Woods v. Bowersox

Decision Date29 March 2013
Docket NumberCase No. 4:10CV541 JAR
PartiesHENRY WOODS, Petitioner, v. MICHAEL BOWERSOX, Respondent.
CourtU.S. District Court — Eastern District of Missouri
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

This matter is before the Court on Petitioner Henry Woods' Petition under 28 U.S.C. §2254 for Writ of Habeas Corpus By a Person in State Custody (ECF No. 1 ("Motion")). Because this Court has determined that Woods' claims are inadequate on their face and the record affirmatively refutes the factual assertions upon which Woods' claims are based, this Court decides this matter without an evidentiary hearing.1

BACKGROUND

The Missouri Court of Appeals summarized the evidence regarding this case as follows:2

On the evening of May 28, 2003, sometime after 9:00 p.m., Keith Wilson and William Robinson ("decedent") were drinking beer and wine at approximately 4200 Natural Bridge in the City of St. Louis. Wilson saw [Woods] and George Morning, whom he had earlier seen walking by, coming towards decedent and himself.
[Woods] and Morning had guns visible as they approached the pair. Earlier that same day Wilson had a confrontation with [Woods'] girlfriend and then with [Woods], who told Wilson to leave his girlfriend alone.
[Woods] and Morning opened fire on Wilson. Wilson was struck in the face by a bullet as [Woods] and Morning approached him and the decedent. Wilson ran off, but heard multiple shots as he fled. After hiding for a time, he went home and told his brother that [Woods] had shot him. Wilson thereafter went to the hospital for treatment of his injuries. James Prichard, a police officer for Moline Acres, was doing security work for an Auto Zone store in the 4200 block of Natural Bridge on the evening of May 28, 2003. He heard multiple gun shots, ran towards the sound and saw Robinson held up against a telephone pole on the corner of Natural Bridge and Harris by [Woods], who had a gun in one hand. Prichard observed that Morning also had a gun. He identified himself as a police officer, and ordered them to stop, but [Woods] and Morning fled the scene.
The police collected evidence from the scene, which included shell casings from two different weapons, and recovered two .45 caliber bullets from decedent's body. Wilson identified both [Woods] and Morning from separate photo arrays, and later identified them in separate line-ups.
[Woods] was indicted for murder in the first degree in violation of section 565.020 RSMo (2000)3 , for armed criminal action in violation of section 571.015 in connection with Count I, for assault in the first degree in violation of section 565.050, and for armed criminal action in connection with Count III. The indictment also charged that [Woods] was a prior offender.
[Woods] had a trial by jury from January 24, 2004 through January 26, 2004. At the instruction conference, [Woods'] counsel made a general objection to the verdict directing instructions on the basis that they were not justified by the evidence. Counsel for [Woods] did not make any specific objections to the verdict directing instructions. The jury convicted [Woods] on all four counts. The trial court sentenced [Woods] to life without the possibility of parole on Count I, and to three life sentences on Counts II, III, and IV, all sentences to run concurrently.

(Respondent's Exhibit E, pp. 2-3). On March 7, 2006, the Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed Woods' convictions on direct appeal. (Id., p. 8); State v. Woods, 188 S.W.3d 459 (Mo. Ct. App. 2006). On May 19, 2009, the court also affirmed the denial of Woods' 29.15 motion for post conviction relief. (Respondent's Exhibit L); Woods v. State, 298 S.W.3d 137 (Mo. Ct. App. 2009).

On March 29, 2010, Woods filed this Motion seeking relief based upon the following grounds:

(1) the trial court committed plain error by giving Instruction No. 9, the verdict director for assault in the first degree, in that there was insufficient evidence to support that instruction;

(2) the trial court committed plain error by giving Instruction No. 9 because there was a variance between the instruction and the indictment for first-degree assault;

(3) trial counsel was ineffective because he had a conflict of interest that adversely affected his performance;

(4) trial counsel was ineffective for failing to impeach the surviving victim with an inconsistent statement;

(5) trial counsel was ineffective for not advising him of, and allowing him to exercise his right to testify; and

(6) trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object when the State offered a theory of the crime that was different from the theory presented at his accomplice's trial.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, a district court "shall entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). "[I]n a § 2254 habeas corpus proceeding, a federal court's review of alleged due process violations stemming from a state court conviction is narrow." Anderson v. Goeke, 44 F.3d 675, 679 (8th Cir. 1995). "[A]n application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim (1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearlyestablished Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). "'A state court's decision is contrary to ... clearly established law if it applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in [Supreme Court] cases or if it confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a [Supreme Court] decision ... and nevertheless arrives at a [different] result.'" Cagle v. Norris, 474 F.3d 1090, 1095 (8th Cir. 2007) (quoting Mitchell v. Esparza, 540 U.S. 12, 15-16 (2003)). The Supreme Court has emphasized the phrase "Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court," refers to "the holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of this Court's decisions," and has cautioned that § 2254(d)(1) "restricts the source of clearly established law to [the Supreme] Court's jurisprudence." Williams, 529 U.S. at 412. A State court "unreasonably applies" federal law when it "identifies the correct governing legal rule from [the Supreme] Court's cases but unreasonably applies it to the facts of the particular state prisoner's case," or "unreasonably extends a legal principle from [the Supreme Court's] precedent to a new context where it should not apply or unreasonably refuses to extend that principle to a new context where it should apply." Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 407 (2000). A State court decision may be considered an unreasonable determination "only if it is shown that the state court's presumptively correct factual findings do not enjoy support in the record." Ryan v. Clarke, 387 F.3d 785, 791 (8th Cir. 2004) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1)).

DISCUSSION
I. Ground 1

In Ground 1, Woods contends that the trial court committed plain error by giving Instruction No. 9, the verdict director for assault in the first degree because he contends that there was insufficient evidence to support that instruction. (Motion, p. 4). Woods contends that there was insufficient evidence to support Instruction No. 9 because there was no evidence that GeorgeMorning or another shot Keith Wilson as hypothesized in that instruction since all of the evidence suggested that Woods shot Wilson.

The Missouri Court of Appeals rejected Woods' claim as follows:

In his first point relied on, [Woods] requests that this Court engage in plain error review, contending that the trial court committed plain error in giving Instruction No. 9, the verdict director for assault in the first degree, and in accepting the jury's verdict of guilty on that charge, in that there was insufficient evidence to support that instruction "because there was no evidence that George Morning or 'another' shot Keith Wilson as hypothesized in that instruction since all of the evidence suggests
that [Woods] shot Wilson."
The written version of Instruction No. 9 contained in the legal file reads, in part, as follows:
As to Count III, if you find and believe from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt:
First, that on May 28, 2003, in the City of St. Louis, State of Missouri, another person knowingly caused serious physical injury to Keith Wilson by shooting him,
then you are instructed that the offense of assault in the first degree has occurred ...
This version of the instruction omits some key words. It should have read "the defendant or another person knowingly caused serious physical injury to Keith Wilson by shooting him[.]" As originally written, Instruction No. 9 indicates that the jury would have to find that another person shot Wilson in order to find [Woods] guilty of Count III, first degree assault. However, the State noticed this omission just after the trial court read the instructions to the jury, and the State brought it to the attention of the trial court prior to the arguments of counsel and the submission of the case to the jury. This led the trial court to make the following statement to the jury:
Ladies and Gentlemen, at this time, the court will re-read Instruction 9. You will note that when you get to Instruction 9, I have added to the first paragraph the following words: "the defendant or." I will re-read the instruction in its entirety at this time.
The record reflects that the trial court did re-read that instruction to the jury. [Woods'] brief fails to mention that the trial court took this corrective measure, which properly
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