Woodruff v. United States
| Decision Date | 18 June 2020 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 16-1884 (RDM) |
| Parties | TYRELL WOODRUFF, Plaintiff, v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Columbia |
Plaintiff Tyrell Woodruff, a former federal inmate, brings this Federal Tort Claims Act ("FTCA"), 28 U.S.C. § 2671 et seq., action against the United States. Dkt. 52. He alleges that, while he was incarcerated at the Gilmer Federal Correctional Institution ("FCI Gilmer"), another inmate assaulted him with a knife in the recreation yard. Id. at 3 . Seeking to recover damages for his injuries, Woodruff alleges that the officials at FCI Gilmer negligently operated the recreation yard's turnstile, thus permitting the assailant to enter with a knife; failed to supervise the recreation yard; failed to intervene and to stop the attack; and, despite having been close enough to see and to hear the assault, delayed responding to the attack by 20 to 25 minutes, during which time Woodruff bled profusely. Id. at 3-4 . The United States moves to dismiss the second amended complaint, arguing that the Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction because the challenged conduct falls within the discretionary function exception to the FTCA. Dkt. 53.
For the reasons explained below, the Court will GRANT in part and DENY in part the government's motion to dismiss.
Unless otherwise indicated, the following facts are derived from Woodruff's second amended complaint and, for the purposes of the pending motion to dismiss, are taken as true. See, e.g., Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984).
Woodruff is a former prisoner who was incarcerated at FCI Gilmer. Dkt. 52 at 2 (2d Am. Comp. ¶¶ 3, 5). On January 13, 2015, while Woodruff was incarcerated at FCI Gilmer, he entered the recreation yard and "noticed that there were no correctional officers at the turnstile entrance to the yard." Id. (2d Am. Compl. ¶ 8). After entering the recreation yard, another inmate attacked Woodruff using a "a home-made knife." Id. at 3 (2d Am. Comp. ¶ 9). "After a struggle, [he] was able to wrest the knife from his unknown assailant, who then fled." Id. at 3 . As a result of the attack, Woodruff sustained a "wound on [his] scalp that required twelve sutures to close," id. at 3 , "four or five additional puncture wounds, as well as abrasions on his head," id. at 3 , and "lost a substantial amount of blood," id.
Woodruff brings a claim for negligence against the United States, id. at 6 , and identifies three separate acts or omissions by FCI Gilmer staff that form the basis of that claim. He alleges, first, that correctional officers at FCI Gilmer failed "to operate the turnstile at the entrance of the recreation yard" and thus "allowed prisoners, including [his] assailant, to freely bring weapons [into] the yard." Id. at 4 . Second, he alleges that, "despite being in a position to see and hear [the] attack," the correctional officers "paid no apparent attention to the long-lasting and potentially deadly attack on [him]." Id. (2d Am. Compl. ¶ 15). Third, he alleges that "[i]t took about 20-25 minutes for correctional officers to respond to [him] following the attack," during which time he bled "profusely from his scalpwound," and that the officers only came to his assistance during a "routine yard closing prior to the 4:00 [p.m.] prisoner count." Id. (2d Am. Compl ¶ 14). These failures, Woodruff alleges, proximately caused his injuries, and he seeks to recover $500,000 in damages for pain and suffering. Id. at 6 (Prayer for Relief).
After Woodruff filed suit, the United States moved to dismiss his original complaint, arguing that the Court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction because the challenged conduct falls within the discretionary function exception to the FTCA's waiver of sovereign immunity. Dkt. 13. The Court denied that motion as premature, afforded Woodruff an opportunity to conduct limited jurisdictional discovery, Dkt. 19 at 6, and later granted him leave to file an amended complaint, Minute Entry (Feb. 28, 2019). The United States now moves to dismiss the second amended complaint, again pressing the argument that the discretionary function exception bars this suit. Dkt. 53.
