Woods v. Mann+hummel Filtration Tech. U.S. LLC
| Decision Date | 07 August 2019 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:17-CV-00605-KDB-DCK |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of North Carolina |
| Parties | CHARLES A. WOODS, Plaintiff, v. MANN+HUMMEL FILTRATION TECHNOLOGY U.S. LLC, et al. Defendants. |
Plaintiff Charles Woods ("Woods") was a long-time manufacturing line employee of Defendants Mann+Hummel Filtration Technology U.S. LLC, Mann+Hummel USA, Inc. and Mann+Hummel Filtration Technology Group, Inc. (together, "Mann+Hummel" or the "Company"). In this action, Woods asserts claims for employment discrimination based on alleged violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA") and the Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA"), racial discrimination, retaliation, wrongful discharge and other related state law and declaratory claims. Now before the Court is Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment ("Motion") on all claims (Doc. No. 36), which Woods opposes.
The Court has carefully considered the Motion and the parties' briefs and exhibits and heard oral argument from the parties' counsel during a hearing on the motion held July 25, 2019. The parties do not materially dispute the applicable legal principles and the elements of the various causes of action. They do, however, dispute whether there is enough evidence in the record to create a genuine issue of material fact, i.e. a basis on which a reasonable jury could rule in favor of the Plaintiff on his various claims. For the reasons discussed below, the Court finds that the Company is not entitled to summary judgment on Woods claims under the ADA but is entitled to summary judgment on Woods' remaining claims of racial discrimination, retaliation, alleged FMLA violations and other causes of action. Accordingly, the Court will in part GRANT and in part DENY the Motion and enter Partial Summary Judgment in favor of Defendants as set forth below.
Summary judgment must be granted "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56. A factual dispute is considered genuine "if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). "A fact is material if it might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law." Vannoy v. Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, 827 F.3d 296, 300 (4th Cir. 2016) (quoting Libertarian Party of Va. v. Judd, 718 F.3d 308, 313 (4th Cir. 2013)).
The party seeking summary judgment bears the initial burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material fact through citations to the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions or affidavits in the record. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986); Bouchat v. Baltimore Ravens Football Club, Inc., 346 F.3d 514, 522 (4th Cir. 2003). "The burden on the moving party may be discharged by 'showing' ... an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case." Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325. Once this initial burden is met, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party. The nonmoving party "must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial," Id. at 322 n.3. The nonmoving party may not rely upon mere allegations or denials of allegations in his pleadings to defeat a motion for summary judgment. Id. at 324.
When ruling on a summary judgment motion, a court must view the evidence and any inferences from the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Tolan v. Cotton, 572 U.S. 650, 657 (2014); see also Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255. "Summary judgment cannot be granted merely because the court believes that the movant will prevail if the action is tried on the merits." Jacobs v. N.C. Admin. Office of the Courts, 780 F.3d 562, 568-69 (4th Cir. 2015) (). "The court therefore cannot weigh the evidence or make credibility determinations." Id. at 569 (citing Mercantile Peninsula Bank v. French (In re French), 499 F.3d 345, 352 (4th Cir. 2007)).
However, "[w]here the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no genuine issue for trial." Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 586 (2009) (internal citations omitted). Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. Also, the mere argued existence of a factual dispute does not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion. Id. If the evidence is merely colorable, or is not significantly probative, summary judgment is appropriate. Id. at 249-50.
In the end, the question posed by a summary judgment motion is whether the evidence as applied to the governing legal rules "is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law." Id. at 252.
Woods was hired by MANN+HUMMEL, formerly known as Wix Filtration Corp., in August 1972. In his last five to six years of employment, Woods, who is African American, worked as a Set-Up Person (a/k/a "Set-Up Operator") at the company's Allen plant, which is one of the most highly paid hourly wage positions. In the Allen plant, the Company manufactures filters, primarily for automotive and industrial applications. As a Set-Up Operator, Woods was expected to set up the equipment to run the desired product and to "assist in maintaining all equipment according to engineering specifications and appropriate work instructions." The physical requirements of the Set-Up Operator position include the "[a]bility to move a minimum of 50 lbs." Woods worked on the first shift, which is the most desirable.
Woods was diagnosed with prostate cancer in January 2015. Following his diagnosis, Woods requested and received approved FMLA leave2 to have surgery. He remained out of work on leave from April 20, 2015 through July 23, 2015. Although Woods exhausted his FMLA leave in early July, the company gave him additional unpaid medical leave until he was ready to return. When he returned to work, Woods went back to his regular job as a Set-Up Operator. While on leave, Woods was entitled to receive short term disability payments for up to twenty-six (26) weeks.
After his return from surgery, Woods was able to perform his job, but his prostate surgery resulted in male incontinence and the problem was exacerbated by heavy lifting. Defendants claim that they did not regard Woods as disabled since he continued to perform allduties of his regular job satisfactorily but did allow him to take all the bathroom breaks necessary to "accommodate" his incontinence.
In early November 2015, Woods discussed his incontinence issues with his urologist and the doctor gave him a three-month medical restriction that prohibited him from lifting 50 lbs. or standing greater than 50% of the time. As a result of these medical restrictions, Woods was restricted from performing the essential functions of his regular job as a Set-Up Operator. Although the Company says that it continued to believe that Woods could perform his job because he had been doing satisfactory work since he returned from surgery in July 2015, the Company honored Woods' medical restrictions and removed him from the Set-Up Operator position on November 4, 2015.
Woods filed an affidavit in which he alleges that he requested a reasonable accommodation based on his disability when he received these medical restrictions. He further alleges that he was told by Wes Sorrells, his supervisor, that The Company's HR manager, Scott Carter, filed an affidavit alleging that he and others tried to find a position that would comply with Woods' medical restrictions, but were unsuccessful.
Woods never returned to work after November 4, 2015. Without a position to work in, Woods applied for FMLA leave, but his request was denied because he had already exhausted his FMLA leave during the preceding 12-month period. However, the Company did provide him with an unpaid medical leave of absence and some opportunity to apply for work asdiscussed below. There is no dispute Woods was paid everything he was owed for his work through November 4, 2015, and Woods received short term disability benefits until they were exhausted in February 2016. The company does not offer sick pay or severance pay to hourly employees.
The Company's "process" for allowing employees who are on unpaid medical leave to return to work is in dispute, or at least uncertain. While the Company has indisputably allowed some employees to return to the positions they held prior to their FMLA or medical leave, the Company alleges that its typical process for filling positions that become available in the plant is through a "bid" process in which current employees are given an opportunity to apply for open positions. The Company contends that it maintains an "open jobs list," which is a list of jobs in the plant that either no one bid on or for which there were no qualified bidders. They include all available jobs for all shifts, including all open assembly line positions. Any employee is free to take a job on the "open jobs list" at any time.
On the one hand, the company says that open positions are filled on a first come basis so that the most desirable positions are filled quickly. On the other hand, some positions in higher pay grades are apparently filled based on a comparison of qualifications among those...
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