77-15-6(1). See Order of December 20, 1990 by the Honorable Leonard H. Russon, Case No. XXXXXXXXXFS ("Judge Russon's Order"). Under section 77-15-6(1), "the court shall order a person found incompetent to proceed to trial committed to the Utah State Hospital." Utah Code Ann. § 77-15-6(1) (Supp.1992); see also Id. § 77-15-1 (1990) (). Judge Russon also found plaintiff "incompetent to give an informed consent to treatment and not competent to...
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