Woods v. Naumkeag Steam Cotton Co.
| Decision Date | 02 March 1883 |
| Citation | 134 Mass. 357 |
| Parties | Ann Woods v. Naumkeag Steam Cotton Company |
| Court | United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court |
Argued November 9, 1882
Essex. Tort for personal injuries. Answer, a general denial. Trial in the Superior Court, before Wilkinson, J., who allowed a bill of exceptions, in substance as follows:
The defendant admitted that, on February 26, 1879, it was the owner of a certain tenement house in Salem. The plaintiff introduced evidence tending to prove that said house was fitted for four families, and contained four tenements, one of which was, at the time of the plaintiff's injury, and since 1876 had been, occupied by the plaintiff with her husband and family, as tenants at will of the defendant; that there was a common entrance on one side of the house for all the tenants, this being the only entrance; that there was a yard adjoining the house, which was for the use of all the tenants, and which was from three to four feet higher than the level of the street; that the only means of passing to and from the yard and street, and of reaching the house, was by three steps leading down from the yard to the street; that the steps were of rough-split, unhewn granite, each of them being from ten inches to one foot in height and from eight to ten inches wide, and about three feet in width from side to side, and no railing had ever been placed on either side thereof.
The defendant admitted that the yard and steps were owned by it and were for the use of all the tenants who might occupy its tenement house.
The plaintiff also introduced evidence tending to prove that none of the tenants had ever taken any care of said steps, and that there was no agreement between any of the tenants and the defendant as to the care, management or repair of the same; and there was no evidence that the defendant had ever exercised any such care, management or control, except so far as such care or control might be inferred from the evidence above stated, and never undertook to remove any snow or ice therefrom, or from any part of the premises, during the plaintiff's occupancy, from 1876 to the time of her injury.
The plaintiff also introduced evidence tending to prove that the steps, on the day of the injury, were filled and clogged up with snow and ice, accumulated thereon from natural causes so that they were in a dangerous and unsafe condition, and had been in the same condition for seven or eight days prior thereto; that the structure of the steps remained unchanged from the time of the plaintiff's first occupancy of the tenement to the time she received her injury; that there was no change in their condition except that resulting from the accumulation of ice and snow; and that, at about eight o'clock in the morning of said day, the plaintiff, in attempting to pass down the steps, slipped upon the ice and snow accumulated on the steps, and received the injury complained of; and there was evidence tending to prove that at the time the plaintiff was injured, she was in the exercise of due care. A view of the premises was taken by the jury.
The plaintiff contended that the steps were of such material, and constructed in such manner, that they occasioned the accumulation of ice and snow thereon improperly, and so as to constitute an unsafe condition of the steps; and that such construction of the steps, and such accumulation of ice and snow allowed to remain thereon, and the defendant's omission to place a rail on either side of the steps, or to take other reasonable precautions to prevent one from falling, was such negligence as would render the defendant liable in this action.
At the close of the plaintiff's case, the defendant asked the judge to rule that there was no evidence to go to the jury, and that the action could not be maintained. The judge ruled as requested, and directed a verdict for the defendant; and the plaintiff alleged exceptions.
Judgment on the verdict.
F. L Evans, for the plaintiff.
L. S. Tuckerman, for the defendant.
Field J. C. Allen, Colburn & Holmes, JJ.,...
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Iwai v. State
...was known as the natural accumulation rule, or the Massachusetts rule, the latter name stemming from Woods v. Naumkeag Steam Cotton Co., 134 Mass. 357, 45 Am.Rep. 344 (1883). Early Washington cases followed this traditional rule in the landlord-tenant context. See, e.g., Oerter v. Ziegler, ......
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Another v. Target Corp. & Another
...rule that property owners owe no duty to remove natural accumulations of snow and ice originated with this court's 1883 decision in Woods, supra. See note 7, supra. In the Woods case, a tenant brought suit against her landlord for injuries she sustained when she fell on a set of ice-covered......
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Western Maryland Ry. Co. v. Griffis
...the flavor of the Massachusetts Rule as to the landlord's responsibility for the removal of snow and ice, Woods v. Naumkeag Steam Cotton Co., 134 Mass. 357, 45 Am.Rep. 344 (1883); Spack v. Longwood Apts., Inc., 338 Mass. 518, 155 N.E.2d 873 (1959), onto which the municipality standard was e......
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Durkin v. Lewitz
...although to us the authorities appear about equally divided. The following cases support the Massachusetts rule: Woods v. Naumkeag Steam Cotton Co., 1883, 134 Mass. 357; Purcell v. English, 1882, 86 Ind. 34; Rosenberg v. Chapman National Bank, 1927, 126 Me. 403, 139 A. 82, 58 A.L.R. 1405; O......