Woodrick v. Woodrick

• Citation: 36 N.E. 395,141 N.Y. 457
• Parties: WOODRICK v. WOODRICK.
• Decision Date: 27 February 1894
• Court: New York Court of Appeals

141 N.Y. 457

36 N.E. 395

WOODRICK

v.WOODRICK.

Court of Appeals of New York.

Feb. 27, 1894.

Appeal from supreme court, general term, second department.

Action by Belle I. Woodrick against William Woodrick, her husband, for separation. Defendant asked for divorce for adultery. From a judgment of the general term (20 N. Y. Supp. 468) affirming a judgment for defendant, plaintiff appeals. Affirmed.

Patrick Keady, for appellant.

Henry A. Monfort, for respondent.

BARTLETT, J.

This is an appeal from a judgment of the general term of the second department affirming a judgment in favor of defendant for an absolute divorce, and from an order denying motion for a new trial. The plaintiff sued for a limited divorce, alleging that defendant was guilty of cruel and inhuman treatment. The defendant denied the charges of the complaint, and set up by way of counterclaim the adultery of plaintiff, and prayed for a judgment of absolute divorce. The jury found against the plaintiff on her own cause of action, and also on the defendant's counterclaim. It is now insisted on behalf of plaintiff that she was entitled to judgment of separation on the evidence, that the finding of the jury that she committed adultery is unsupported by evidence, and that there were errors of law on the trial that must lead to a reversal of the judgment. In view of the very serious consequences to the plaintiff, following the affirmance of the judgment, and the insistence of her counsel that finding her guilty of adultery was legal error, we have looked into the facts of this case with great care, and are unable to say that either of the findings of the jury is unsupported by evidence. This case was properly submitted to the jury, and their verdict is conclusive on the questions of fact.

Passing to the alleged errors of law, we will consider those upon which the learned counsel for the appellant principally relies for the reversal of this judgment:

At the trial the plaintiff's counsel pursued the rather unusual course, before resting his case, of anticipating the proofs of defendant to support the cause of action set up in the counterclaim. The co-respondent was placed on the stand by plaintiff, and denied the acts of criminal conversation alleged in defendant's counterclaim. On cross-examination, he was asked if he did not, on a certain occasion, admit to Robert Phillips that his relations with the plaintiff were illicit. The witness was allowed to answer, against the objection of plaintiff. The question was competent as laying the foundation for the collateral impeachment of the witness. The defendant subsequently put Robert Phillips on the stand, to whom this admission was alleged to have been made, and he testified it was made.

The plaintiff set up in the complaint that defendant prohibited her from visiting her parents, and from going into society, even among her neighbors. The defendant alleged that the reason the plaintiff did not visit her mother was they had a falling out between themselves. The defendant was allowed to testify-the plaintiff objecting-to certain alleged communications of plaintiff's mother to him concerning the conduct of plaintiff with other men, which defendant communicated to plaintiff. This was competent evidence, as showing great provocation for the use of violent language by defendant, addressed to his wife. It also tended to disprove the charge that defendant had separated the mother from her daughter. It is true the mother denied on the stand the conversation...