Lyles v. State, No. 49S02–1201–CR–49.

Docket NºNo. 49S02–1201–CR–49.
Citation970 N.E.2d 140
Case DateJune 29, 2012
CourtSupreme Court of Indiana

970 N.E.2d 140

Walter LYLES, Appellant,
v.
STATE of Indiana, Appellee.

No. 49S02–1201–CR–49.

Supreme Court of Indiana.

June 29, 2012.


[970 N.E.2d 141]


Darren D. Bedwell, Ruth A. Johnson, Marion County Public Defender, Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Appellant.

Gregory F. Zoeller, Attorney General of Indiana, Karl M. Scharnberg, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Appellee.


On Transfer from the Indiana Court of Appeals, No. 49A02–1104–CR–291

DICKSON, Chief Justice.

The defendant, Walter Lyles, has appealed his conviction for misdemeanor Criminal Trespass, contending that there was insufficient evidence to support any inference that he lacked a contractual interest in the property upon which he is accused of trespassing. We hold that there was sufficient evidence to support his conviction.

The underlying facts of the case are not in dispute. On December 3, 2010, the defendant visited a bank branch located at 2600 West Michigan Street in Indianapolis, Indiana. The defendant, an account holder of the bank, was seeking to obtain a

[970 N.E.2d 142]

“print-out” of his account for free from one of the bank's tellers. Tr. at 17. Per its policy, the bank refused to give the defendant a free “print-out” and instead offered to give the defendant a “statement” for a $6 fee. Tr. at 6. A manager explained the bank's policy to the defendant, but the defendant persisted in his request and became “irate and disrespectful.” Tr. at 8. The manager then asked the defendant to leave the bank and called the police when the defendant refused. The police officer who responded to the bank's call arrested the defendant after first asking the defendant to leave multiple times.

The State charged the defendant with Criminal Trespass as a class A misdemeanor under Indiana Code Section 35–43–2–2. The case was tried before a commissioner, who found the defendant guilty of misdemeanor Criminal Trespass. The defendant then initiated this appeal of his conviction, claiming insufficient evidence. The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court, vacating the conviction. Lyles v. State, 956 N.E.2d 180 (Ind.Ct.App.2011). We granted transfer and now affirm the defendant's conviction for Criminal Trespass.

On appeal, the defendant's only contention is that there was insufficient evidence to convict him of Criminal Trespass as charged because he contends that there was no evidence from which the trier of fact could infer that he lacked a contractual interest in the real property of the bank.

An accused person's right to Due Process of Law obliges the State to prove every element of the charged offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 316, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2787, 61 L.Ed.2d 560, 571 (1979); Adkins v. State, 887 N.E.2d 934, 936–37 (Ind.2008). When reviewing a claim of insufficient evidence, an appellate court neither reweighs the evidence nor judges the credibility of the witnesses as this is the exclusive province of the jury. Fleck v. State, 508 N.E.2d 539, 540 (Ind.1987); Deal v. State, 140 Ind. 354, 356–61, 39 N.E. 930, 930–32 (1895) (establishing standard of review for claims of insufficient evidence). We consider only the evidence most favorable to the State together with all reasonable and logical inferences which may be drawn therefrom. Fleck, 508 N.E.2d at 540;Lee v. State, 156 Ind. 541, 545–46, 60 N.E. 299, 301 (1901) (requiring all reasonable inferences to be construed in favor of verdict). “If a reasonable finder of fact could determine from the evidence that the defendant was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, then we will uphold the verdict.” Justice v. State, 530 N.E.2d 295, 296 (Ind.1988) (emphasis added).

The Criminal Trespass statute criminalizes several categories of conduct relating to one person's interference with another's property. See generallyInd.Code § 35–43–2–2. In this case, the State charged the defendant with Criminal Trespass for violating Section 35–43–2–2(a)(2), which makes it a crime for a person who, “not having a contractual interest in the property, knowingly or intentionally refuses to leave the real property of another person after having been asked to leave by the other person or that person's agent.” 1 Thus, the State must prove that the defendant (1) knowingly or intentionally (2) refused to leave (3) the real property (4) of another person (5) after having been asked to leave (6) by the person or the person's agent (7) when such defendant lacked a

[970 N.E.2d 143]

contractual interest 2 in the real property.3See id. § 35–43–2–2(a)(2).

