Woods v. Bowersox
Decision Date | 29 March 2013 |
Docket Number | Case No. 4:10CV541 JAR |
Parties | HENRY WOODS, Petitioner, v. MICHAEL BOWERSOX, Respondent. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Missouri |
This matter is before the Court on Petitioner Henry Woods' Petition under 28 U.S.C. §2254 for Writ of Habeas Corpus By a Person in State Custody (ECF No. 1 ("Motion")). Because this Court has determined that Woods' claims are inadequate on their face and the record affirmatively refutes the factual assertions upon which Woods' claims are based, this Court decides this matter without an evidentiary hearing.1
The Missouri Court of Appeals summarized the evidence regarding this case as follows:2
(Respondent's Exhibit E, pp. 2-3). On March 7, 2006, the Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed Woods' convictions on direct appeal. (Id., p. 8); State v. Woods, 188 S.W.3d 459 (Mo. Ct. App. 2006). On May 19, 2009, the court also affirmed the denial of Woods' 29.15 motion for post conviction relief. (Respondent's Exhibit L); Woods v. State, 298 S.W.3d 137 (Mo. Ct. App. 2009).
On March 29, 2010, Woods filed this Motion seeking relief based upon the following grounds:
(1) the trial court committed plain error by giving Instruction No. 9, the verdict director for assault in the first degree, in that there was insufficient evidence to support that instruction;
(2) the trial court committed plain error by giving Instruction No. 9 because there was a variance between the instruction and the indictment for first-degree assault;
(3) trial counsel was ineffective because he had a conflict of interest that adversely affected his performance;
(4) trial counsel was ineffective for failing to impeach the surviving victim with an inconsistent statement;
(5) trial counsel was ineffective for not advising him of, and allowing him to exercise his right to testify; and
(6) trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object when the State offered a theory of the crime that was different from the theory presented at his accomplice's trial.
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, a district court "shall entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). "[I]n a § 2254 habeas corpus proceeding, a federal court's review of alleged due process violations stemming from a state court conviction is narrow." Anderson v. Goeke, 44 F.3d 675, 679 (8th Cir. 1995). "[A]n application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim (1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearlyestablished Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). "'A state court's decision is contrary to ... clearly established law if it applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in [Supreme Court] cases or if it confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a [Supreme Court] decision ... and nevertheless arrives at a [different] result.'" Cagle v. Norris, 474 F.3d 1090, 1095 (8th Cir. 2007) (quoting Mitchell v. Esparza, 540 U.S. 12, 15-16 (2003)). The Supreme Court has emphasized the phrase "Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court," refers to "the holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of this Court's decisions," and has cautioned that § 2254(d)(1) "restricts the source of clearly established law to Court's jurisprudence." Williams, 529 U.S. at 412. A State court "unreasonably applies" federal law when it "identifies the correct governing legal rule from Court's cases but unreasonably applies it to the facts of the particular state prisoner's case," or "unreasonably extends a legal principle from [the Supreme Court's] precedent to a new context where it should not apply or unreasonably refuses to extend that principle to a new context where it should apply." Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 407 (2000). A State court decision may be considered an unreasonable determination "only if it is shown that the state court's presumptively correct factual findings do not enjoy support in the record." Ryan v. Clarke, 387 F.3d 785, 791 (8th Cir. 2004) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1)).
In Ground 1, Woods contends that the trial court committed plain error by giving Instruction No. 9, the verdict director for assault in the first degree because he contends that there was insufficient evidence to support that instruction. (Motion, p. 4). Woods contends that there was insufficient evidence to support Instruction No. 9 because there was no evidence that GeorgeMorning or another shot Keith Wilson as hypothesized in that instruction since all of the evidence suggested that Woods shot Wilson.
The Missouri Court of Appeals rejected Woods' claim as follows:
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