Woods v. Alto Asset Co. 3
| Decision Date | 24 August 2022 |
| Docket Number | 08-21-00083-CV |
| Parties | SAMMY LEE WOODS, JR., Appellant, v. ALTO ASSET COMPANY 3, LLC f/k/a FIREBIRD SFE I, LLC, Appellee. |
| Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
Appeal from the 131st Judicial District Court of Bexar County, Texas (TC# 2020CI00620)
Before Rodriguez, C.J., Palafox, and Alley, JJ.
This appeal arises out of the foreclosure of a residential home formerly owned by Appellant Sammy Woods, Jr. Our Court is not the first to hear the dispute-Woods filed two prior federal lawsuits against several parties involved in the foreclosure proceedings. After his federal lawsuits were dismissed Appellee ALTO Asset Company 3, LLC (ALTO) filed this state court lawsuit against Woods asserting claims for trespass to try title, trespass to realty, and an action to quiet title to the home. In the state court proceedings, ALTO prevailed on a motion for partial summary judgment on its trespass to try title claim. Through a severance, that partial summary judgment was converted to a final judgment. Woods, appearing pro se now appeals the trial court's grant of summary judgment and severance order. For the following reasons, we affirm.[1]
In 2008, Woods and his first ex-wife, Sofia Huynh, bought a house in San Antonio, Texas (the Property). Woods and Huynh first mortgaged the house through lender W.R. Starkey Mortgage, L.L.P. (Starkey). One year later, the couple refinanced their mortgage loan through High Point Mortgage Corp. (High Point). Woods executed a deed of trust to High Point, and Starkey executed a deed releasing its rights, title, and interest in the Property (the first deed of release). Woods and Huynh divorced in 2011, and Woods was awarded the Property in the divorce decree. After Woods remarried to Darlene J. Aden-Woods, the couple again refinanced the mortgage loan on the Property, this time with Flagstar Bank, FSB (Flagstar). Woods executed a Deed of Trust to Flagstar, and in return, High Point released its rights, title, and interest in the Property (the second deed of release). Woods and Aden divorced in 2013, and Woods again received the Property in the divorce proceedings. In 2017, Flagstar transferred the mortgage loan to Lakeview Loan Servicing, LLC (Lakeview).
In 2016 or 2017, Woods defaulted on the payment of his mortgage loan with Lakeview. Supported by a "Substitute Trustee's Deed," Lakeview began foreclosure proceedings and notified Woods that a foreclosure sale was scheduled for December 5, 2017. Firebird SFE I, LLC (Firebird) purchased the Property at the foreclosure sale.
Despite the foreclosure sale, Woods refused to vacate the Property and he filed two lawsuits in federal district court relevant here. In the first lawsuit, Woods sued Flagstar, Lakeview, Loancare (the loan servicer for Lakeview), and Lakeview's attorneys. The crux of Woods's lawsuit was that the sale of the Property through foreclosure was ineffective because he had superior title to the Property through the first and second releases of deed. The federal magistrate judge, however, recommended that Woods's lawsuit be dismissed with prejudice. In so doing, the magistrate found that there was no basis to support Woods's claim that Flagstar lacked authority to foreclose on the Property. In particular, the magistrate found that Woods failed to allege any facts that would support his causes of action, and that Woods's allegations did not give rise to a factually plausible claim against any defendant. See Woods v. Flagstar Bank, No. SA-17-CV-01209-FB, 2018 WL 7288031, at *2-4 (W.D. Tex. Apr. 12, 2018). The district court judge accepted the magistrate's recommendation and dismissed Woods's claims with prejudice. See Woods v. Flagstar Bank, No. SA-17-CA-01209-FB, 2018 WL 6795986, at *2 (W.D. Tex. Oct. 31, 2018). The appellate court dismissed Woods appeal for want of prosecution. Woods v. Flagstar Bank, No. 18-50999, 2019 WL 2314539, at *1 (5th Cir. Mar. 6, 2019).