In proving the lack of a contractual interest, the State need not “disprove every conceivable contractual interest” that a defendant might have obtained in the real property at issue. Fleck, 508...

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23 practice notes
  • Semenick v. State, No. 49A02–1111–CR–1035.
    • United States
    • Indiana Court of Appeals of Indiana
    • October 9, 2012
    ...‘disprove every conceivable contractual interest’ that a defendant might have obtained in the real property at issue.” Lyles v. State, 970 N.E.2d 140, 143 (Ind.2012) (quoting Fleck v. State, 508 N.E.2d 539, 541 (Ind.1987)). “[T]he State satisfies its burden when it disproves those contractu......
  • Lock v. State, No. 35S04–1110–CR–622.
    • United States
    • Indiana Supreme Court of Indiana
    • July 26, 2012
    ...speculation-they reflect the possibility of a reasonable inference, which is all that is required. 1.See, e.g., Lyles v. State, 970 N.E.2d 140, 142–43 n. 3 (Ind.2012) (citing Russell v. State, 50 Ind. 174, 174 (1875)). “[I]n determining whether a statutory exception is a material element or......
  • Frink v. State, No. 73A05–1507–CR–761.
    • United States
    • Indiana Court of Appeals of Indiana
    • March 24, 2016
    ...as “a right, title, or legal share of real property arising out of a binding agreement between two or more parties.” Lyles v. State, 970 N.E.2d 140, 143 n. 2 (Ind.2012). The lack of a contractual interest in the real property at issue is a material element of the offense that the State must......
  • Donovan v. Hoosier Park, LLC, Court of Appeals Case No. 48A02-1608-PL-1704.
    • United States
    • Indiana Court of Appeals of Indiana
    • September 26, 2017
    ...Donovan intentionally returned to Hoosier Park on August 5, 2011. Thus, as a matter of law, Donovan was trespassing.8 See Lyles v. State, 970 N.E.2d 140, 143 (Ind. 2012) (evidence was sufficient defendant committed criminal trespass where defendant was neither an owner nor employee of bank,......
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23 cases
  • Semenick v. State, No. 49A02–1111–CR–1035.
    • United States
    • Indiana Court of Appeals of Indiana
    • October 9, 2012
    ...‘disprove every conceivable contractual interest’ that a defendant might have obtained in the real property at issue.” Lyles v. State, 970 N.E.2d 140, 143 (Ind.2012) (quoting Fleck v. State, 508 N.E.2d 539, 541 (Ind.1987)). “[T]he State satisfies its burden when it disproves those contractu......
  • Lock v. State, No. 35S04–1110–CR–622.
    • United States
    • Indiana Supreme Court of Indiana
    • July 26, 2012
    ...speculation-they reflect the possibility of a reasonable inference, which is all that is required. 1.See, e.g., Lyles v. State, 970 N.E.2d 140, 142–43 n. 3 (Ind.2012) (citing Russell v. State, 50 Ind. 174, 174 (1875)). “[I]n determining whether a statutory exception is a material element or......
  • Frink v. State, No. 73A05–1507–CR–761.
    • United States
    • Indiana Court of Appeals of Indiana
    • March 24, 2016
    ...as “a right, title, or legal share of real property arising out of a binding agreement between two or more parties.” Lyles v. State, 970 N.E.2d 140, 143 n. 2 (Ind.2012). The lack of a contractual interest in the real property at issue is a material element of the offense that the State must......
  • Donovan v. Hoosier Park, LLC, Court of Appeals Case No. 48A02-1608-PL-1704.
    • United States
    • Indiana Court of Appeals of Indiana
    • September 26, 2017
    ...Donovan intentionally returned to Hoosier Park on August 5, 2011. Thus, as a matter of law, Donovan was trespassing.8 See Lyles v. State, 970 N.E.2d 140, 143 (Ind. 2012) (evidence was sufficient defendant committed criminal trespass where defendant was neither an owner nor employee of bank,......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

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