Woodruff v. Bradstreet Co.

• Decision Date: 08 October 1889
• Citation: 116 N.Y. 217,22 N.E. 354
• Parties: WOODRUFF v. BRADSTREET CO.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

116 N.Y. 217

22 N.E. 354

WOODRUFF

v.BRADSTREET CO.

Court of Appeals of New York, Second Division.

Oct. 8, 1889.

Appeal from supreme court, general term, fourth department.

Action by Charles T. Woodruff against the Bradstreet Company for alleged libel, founded upon the publication by the defendant of the following: ‘Watertown. Robinson, J. S., printer, binder, and mfr. woolens. Judgment vs. him and C. T. Woodruff $4M.’ Upon the complaint and opening the complaint was dismissed. Plaintiff appeals.

Hannibal Smith, for appellant.

John H. Bird, for respondent.

BRADLEY, J.

The question presented is whether, in any view which can be taken of the publication, the words there used were libelous per se. The plaintiff was engaged in the business of manufacturing and selling brick in the city of Watertown. It must be assumed that at the time of the publication he was in good financial and business standing, and that the publication as to him was false. His reputation in that respect was his property, and he had the right to its protection against defamation; and any published imputation against him in that relation, which could be so construed as to import insolvency, or a condition of financial embarrassment, would be ground for an action, because it is the policy of the law to afford protection to the credit of merchants and traders, for reasons which it is now unnecessary to repeat. The plaintiff came within that class, and his reputation in relation to his business as such was entitled to such protection. Mott v. Comstock, 7 Cow. 654;Sewall v. Catlin, 3 Wend. 291;Ostrom v. Calkins, 5 Wend. 263; Carpenter v. Dennis, 3 Sandf. 305. The plaintiff has not sought to support this action by any charge of special damage, but rests it solely upon the ground that the law will imply that damages have been the consequence of the publication. The inquiry, therefore, is whether the statement that a judgment for $4,000 had been recovered against the plaintiff was an imputation against his financial credit or pecuniary responsibility. This must depend solely upon the import which may be given to the words in their relation to him in that respect, without the aid of any extrinsic circumstances to give them any other or different construction or import than the same words would have if published of and concerning any person within the class before mentioned. The proposition, therefore, is whether to publish of a merchant or trader that a judgment has been recovered against him is the employment of words, in themselves libelous or slanderous, as an imputation against the soundness of his financial condition. There is no ambiguity or uncertainty about the import of the words in question. It is when words spoken or published are ambiguous in their import, or may permit in their construction, connection, or application a doubtful, or more than one, interpretation, and in some sense may be defamatory, that the question whether they are such is for the jury. Lewis v. Chapman, 16 N. Y. 369;Sanderson v. Caldwell, 45 N. Y. 398. In the present case there was no occasion for such inquiry. The question in that respect was one of law for the court. Matthews v. Beach, 5 Sandf. 256; Green v. Telfair, 20 Barb. 11;Hunt v. Bennett, 19 N. Y. 173, 177; Pittock v. O'Neill, 16 Pa. St. 253.

It must be taken as true, as alleged in the complaint and stated in the opening, that the organization of the defendant was for the purpose of ascertaining and reporting the financial standing and ability of merchants, traders, and other business men throughout the country, and that such reports were from time to time issued and sent to its subscribers. It is therefore argued that the purpose of this report was to affect or impair the credit of the plaintiff, and that such must be presumed to have been its effect. The circumstances under which a publication is made concerning a party, and the connection or association given to it by other matter published with it, may tend to characterize the words used so as to give to them an import productive of an imputation which otherwise they could not have. This was illustrated in the cases of Zier v. Hofflin, 33 Minn. 66, 21 N. W. Rep. 862; Shepheard v. Whitaker, L. R. 10 C. P. 502, 14 Moak, Eng. R. 395; Erber v. Dun, 12 Fed. Rep. 526. In cases of that character there may be a question for the jury to determine in view of the situation and relation so represented, and upon their finding may be dependent the question whether the words used are libelous. In the case at bar there is nothing except the import of the words themselves to characterize their purpose or effect, other than the fact that the business of the defendant was to furnish information of the pecuniary condition of persons whose vocations were such as to be likely to render business credit desirable. It is not seen that the character of the enterprise in which the defendant was engaged gave to the mere statement of what purported to be a fact anything more than it expressed or fairly implied. The meaning of words in an action of slander or libel cannot be extended by innuendo beyond their import, aided, as they may be, by extrinsic facts with which they are connected. Its use...