While the first lawsuit was still pending, Woods filed a second lawsuit in federal district court, alleging that Flagstar's property manager lacked standing to foreclose on the Property because of the first and second releases of deed. In its report and recommendation, a second federal magistrate judge found that Woods's claims in this lawsuit were duplicative of those in the first case and had been decided on the merits. The magistrate judge recommended dismissal of Woods's lawsuit as "frivolous and malicious, [and] for failure to state a claim on which relief can be granted." See Woods v. Main St. Renewal LLC, No. 5-18-CV-0189-FB-RBF, 2018 WL 4677908, at *1 (W.D. Tex. May 30, 2018). The district court agreed and dismissed the second lawsuit. See Woods v. Main St. Renewal LLC, No. SA-18-CA-0189-FB, 2018 WL 4688780, at *1 (W.D. Tex. June 20, 2018). Woods again appealed the district court's ruling to the Fifth Circuit, and the appellate court dismissed the appeal for want of prosecution.
Firebird then sued Woods for trespass to try title, trespass to realty, and an action to quiet title against Woods in state court. Firebird alleged it held title superior to Woods through the Substitute Trustee's Deed, alternately arguing that it acquired title to the Property from a common source, and that Woods lost title to the Property through the foreclosure proceeding. Pointing to the resolution of the federal cases, Firebird argued that Woods was collaterally estopped from arguing that the first and second releases of deed provided him with superior title to the Property. Firebird likewise argued that res judicata barred Woods from relitigating any claims raised in the federal cases. Based on a merger while the suit was pending, ALTO succeeded Firebird and the trial court substituted ALTO as plaintiff.
In its second amended partial summary judgment motion, ALTO sought judgment only as to its trespass to try title claim and against counterclaims that Woods had filed. ALTO supported the motion with 25 exhibits, which include the several deeds noted above, and the several opinions and orders from the federal proceedings. In addition, ALTO attached requests for admissions that Woods failed to answer. These included the following deemed statements:
In response, Woods filed a document titled "Defendant Affidavit of Facts in Support of Objection to Granting Plaintiff Summary Judgment." The document, however, largely consists of legal arguments and case citations. Following a hearing on ALTO's motion, the trial court granted judgment in ALTO's favor on its trespass to try title claim. The court found that ALTO had superior title to the Property and ordered that ALTO was entitled to a writ of possession to enforce the judgment. The court furthered ordered that Woods take nothing on his counterclaims against ALTO. ALTO moved to sever out its other claims which the court granted. Woods subsequently filed an "Objection to Granting of Summary Judgment" that the trial court denied.
Woods now appeals the trial court's grant of partial summary judgment in thirteen issues. Before addressing the merits of Woods's claims, we first address ALTO's argument that Woods has waived his claims through inadequate briefing.
Appellant is acting pro se on appeal and we must construe his brief liberally and with patience. See Johnson v. McAdams, 781 S.W.2d 451, 452 (Tex.App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 1989, orig. proceeding) ("The Supreme Court directs us to seek the substance of a pro se complaint by reviewing pro se applications with liberality and patience."). But even so, the law is well-settled that a party proceeding pro se must comply with all applicable procedural rules. Valadez v. Avitia, 238 S.W.3d 843, 845 (Tex.App.--El Paso 2007, no pet.). Those procedural requirements include proper presentation of a case on appeal as is similarly required in the trial court. Id. In short, reviewing courts cannot make allowances simply because a pro se litigant is not an attorney. Jonson v. Duong, 642 S.W.3d 189, 193 (Tex.App.--El Paso 2021, no pet.). Otherwise, such litigants would be given an unfair advantage over those parties represented by counsel. Id
Our rules of appellate procedure require an appellant to clearly articulate the issues a reviewing court will be asked to decide, to make cogent and specific arguments in support of its position, to cite authorities, and to specify the pages in the record where each alleged error can be found. Tex.R.App.P. 38.1; Lee v. Abbott, No 05-18-01185-CV, 2019 WL 1970521, at *1 (Tex.App.--Dallas May 3, 2019, no pet.) (mem. op.); Bolling v. Farmers Branch Indep. Sch. Dist, 315 S.W.3d 893, 895 (Tex.App.--Dallas 2010, no pet.) (rules require appellants to "state concisely the complaint they may have, provide understandable, succinct, and clear argument for why their complaint has merit in fact and in law, and cite and apply law that is applicable to the complaint being made along with record references that are appropriate"). Specifically, Rule 38.1 of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure requires an appellant's brief to contain "a clear and concise argument for the contentions made, with appropriate citations to authorities and to the record." Tex.R.App.P. 38.1(i). ...
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