Woodruff v. Bowers

Decision Date17 December 1927
Docket Number6147.
Citation140 S.E. 844,165 Ga. 408
PartiesWOODRUFF v. BOWERS.
CourtGeorgia Supreme Court

Syllabus by Editorial Staff.

Petition alleging that defendant consented to opening of public street through his property and opening of street by plaintiff in place designated by defendant at plaintiff's expense, and seeking to enjoin defendant from closing or obstructing street, held good on demurrer, since it showed parol agreement under which plaintiff obtained license to enter defendant's land and in execution of license incurred expense whereby license, under Civ. Code 1910, § 3645 ripened into easement running with land, and was irrevocable and plaintiff was not a trespasser.

If enjoyment of parol license must be preceded necessarily by expenditure of money, and grantee incurred expense in executing it, it becomes agreement for valuable consideration, and licensee a purchaser for value.

In suit to enjoin defendant from closing or obstructing street through his property built thereon by plaintiff under parol agreement with defendant, court did not err in giving defendant's requested charge that, before verbal contract was binding, jury must believe minds of parties met, by inserting therein that it was not insisted in this case that there was written contract.

Charge on measure of damages, erroneous for any reason, does not require grant of new trial, where jury does not award any damages.

Where, during argument of counsel as to admissibility of evidence objected to by plaintiff, remark of trial court that he did not see relevancy of evidence before he admitted it was not expression of opinion as to what had or had not been proved or weight of evidence after it was admitted, nor invasive of jury's province.

Error from Superior Court, Muscogee County; C. F. McLaughlin, Judge.

Suit by L. G. Bowers against J. W. Woodruff. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant brings error. Affirmed.

McCutchen, Bowden & Gaggstatter, of Columbus, for plaintiff in error.

Worsley & Flournoy, of Columbus, for defendant in error.

Syllabus OPINION.

HINES J.

1. The petition set forth a cause of action, and was not subject to general demurrer. It is to be treated as setting up a parol agreement by which the plaintiff obtained from the defendant a license to enter upon his land and lay out and open thereon a street for the use of the plaintiff and the public, and in the execution of this license incurred expense, whereby the license ripened into an easement running with the land, and irrevocable. In these circumstances the plaintiff was in no sense a trespasser. Sheffield v. Collier, 3 Ga. 82; Southwestern R. R. v. Mitchell, 69 Ga. 114 (2c); Brantley v. Perry, 120 Ga. 760, 48 S.E. 332; Cherokee Mills v. Standard Cotton Mills, 138 Ga. 856, 76 S.E. 373; Civil Code 1910, § 3645. If the enjoyment of the parol license must be preceded necessarily by the expenditure of money, and the grantee incurred expense in executing it, it becomes an agreement for a valuable consideration, and the licensee a purchaser for value. Mayor, etc., of City of Macon v. Franklin, 12 Ga. 239, 243.

2. The grounds of special demurrer are without merit, and the court did not err in overruling them.

3. In the first special ground of the defendant's motion for new trial it is alleged that ...

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