Woodruff v. State

• Decision Date: 13 January 1993
• Docket Number: No. F-87-442,F-87-442
• Parties: David Wayne WOODRUFF, Appellant, v. STATE of Oklahoma, Appellee.
• Court: United States State Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma. Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma

Page 1124

846 P.2d 1124

David Wayne WOODRUFF, Appellant, v. STATE of Oklahoma, Appellee.

No. F-87-442.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma.

Jan. 13, 1993.

Rehearing Denied March 17, 1993.

An appeal from the District Court of Oklahoma County; William Saied, District Judge.

DAVID WAYNE WOODRUFF, Appellant, was tried by jury and convicted of Murder in the First Degree (21 O.S.1981, § 701.7) in Case No. CRF-87-397, in the District Court of Oklahoma County. The jury found the existence of three aggravating circumstances and recommended punishment of death. The trial court sentenced accordingly. From this judgment and sentence Appellant has perfected this appeal. AFFIRMED.

Chris Box, Oklahoma City, Trial Counsel and David Autry, Asst. Appellate Public Defender, Norman, for appellant.

Robert Macy, Dist. Atty., Lou Keel, Greg Ryan, Asst. Dist. Attys., Trial Counsel, and Robert H. Henry, Atty. Gen. of Oklahoma and Beverley Quarles Watts, Asst. Atty. Gen., Oklahoma City, Appellate Counsel for appellee.

OPINION

LUMPKIN, Vice Presiding Judge:

Appellant David Wayne Woodruff was tried by jury and convicted of Murder in the First Degree (21 O.S.1981, § 701.7) and Robbery with a Dangerous Weapon, After Former Conviction of A Felony (21 O.S.1981, § 801), Case No. CRF-87-397, in the District Court of Oklahoma County. The jury found the existence of three aggravating circumstances and recommended punishment of death for the murder conviction and one thousand (1000) years imprisonment for the robbery conviction. The trial court sentenced accordingly. From this judgment and sentence Appellant has perfected this appeal.

Appellant and co-defendant John Romano were found guilty of the first degree murder of Roger Sarfaty. The decedent's body was discovered on October 16, 1985, in his apartment in Oklahoma City. The decedent had been beaten, strangled and stabbed. Further facts will be presented as necessary.

I. JURY SELECTION ISSUES

Appellant contends that it was reversible error for the trial court to refuse to conduct a hearing as to whether jury foreman McDonald had knowledge of Appellant's involvement in the Lloyd Thompson murder ¹ and whether this knowledge had been communicated to the jury. The record reveals that Mr. Eugene McDonald was one of the original twelve venirepersons called to service. The State's list of witnesses was belatedly read to the jury, preceding the eighth peremptory challenge to the panel. One of the venire stated that he recognized the name "Cheryl Moody" as that of a secretary at his place of employment. Although the prospective juror is not identified by name in the transcript, the Appellant states that it was Mr. McDonald. This is not disputed by the State. The following exchange then took place:

MR. KEEL: (Prosecutor) In the event she is called to testify in this case, is there anything about the relationship you have had from what you have known of Cheryl Moody, to this point, that you think would make it hard for you to be fair and listen to the testimony. In other words, because of you having known her, would you give her more or less weight her testimony than you would anybody else?

PROSPECTIVE JUROR: No, sir.

MR. KEEL: So you can be fair to both sides in this case in spite of that?

PROSPECTIVE JUROR: I believe so.

(Vol. II, Tr. 193-194)

The defense did not question him further, did not challenge him for cause nor remove him with a peremptory challenge. At that time, Appellant and co-defendant Romano each had one (1) peremptory challenge remaining. Both challenges were waived. Mr. McDonald remained on the jury and was ultimately selected as foreman.

On the seventh day of trial, before closing arguments were to be given in the second stage, counsel for co-defendant Romano, joined by Appellant's counsel, asked that the jurors be individually questioned to determine whether during first stage deliberations they had learned of the defendants' connection with the Thompson murder. It was revealed that Cheryl Moody was the daughter of Lloyd Thompson.

The reason given by defense counsel for the motion was their opinion that the jury did not react appropriately to the State's reading of the bill of particulars and the mention of the convictions for the Thompson murder and the length of time during first stage deliberations. ² The trial court denied the motion, stating that to grant it would violate the sanctity of the jury.

