Woodruff v. State

• Decision Date: 16 December 2020
• Docket Number: CR-19-0113
• Citation: 347 So.3d 281
• Parties: John Michael WOODRUFF v. STATE of Alabama
• Court: Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals

347 So.3d 281

John Michael WOODRUFF

v.STATE of Alabama

CR-19-0113

Court of Criminal Appeals of Alabama.

December 16, 2020

Rehearing Denied March 5, 2021

Certiorari Denied August 13, 2021

Alabama Supreme Court 1200415

S. Randall Horton, Birmingham, for appellant.

Steve Marshall, att'y gen., and Laura I. Cuthbert, asst. att'y gen., for appellee.

MINOR, Judge.

In this appeal, we address whether the definition of "conviction" in § 15-20A-4(4), Ala. Code 1975, part of the Alabama Sex Offender Registration and Community Notification Act ("the ASORCNA"), includes a municipal-court conviction appealed to a circuit court for a trial de novo. For the reasons below, we hold that it does.

Facts and Procedural History

The Alabaster Municipal Court convicted John Michael Woodruff on April 4, 2018, of indecent exposure. Woodruff appealed for a trial de novo in the Shelby Circuit Court. See Rule 30.1(a), Ala. R. Crim. P. In May 2018, while Woodruff's appeal was pending, a Shelby County grand jury indicted Woodruff for failing to register under § 15-20A-10(a)(1), Ala. Code 1975, part of the ASORCNA.

Two months later, Woodruff moved to dismiss the indictment. Citing Rule 30.1(a), Ala. R. Crim. P., Woodruff argued that, because he had perfected his request for a trial de novo, he did not have a "conviction" as that term is defined in § 15-20A-4(4).¹ The State responded, arguing that Woodruff's interpretation of Rule 30.1 and § 15-20A-4(4) was wrong. Several months later, the circuit court denied Woodruff's motion to dismiss.

In November 2019, Woodruff, under a negotiated agreement, pleaded guilty to failing to register as a sex offender, see § 15-20A-10, Ala. Code 1975. Woodruff reserved for appeal the issues raised in his motion to dismiss the indictment.² The circuit court sentenced Woodruff to 10 years’ imprisonment, but the court suspended that sentence and placed Woodruff on 2 years’ probation.

Discussion

On appeal, Woodruff argues: (1) the definition of "conviction" in § 15-20A-4(4) does not include his municipal-court conviction because he had appealed that conviction to the circuit court for a trial de novo, and (2) the indictment was defective because it did not allege facts showing that Woodruff knowingly violated the ASORCNA.

I.

Woodruff pleaded guilty to failing to register as a sex offender under § 15-20A-10(a)(1), Ala. Code 1975. That subsection provides:

"Immediately upon release from incarceration, or immediately upon conviction if the adult sex offender is not incarcerated, the adult sex offender shall appear in person and register all required registration information with local law enforcement in each county in which the adult sex offender resides or intends to reside, accepts or intends to accept employment, accepts or intends to accept a volunteer position, and begins or intends to begin school attendance."

(Emphasis added.) Section 15-20A-4(4) defines a "conviction" for purposes of the ASORCNA as

"[a] verdict or finding of guilt as the result of a trial, a plea of guilty, a plea of nolo contendere, or an Alford plea regardless of whether adjudication was withheld. Conviction includes, but is not limited to, a conviction in a United States territory, a conviction in a federal or military tribunal, including a court martial conducted by the Armed Forces of the United States, a conviction for an offense committed on an Indian reservation or other federal property, a conviction in any state of the United States or a conviction in a foreign country if the foreign country's judicial system is such that it satisfies minimum due process set forth in the guidelines under Section 111(5)(B) of Public Law 109-248. Cases on appeal are deemed convictions until reversed or overturned."

The following principles guide our interpretation of a statute:

"In determining the meaning of a statute, this Court looks to the plain meaning of the words as written by the legislature. As we have said:

" ‘ "Words used in a statute must be given their natural, plain, ordinary, and commonly understood meaning, and where plain language is used a court is bound to interpret that language to mean exactly what it says. If the language of the statute is unambiguous, then there is no room for judicial construction and the clearly expressed intent of the legislature must be given effect." ’

" Blue Cross & Blue Shield v. Nielsen, 714 So. 2d 293, 296 (Ala. 1998) (quoting IMED Corp. v. Systems Eng'g Assocs. Corp., 602 So. 2d 344, 346 (Ala. 1992) ); see also Tuscaloosa County Comm'n v. Deputy Sheriffs’ Ass'n, 589 So. 2d 687, 689 (Ala. 1991) ; Coastal States Gas Transmission Co. v. Alabama Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 524 So. 2d 357, 360 (Ala. 1988) ; Alabama Farm Bureau Mut. Cas. Ins. Co. v. City of Hartselle, 460 So. 2d 1219, 1223 (Ala. 1984) ; Dumas Bros. Mfg. Co. v. Southern Guar. Ins. Co., 431 So. 2d 534, 536 (Ala. 1983) ; Town of Loxley v. Rosinton Water, Sewer, & Fire Protection Auth., Inc., 376 So. 2d 705, 708 (Ala. 1979). It is true that when looking at a statute we might sometimes think that the ramifications of the words are inefficient or unusual. However, it is our job to say what the law is, not to say what it should be. Therefore, only if there is no rational way to interpret the words as stated will we look beyond those words to determine legislative intent. To apply a different policy would turn this Court into a legislative body, and doing that, of course, would be utterly inconsistent with the doctrine of separation of powers. See Ex parte T.B., 698 So. 2d 127, 130 (Ala. 1997)."

