Woods v. Iowa Dept. of Job Service, 2-65641

• Decision Date: 24 November 1981
• Docket Number: No. 2-65641,2-65641
• Parties: Michael A. WOODS, Petitioner-Appellant, v. IOWA DEPARTMENT OF JOB SERVICE and City of Des Moines, Respondent-Appellee.
• Court: Iowa Court of Appeals

Page 838

315 N.W.2d 838

Michael A. WOODS, Petitioner-Appellant, v. IOWA DEPARTMENT OF JOB SERVICE and City of Des Moines, Respondent-Appellee.

No. 2-65641.

Court of Appeals of Iowa.

Nov. 24, 1981.

Linda Pettit and Francisco Colon, Jr., Des Moines, for petitioner-appellant.

Joseph L. Bervid, Iowa Dept. of Job Service, Des Moines, for respondent-appellee.

Heard by OXBERGER, C. J., and DONIELSON, SNELL, CARTER and JOHNSON, JJ.

JOHNSON, Judge.

Petitioner-claimant, Michael Woods, appeals from district court's decision on judicial review, affirming respondent-agency's denial of unemployment benefits. He asserts the record lacks substantial evidence to support a determination that he voluntarily quit without good cause attributable to his employer. We affirm.

Claimant began working for the city of Des Moines on December 4, 1973. He was originally hired as an equipment service man for the evening shift from 3 p. m. to 11 p. m., but eventually started working the day shift when personnel senior to him were promoted out of that job category, thus increasing his seniority. As a result of a civil service examination, he was subsequently promoted to assistant parts handler but, because of his low seniority in that job category, was again required to work the night shift. Thereafter, a new employee was hired into the parts department and was placed on the day shift from 7 a. m. to 3 p. m. Claimant believed that assigning a new employee to the day shift, instead of himself, was a violation of a seniority rule and made a complaint to his supervisor. Several months later, in September, 1978, claimant was assigned to the day shift after another parts man with higher seniority left. However, on May 2, 1979, claimant was notified that, commencing the following week, he would be required to work a new intermediate shift from 1 p. m. to 9 p. m. Claimant considered this another violation of the seniority system and became concerned that he was being singled out for unfair treatment. Two other incidents had occurred earlier which fostered claimant's belief. The first involved the employer's time clock policy which had been initiated as a pilot program in February, 1979, with the intent of having all garage employees converted to that basis. However, in May, 1979, no other garage employees were required to punch in and out as claimant was required to do. The second incident occurred on May 2, 1979, before claimant was notified of the last change in his shift assignment. Claimant was reprimanded by a supervisor in another department for not wearing a uniform. The uniforms were provided by the employer and claimant was ordered to put the uniform on but chose to ignore that order. Later that day, when plaintiff was told of his new shift assignment, he went to his manager to complain; he stated that there was "no way" he was going to work the 1 p. m. to 9 p. m. shift. His manager replied that "there was only one way" he was not going to work that shift. Claimant thereupon submitted his resignation and used two weeks' vacation as his notice.

Claimant filed his claim for unemployment insurance benefits effective May 20, 1979. The employer protested the claim, alleging that claimant voluntarily left his employment. The claims deputy disqualified claimant, deciding that claimant "left (his) work voluntarily rather than perform the assigned work as instructed." Claimant timely appealed this decision. Following a hearing, the hearing officer rendered his decision affirming the claims deputy's denial of unemployment benefits. Claimant then appealed to the appeal board, which affirmed the hearing officer's decision. His subsequent application for rehearing was denied. Upon claimant's petition for judicial review, the district court affirmed the agency's decision. This appeal followed.

I. Scope of Review. Pursuant to section 17A.20, The Code 1981, our review in this case is limited to a determination of whether the district court made errors of law when it exercised its power of review of the agency action under section 17A.19. Jackson County Public Hospital v. PERB, 280 N.W.2d 426, 429 (Iowa 1979). Section 17A.19 of The Code, limits the district court's review to a determination of whether the agency committed any errors of law specified in section 17A.19(8). Thus, to determine whether the district court properly exercised its power of judicial review "this court applies the standards of section 17.19(8) to the agency action to determine whether this court's conclusions are the same as those of the district court. If the conclusions are the same, affirmance is in order. If they are not, reversal may be required." Jackson County, 280 N.W.2d at 429-30. Section 17A.19(8) provides that the district court shall reverse or modify the agency action if such action is affected by error in the application of law or administrative rule (section 17A.19(8)(a)(b)(c)(e), The Code 1981), or is not supported by substantial evidence in the record made before the agency when the record is viewed as a whole (section 17A.19(8)(f), The Code).

II. Agency's Decision. Claimant argues the record lacks substantial evidence to support the agency's conclusion that he voluntarily left his employment without good cause attributable to his employer. He specifically contends: 1) the agency erroneously concluded the "contract of hire" between claimant and his employer was limited to the terms of the collective bargaining agreement between claimant's employer and a union representing the majority of the city employees; 2) the contract of hire in this case is properly interpreted to include the policy of assigning shifts according to seniority; 3) the agency findings that a) the change in claimant's working hours was a substantial change in working conditions, and b) the change was not a substantial change in the contract of hire, are inconsistent; 4) the change in claimant's hours is a substantial change in the contract of hire and thus constitutes good cause for leaving his employment; 5) the agency erred in determining an emergency exception to the seniority system existed in the collective bargaining agreement because the agreement was not introduced into evidence to prove such an exception; 6) there was no substantial evidence in the record to support a finding that there was a policy exception to the seniority rule in an emergency situation; and 7) the agency erred in implying claimant was required to exhaust union appeal procedures. We are not persuaded by claimant's analysis.

A. Contract of Hire. We agree with claimant's assertion that the "contract of hire" is not limited to the collective bargaining agreement but also encompasses implied...