A court must dismiss a case pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) if it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction. In determining whether it has jurisdiction, a court may "consider the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts evidenced in the record, or the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts plus the court's resolution of disputed facts." Coalition for Underground Expansion v. Mineta, 333 F.3d 193, 198 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (quoting Herbert v. Nat'l Acad. of Scis., 974 F.2d 192, 197 (D.C. Cir. 1992)). Courts must construe the complaint "with sufficient liberality to afford all possible inferences favorable to the pleader on allegations of fact." Settles v. U.S. Parole Comm'n, 429 F.3d 1098, 1106 (D.C. Cir. 2005). But, when the defendant raises a factual challenge to the jurisdictional allegations contained in the complaint, the Court may go beyond the four corners of the complaint and weigh conflicting evidence to determine if it hasjurisdiction. See Phoenix Consulting Inc., v. Republic of Angola, 216 F.3d 36, 40 (D.C. Cir. 2000); Herbert, 974 F.2d at 197. If the Court "determines that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction, it can proceed no further." Simpkins v. District of Columbia Gov't, 108 F.3d 366, 371 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (citations omitted).
The United States argues that each of the alleged omissions that Woodruff challenges falls within the FTCA's discretionary function exception. See Dkt. 53 at 12-21. Woodruff, in turn, disputes that the discretionary function exception applies. Dkt. 55. As explained below, the Court concludes that (1) there is evidence that the discretionary function exception does not apply to Woodruff's claim that the officers failed to operate the turnstile at the entrance of the recreation yard, (2) Woodruff has plausibly alleged that the failure to intervene constituted an Eighth Amendment violation, and, as a result, that conduct is not shielded by the discretionary function exception, and (3) Woodruff's remaining claims are subject to the discretionary function exception and thus lie beyond this Court's jurisdiction. As a result, the Court will GRANT in part and DENY in part the government's motion to dismiss.
Sovereign immunity is "jurisdictional in nature" and, "[a]bsent a waiver, . . . shields the Federal Government and its agencies from suit." FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 475 (1994); see also United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 212 (1983) (). The FTCA waives the sovereign immunity of the United States for damages claims "arising from certain torts committed by federal employees in the scope of their employment." Sloan v. U.S. Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev., 236 F.3d 756, 759 (D.C. Cir. 2001);see 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1). This waiver, however, is subject to several exceptions. See 28 U.S.C. § 2680. The exception at issue here—the discretionary function exception—applies to "[a]ny claim based upon an act or omission of an employee of the Government . . . based upon the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty on the part of a federal agency or an employee of the Government, whether or not the discretion involved be abused." 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a). If conduct falls within this exception, the United States remains immune from suit, and the Court lacks jurisdiction over the claim. See Cope v. Scott, 45 F.3d 445, 448 (D.C. Cir. 1995) ().
A two-part test guides the Court's assessment of whether the discretionary function exception applies. See United States v. Gaubert, 499 U.S. 315, 322-23 (1991). The Court must first decide whether a "federal statute, regulation, or policy specifically prescribes a course of action for the employee to follow." Berkovitz by Berkovitz v. United States, 486 U.S. 531, 536 (1988)). If so, the discretionary function exception will not shield the United States from suit because "the employee has no rightful option but to adhere to the directive." Id. (quoting same). If, however, "the challenged conduct involves an element of judgment," the Court must then determine "whether that judgment is of the kind that the discretionary function exception was designed to shield." Id. at 322-23 (quoting same). The purpose of the exception is "to prevent judicial 'second-guessing' of legislative and administrative decisions grounded in social, economic, and political policy through the medium of an action in tort." United States v. S.A. Empresa de Viacao Aerea Rio Grandense, 467 U.S. 797, 814 (1984). The exception, accordingly, "protects only governmental actions and decisions based on considerations of public policy." Berkovitz, 486 U.S. at 537.
At step one of the discretionary-function test, the Court must ask whether a "statute, regulation, or policy" directs a government employee to conduct himself in a particular way. Id. at 536. The government argues that "no specific statutes, regulations, or procedures" specified a prescribed course of action relevant to Woodruff's claims. Dkt. 53 at 15-16. Woodruff disagrees and argues that step one is satisfied because the post orders at FCI Gilmer left the correctional officers with no discretion regarding how to respond to the attack. See Dkt. 55 at 14-19. Having reviewed the post orders and other evidence in the record, the Court concludes that, although Woodruff has not alleged any claims...
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