DeKalb Cnty. LP Gas Co. v. Suburban Gas, Inc., 729 So. 2d 270, 275–76 (Ala. 1998). A straightforward reading of § 15-20A-4(4) includes Woodruff's municipal-court conviction for indecent exposure.³ A conviction in a municipal court is "[a] verdict or finding of guilt" in a "state of the United States"⁴ § 15-20A-4(4). And that unambiguously includes a case on appeal: "Cases on appeal are deemed convictions until reversed or overturned." (Emphasis added.)

Woodruff argues, however, that an appeal of a municipal-court conviction "is not an appeal in the common-sense meaning, but merely a defendant's request for his constitutional right to a jury trial." Based on that, he argues "that the last sentence of § 15-20A-4(4), ‘cases on appeal are deemed convictions until reversed or overturned,’ does not apply to a perfected request for a trial de novo." (Woodruff's brief, pp. 8-9.)

In support of his position, Woodruff cites Rule 30.1, Ala. R. Crim. P., Ex parte Sorsby, 12 So. 3d 139 (Ala. 2007), § 15-20A-40(g), Ala. Code 1975, and certain dictionary definitions of "appeal" and "trial de novo." Those authorities, however, do not give Woodruff a right to relief.

Rule 30.1(a) provides:

"A defendant convicted of an offense in a municipal court or a district court shall have the right to appeal the judgment, within fourteen (14) days of the date of the judgment or the denial of a timely filed post-judgment motion, to the circuit court for a trial de novo."

(Emphasis added.) In Ex parte Sorsby, the Alabama Supreme Court held that a defendant who appeals from a guilty-plea conviction in a municipal or district court for a trial de novo in the circuit court does not have to reserve any issues for appeal or move to withdraw his guilty plea. The Court stated: "The appellate authority of the circuit court provided by statute [see, e.g., §§ 12-12-70(b) and (d), 12-12-71, and 12-11-30, Ala. Code 1975,] allows for an appeal from the district or the municipal court to the circuit court for a trial de novo." 12 So. 3d at 148. The Court reasoned that applying rules such as the requirement in Rule 14.4(a), Ala. R. Crim. P., that a defendant reserve an issue for appeal or the requirement in Rule 26.9(b)(4), Ala. R. Crim. P., that a defendant move to withdraw his guilty plea before proceeding with a trial de novo in the circuit court would limit the statutory jurisdiction of the circuit court—something the Supreme Court lacks the authority to do through its rulemaking power. Id.

In discussing a trial de novo, the Supreme Court stated:

"A trial de novo is ‘[a] new trial on the entire case—that is, on both questions of fact and issues of law—conducted as if there had been no trial in the first instance.’ Black's Law Dictionary 1544 (8th ed. 1990). In Louisville & Nashville R.R. v. Lancaster, 121 Ala. 471, 473–74, 25 So. 733, 735 (1899), this Court stated:

" ‘[After appeal from a judgment of a justice of the peace] the case is to be tried in the circuit court de novo; or, in other words, as if no trial had ever been had, and just as if it had originated in the circuit court. The appeal when taken operates to annul and vacate the entire judgment of the justice of the peace, and not a part only of the judgment. The judgment of the justice cannot upon the trial in the circuit court be looked to as a matter of evidence or of estoppel. "The judgment of the justice is not reversed or affirmed; but a new, distinct, and independent judgment, as may be required by the merits shown on the trial, is rendered by the city or circuit court." Abraham v. Alford, 64 Ala. 281 [(1879)] ; Harsh et al. v. Heflin, 76 Ala. 499 [(1884)].’

"(Final emphasis added.) At the district court level, whether Sorsby is found guilty following a bench trial, stipulates to the facts as alleged by the State in order to be found guilty, or pleads guilty, review in the circuit court is by trial de novo without any consideration being given to the prior proceedings in the district court."

12 So. 3d at 146. Relying on this language from Ex parte Sorsby, Woodruff argues that the appeal of his municipal-court conviction did away with that conviction and that he thus had no duty to register under the ASORCNA. Woodruff's reliance on Ex parte Sorsby, however, is misplaced.

As stated above, Ex parte Sorsby turned on the Alabama Supreme Court's understanding that it could not use its rulemaking power to limit the statutory jurisdiction of the circuit court to...