Woods v. Brown's Bakery

• Decision Date: 28 December 1960
• Docket Number: No. 36413,36413
• Citation: 171 N.E.2d 496,171 Ohio St. 383
• Parties: , 14 O.O.2d 145 WOODS, Appellee, v. BROWN'S BAKERY, Appellant.
• Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Page 383

171 Ohio St. 383

171 N.E.2d 496, 14 O.O.2d 145

WOODS, Appellee, v. BROWN'S BAKERY, Appellant.

No. 36413.

Supreme Court of Ohio.

Dec. 28, 1960.

Syllabus by the Court.

1. The assured-clear-distance rule (Section 4511.21, Revised Code) applies to drivers of motor vehicles approaching an intersection on intersecting roads, in instances where such converging vehicles at the intersection are obscured by fog.

2. The assured-clear-distance rule is violated where the driver of a motor vehicle approaching an intersection collides with a second vehicle which had entered into the driver's path from an intersecting road, and where the second vehicle upon entering the intersection was, because of fog, beyond the vision of such driver.

3. In determining whether a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict should be sustained, a court must give consideration to the jury's answers to interrogatories.

4. Where the jury in answer to interrogatories determines, in effect, (1) that plaintiff's motor vehicle approached an intersection at such a speed that plaintiff could not stop his vehicle within his actual vision ahead, and (2) that defendant's vehicle entered into plaintiff's path from an intersecting road and upon entering the intersection was beyond the vision of the plaintiff because of fog, the effect of such findings determines, as a matter of law, that plaintiff violated the assured-clear-distance rule, that he failed to exercise ordinary care under the circumstances, and that such failure contributed proximately to plaintiff's injuries.

This case deals with the collision of two motor vehicles at the intersection of a state highway and a country road. After daylight and at approximately 5:20 a. m. on June 7, 1956, plaintiff was driving his Mercury sedan in a westerly direction on state highway No. 114 in Paulding County. At such time, the plaintiff was approaching the intersection with Briceton Road. The latter is a country road which runs north and south and crosses highway 114 at right angles. Plaintiff had traveled this same course many times prior to the morning in question since it was the usual route to his job which was located in a nearby city. Therefore, plaintiff was quite familiar with the locale and the Briceton Road intersection.

After leaving his home approximately 20 minutes before, plaintiff encountered pockets of heavy fog along his route. Three hundred to four hundred feet from the Briceton Road intersection, plaintiff came upon another pocket of heavy fog. At this point, his speed was 40 miles an hour, and his visibility was 20 to 30 feet ahead. Plaintiff took his foot from the accelerator and coasted, without braking, towards the intersection. His established speed upon reaching the intersection was 32 miles an hour.

At the intersection, plaintiff's vehicle struck broadside defendant's large bakery truck. The point of the impact was the north lane of highway 114 at the intersection. Defendant's driver had been attempting to cross the highway and had been proceeding in a southerly direction on Briceton Road. There were warning and stop signs along Briceton Road on the north side of the intersection. Defendant's driver too was well acquainted with the road and with the intersection.

At the trial of the cause, defendant's driver testified that a few moments prior to the collision he had stopped his truck 15 or 20 feet from the intersection, had removed himself from the vehicle and had used a flashlight to look 'underneath the fog' in order to ascertain his distance from the guardrail and from the intersection with highway 114. The driver testified further that because of the heavy fog he did not see either the warning sign or the stop sign upon approaching the intersection with Briceton Road. The driver testified further that he was 'barely moving, I just started our' into the intersection at the time of the collision.

Plaintiff, on the other hand, introduced in evidence a signed statement, purportedly that of defendant's driver, in which the latter stated: '* * * I stopped * * * approximately 35 feet of state route 114, and then started on to find the corner and I was upon it before I could stop. * * * My stated speed was between 20 and 25 miles per hour.'

On cross-examination, defendant's driver denied having made the quoted statement. Each driver testified that he did not see the vehicle of the other prior to the actual impact.

Plaintiff brought this action in the Court of Common Pleas of Paulding County for damages for the personal injuries he received due to the collision. Four interrogatories and numerous instructions were submitted to the jury in this cause.

The plaintiff charges defendant with violation of the 'highway right-of-way statute' (Section 4511.43, Revised Code), which violation and negligent operation, it is claimed, proximately caused plaintiff's injuries.

Defendant charges that plaintiff's right to recover was defeated because plaintiff lost his right of way by proceeding in an unlawful manner in violation of the assured-clear-distance statute (Section 4511.21, Revised Code), which violation it is claimed contributed proximately to plaintiff's injuries.

The jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff in the sum of s35,000. The defendant moved for a judgment in its favor notwithstanding the verdict and then filed a motion for a new trial and a motion to vacate the judgment. All such motions were overruled by the trial judge, and judgment was entered for the plaintiff, whereupon defendant prosecuted an appeal to the Court of Appeals where the judgment of the trial court was affirmed.

The cause is before this court pursuant to the allowance of defendant's motion to certify the record.

John W. Winn and Karl H. Weaner, Jr., Defiance, for appellant.

Goslee & Dunlap, Bellefontaine, for appellee.

MATTHIAS, Judge.

The issue presented in this cause may be framed as follows:

Was plaintiff's conduct such as to constitute contributory negligence and in such manner as to have proximately contributed to his own injuries as a matter of law?

The state of the record is such as to establish defendant's negligence. For its driver to have moved his truck into an intersection under conditions of fog in such density as to obscure stop signs, guardrails and even in fact the state highway itself justified the jury's finding of a failure to exercise ordinary care.

Plaintiff's conduct, in view of the jury's answers to the interrogatories, clearly amounted to contributory negligence as a matter of law. The jury found that plaintiff's speed upon entering the intersection in question was 32 miles an hour. (Answer to interrogatory No. 1.) The undisputed testimony indicates that plaintiff's visibility was 20 to 30 feet ahead. The record discloses that an antomobile traveling at 30 miles an hour requires 83 feet in which to stop. Plaintiff's speed, therefore, would have required a stopping distance virtually three times greated than his actual vision ahead allowed.

The assured-clear-distance rule is found in Section 4511.21, Revised Code. It provides in part as follows:

'No person shall operate a motor vehicle * * * in and upon the streets and highways * * * at a greater speed than will permit him to bring it to a stop within the assured clear distance ahead.'

The assured-clear-distance statute constitutes a specific requirement of law, a violation of which constitutes negligence per se. Gumley v. Cowman, 129 Ohio St. 36, 193 N.E. 627. And a plaintiff who violated the statute was, in the absence of a legal excuse therefor, guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law. Kormos v. Cleveland Retail Credit Men's Co., 131 Ohio St. 471, 3 N.E.2d 427. And such statute is to be strictly construed. Smiley v. Arrow Spring Bed Co., 138 Ohio St. 81, 33 N.E.2d 3, 133 A.L.R. 960; Bickel v. American Can Co., 154 Ohio St. 380, 96 N.E.2d 4.

We have held that Section 4511.21, Revised Code, has no application under ordinary circumstances to intersection cases. Blackford v. Kaplan, 135 Ohio St. 268, 20 N.E.2d 522. The term, 'ordinary circumstances,' referred to has been defined in Sherer v. Smith, 155 Ohio St. 567, 99 N.E.2d 763, 764, in paragraph one of the syllabus:

'1. The 'assured-clear-distance-ahead' rule * * * has no application in a situation where a person, motor vehicle or other object suddently enters the path of another motor vehicle in such manner that the operator of such other motor vehicle is afforded no reasonable opportunity to stop his vehicle and avoid a collision.'

It is to be noted that in such an instance the driver's assured clear distance ahead is cut off or interfered with due to no fault of his own. Hence the duty imposed upon the driver by the statute is not in fact violated. However, in a situation where intersections or vehicles entering into intersections are obscured to the driver because of existing weather conditions or hills or curves in the road ahead, Section 4511.21 again becomes applicable and requires the driver, under such conditions, to reduce speed so that he may comply with the mandate of the statute. Blackford v. Kaplan, supra, 135 Ohio St. 268, 20 N.E.2d 522; Skinner v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 127 Ohio St. 69, 186 N.E. 722.

The assured-clear-distance statute and the decisions of this court applicable thereto received careful and thorough analysis by Judge Hart in the case of Smiley v. Arrow Spring Bed Co., supra, 138 Ohio St. 81, 33 N.E.2d 3. In that well reasoned opinion, at page 88 of 138 Ohio St., at page 7 of 33 N.E.2d, Judge Hart pointed out that the common-law principle, which grants the driver of an automobile the right to assume, until he has notice to the contrary, that others on the highway will obey the law, has little if any legal effect because of the application of the assured-clear-distance statute. We quote, as follows, from that opinion, at page 88 of 138 Ohio St., at page 7 of 33 N.E.2d:

'* * * The...