Appellant now argues in the alternative that failure to hold a hearing to determine whether Mr. McDonald communicated his knowledge to the other jurors was error, the failure to excuse McDonald from the jury was error, and that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to remove him from the jury. We disagree with Appellant's arguments and find no reason for reversal or modification. The record reflects that Mr. McDonald was competent to serve as a juror and that Appellant has failed to show that he was denied a fair trial by Mr. McDonald's service on the jury. The question of the competency of jurors is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court, and absent an abuse thereof, the finding of the trial court will not be upset on review. Greathouse v. State, 503 P.2d 239, 240 (Okl.Cr.1972).

During voir dire, Mr. McDonald clearly indicated that he understood that the defendants were presumed to be innocent of the charges against them; that the State has the burden of proof and if the State does not meet that burden of proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendants' must be found not guilty. He further indicated that he could keep an open mind and listen to all the evidence presented by both the State and the defense and that he knew of no reason why he could not be a fair juror. He assured defense counsel that he would hold the State to its burden of proof and make them prove each and every element, beyond a reasonable doubt, of the crimes charged against the defendants. Mr. McDonald indicated that he could follow the court's instructions as to the law, and that he was not prejudiced against the defendants. (Vol. I, Tr. 83, 154-155, 174)

By failing to exercise his last peremptory challenge, Appellant has waived whatever claim he may have had concerning the partiality or improper makeup of the jury. See Greathouse, 503 P.2d at 241. (wherein the trial judge refused to grant a mistrial after a juror indicated that he knew one of the State's witnesses. The conviction was affirmed based on the juror's indication that knowledge of the witness would not affect his partiality. We held that when defense counsel failed to inquire as to the knowledge of the witness by the juror, any error was waived.) See also Hamilton v. State, 79 Okl.Cr. 124, 152 P.2d 291, 295 (Okl.1944).

However, due to the nature of Appellant's allegations, we will address the issue further. The jury trial system is founded on the impartiality of a body of peers selected by counsel. Voir dire is the procedure designed to give a criminal defendant the opportunity to explore the opinions and personal knowledge of potential jurors who may ultimately decide his fate. One of the purposes of voir dire is to ensure a criminal defendant's right to a fair and impartial jury. The critical fact to be determined is whether the defendant received a fair trial from jurors who could lay aside any personal opinions and base a verdict on the evidence.

In the present case, the trial court conducted an exhaustive voir dire. Those prospective jurors with preconceived opinions for or against Appellant, who could not set aside those opinions or who had doubts about their ability to be impartial, were excused. The remaining prospective jurors were questioned further as to their knowledge of persons involved in the case. Counsel for the State and for both defendants carefully questioned each prospective juror to make certain that each could and would set aside any emotion he or she might have concerning this case and depend solely on the evidence presented during trial to decide the outcome. As a result, we find that the defendants were left with twelve impartial jurors.

The mere fact that Mr. McDonald knew Lloyd Thompson's daughter does not render him incapable of serving on the jury. A criminal defendant is not entitled to jurors who know nothing about his case. Hale v. State, 750 P.2d 130, 134 (Okl.Cr.1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 878, 109 S.Ct. 195, 102 L.Ed.2d 164 (1988); Brecheen v. State, 732 P.2d 889, 892 (Okl.Cr.1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 909, 108 S.Ct. 1085, 99 L.Ed.2d 244 (1988); Wooldridge v. State, 659 P.2d 943, 946 (Okl.Cr.1983). The constitutional guarantee of a fair and impartial trial does not exclude service by a juror with knowledge of facts and circumstances involving the case, but only those persons who use that knowledge to form opinions concerning the merits of the case, or who form a negative opinion of the defendant based on that knowledge. Smithey v. State, 385 P.2d 920, 924 (Okl.Cr.1963).

Judge Saied's refusal to hold an evidentiary hearing to determine whether or not any improper information had been imparted to the other jurors was a proper determination. In order to establish juror misconduct, "a defendant must show actual prejudice from any alleged jury misconduct and defense counsel's mere speculation and surmise is insufficient upon which to cause reversal". Chatham v. State, 712 P.2d 69, 71 (Okl.Cr.1986). See also Parsons v. State, 603 P.2d 1144, 1146 (Okl.Cr.1979).

The record in the present case is absolutely barren of anything other than speculation or surmise by defense counsel. Judge Saied, an experienced trial judge, disputed defense counsel's observations on the record. He stated that he observed the jury during the reading of the bill of particulars. At the mention of the prior murder conviction, he noticed two jurors in particular who showed some surprise. He added that he did not think that Mr. McDonald knew of the murder conviction, but if he did, there...