Woods v. State
| Decision Date | 31 December 1998 |
| Docket Number | No. 49A05-9712-CR-536,49A05-9712-CR-536 |
| Citation | 703 N.E.2d 1115 |
| Parties | Jennifer WOODS, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff. |
| Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
The State charged Jennifer Woods with Criminal Trespass, a Class A misdemeanor, 1 after she was asked but refused to leave the premises of Bally Total Fitness Health Club ("Bally's"). Following a bench trial, Woods was convicted as charged. Woods presents one issue for review which we restate as whether the State proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Woods did not have a contractual interest in the property occupied by Bally's.
We reverse.
In 1990, Woods became a member of Bally's under a three-year membership contract, which she could renew annually. On January 2, 1997, Woods contacted Bally's regional office to renew her membership. She paid by MasterCard, and the charge was posted to her credit card account on January 6, 1997.
On January 7, 1997, Woods went to Bally's to exercise. She presented her membership card to the receptionist, who informed her that there was a problem with her card. However, Woods was permitted to exercise while Bally's attempted to resolve the problem. Woods was in the parking lot preparing to leave after her workout when she realized that she had not retrieved her card. Upon returning to the reception area, she was informed that her membership had expired, as evidenced by computer records. Over Woods' objection, the receptionist refused to return the card to Woods.
Woods was referred to Bally's general manager, Brian Collier. Woods informed Collier that she would leave the premises if he returned her membership card. Woods became disruptive, and Collier asked her to accompany him to the office to discuss the matter. He retained the card during that discussion. Eventually, Collier asked Woods to leave because of the disturbance she was causing. Woods started to leave but then changed her mind and returned to Collier's office. Collier again asked her to leave. Collier warned her that he would call the police if she refused, and Woods agreed that he should call the police.
Subsequently, Indianapolis Police Officers Donald Payton and Gerald Neuman arrived at Bally's and asked both Collier and Woods to explain the dispute. Collier stated that there had been a disagreement about Woods' membership status and that Woods had refused Collier's request to leave the facility. The officers then asked Woods to leave and arrested her when she refused.
Woods complains that the State presented insufficient evidence to sustain her conviction for criminal trespass. When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we neither reweigh the evidence nor judge witness credibility. Nield v. State, 677 N.E.2d 79, 81 (Ind.Ct.App.1997). We consider only the evidence favorable to the judgment, together with the reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom. Snyder v. State, 655 N.E.2d 1238, 1240 (Ind.Ct.App.1995). If there is substantial evidence of probative value to support the conviction, the decision will not be set aside. Owens v. State, 659 N.E.2d 466, 474 (Ind.1995).
Indiana Code § 35-43-2-2(a)(2) states that "a person who, not having a contractual interest in the property, knowingly or intentionally refuses to leave the real property of another person, having been asked to leave by the other person or that person's agent" commits criminal trespass, a Class A misdemeanor. Lack of a contractual interest in the property is a material element the State must prove to convict a person of criminal trespass. Fleck v. State, 508 N.E.2d 539, 540 (Ind.1987). Woods claims that she had a contractual interest in the property by virtue of her membership contract with Bally's. We must agree.
The primary goal in interpreting the meaning of a statute is to determine and effectuate the legislative intent. Freeman v. State, 658 N.E.2d 68, 70 (Ind.1995). In determining legislative intent, courts must also consider the objectives and purposes of the statute in question and the policy underlying the statute's enactment. Miller v. State, 641 N.E.2d 64, 68 (Ind.Ct.App.1994), trans. denied. The term "contractual interest" as used in the criminal trespass statute has not been defined or construed by statute or case law. If a statute has not previously been construed, its interpretation is controlled by the express language of the statute and by application of the general rules of statutory constructions. Blackmon v. Duckworth, 675 N.E.2d 349, 351 (Ind.Ct.App.1996). Preeminent among the rules of statutory construction is that we look to the plain language of the statute and attribute the common, ordinary meaning to terms found in everyday speech. Nield, 677 N.E.2d at 82.
A contract is an agreement between at least two parties that creates an obligation to do or not to do a particular thing. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 322 (6th ed.1990). An "interest" is defined as:
[T]he most general term that can be employed to denote a right, claim, title, or legal share in something.... More particularly it means a right to have the advantage accruing from anything; any right in the nature of property, but less than title.
Id. at 812. In this context, "contractual interest" refers to Woods' right, arising out of her membership contract, to be present on Bally's property.
Woods first joined Bally's in 1990. Her membership contract granted her full access to the facilities on unlimited days and unlimited hours. Woods renewed her membership on January 2, 1997. On January 7, Woods went to Bally's and was told that her membership had expired. Apparently, Woods' payment had not yet appeared on the database available to Bally's receptionist, although the health club's records later indicated that her payment had been posted on January 6.
The criminal trespass statute's purpose is to punish those who wilfully or without a bona fide claim of right commit acts of trespass on the land of another. See Myers v. State, 190...
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