Woods v. State
| Decision Date | 15 December 2004 |
| Docket Number | No. AP-74430.,AP-74430. |
| Citation | 152 S.W.3d 105 |
| Parties | Steven Michael WOODS, a/k/a Halo, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas. |
| Court | Texas Court of Criminal Appeals |
William Reagan Wynn, Fort Worth, for Appellant.
Kathleen A. Walsh, Asst. District Attorney, Denton, Matthew Paul, State's Attorney, Austin, for State.
Before the court en banc.
In August 2002, a Denton County jury convicted the appellant, Steven Michael Woods, of killing Ronald Whitehead and Bethena Brosz.1 Pursuant to the jury's answers to the special issues set forth in Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Article 37.071, §§ 2(b) and 2(e), the trial court sentenced the appellant to death.2 Direct appeal to this Court is automatic.3 The appellant raises seventeen points of error challenging his conviction and sentence. We will affirm.
In points of error fifteen, sixteen, and seventeen, the appellant argues that the trial court improperly restricted his questioning of prospective jurors during voir dire. He contends that, as a result, he was unable to intelligently exercise peremptory challenges and challenges for cause.
The trial court has broad discretion over the jury selection process.4 Voir dire could go on indefinitely if the trial court did not have the ability to impose reasonable limits on it.5 A trial court abuses its discretion only when it prohibits a proper question about a proper area of inquiry.6 A question is proper if it seeks to discover a juror's views on an issue applicable to the case.7 However, an otherwise proper question is impermissible if it attempts to commit the juror to a particular verdict based on particular facts.8 A voir dire question that is so vague or broad in nature as to constitute a global fishing expedition is also improper and may be prevented by the trial court.9
A. Commitment Question
The appellant asserts in point of error fifteen that the trial court improperly limited his voir dire questioning of venire member Kerri Denise Wyrick during the following exchange:
Q. And it mentions on there if you find sufficient mitigating circumstance or circumstances to warrant that a sentence of life imprisonment rather than a death sentence be imposed. It says "sufficient mitigating circumstance or circumstances." So do you understand that to mean that even one mitigating circumstance, if it's sufficient, is enough to award a life penalty instead of a death penalty?
A. I understand.
Q. Could you do that even if you'd already found a defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of committing a capital murder, you'd found special issue number 1, that the State proved that beyond a reasonable doubt, that you found on special issue number 2 that the State proved that beyond a reasonable doubt? If the State did all that, could you still support and vote for a life punishment if you found a sufficient mitigating circumstance?
Q. Would you be able to follow the law as to special issue number 3 if you found even one sufficient mitigating circumstance?
Defense counsel did not exercise a challenge for cause or a peremptory challenge against Wyrick, and she was seated on the jury.
The appellant argues that the question was proper because it sought to discover Wyrick's views on an issue applicable to the case, that is, whether she could fairly consider the mitigation special issue even if the jury had already answered yes to the future dangerousness and anti-parties special issues.10 The trial court sustained the State's objection that it was an improper commitment question.11 A commitment question can be proper or improper, depending on whether the question leads to a valid challenge for cause.12 For a commitment question to be proper, one of the possible answers to that question must give rise to a valid challenge for cause.13 If Wyrick had answered the question "no," then she would have been challengeable for cause.14 Thus, the trial court erred in refusing to allow the question to be asked.
The appropriate standard of harm is to disregard the error unless a substantial right has been affected.15 A substantial right is affected when the error has a substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict.16
The trial court's denial of a proper question in this case did not have a substantial or injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict because defense counsel was able to ask Wyrick essentially the same question. After the trial court sustained the State's objection, defense counsel immediately asked her, "Would you be able to follow the law as to special issue number 3 if you found even one sufficient mitigating circumstance?" and she replied, "Yes." Point of error fifteen is overruled.
The appellant complains in point of error sixteen that the trial court prevented him from asking venire member Michael Rudolf Ziegler the following question: "Could you be fair and impartial in a murder case where the people killed were under 25 years of age?" The prosecutor objected that the question was "contracting," and the trial court sustained the objection. Defense counsel exercised a peremptory strike against Ziegler.
The appellant similarly asserts in point of error seventeen that the trial court improperly limited his voir dire questioning of venire member Jerry Linsley during the following exchange:
Q. Can you be impartial in this case if the victims were young?
Q. Can you consider the life penalty where the victims were young?
Q. Can you be impartial if one of the victims is a young woman?
Q. Can you consider the life penalty if a victim was a young woman?
Defense counsel then said that he wanted to ask the same four questions of every venire member. He asked the trial court for a running objection with regard to all subsequent jurors. The trial court replied: "Well, I've sustained the objection on this juror, and if the exact same question were asked of subsequent jurors, the Court's ruling would be the same." Defense counsel did not exercise a challenge for cause or a peremptory strike against Linsley, and he was seated on the jury.
The questions that the appellant sought to ask Ziegler, Linsley, and the other venire members in this case are similar to the questions that we held to be improper in Barajas v. State.17 In Barajas, defense counsel desired to ask whether venire members could be impartial in an indecency case involving a victim who was eight to ten years old or, in the alternative, a victim who was nine years old.18 Defense counsel also sought to ask whether venire members could consider probation in a case involving a victim who was eight to ten years old.19 We held in Barajas that these questions constituted global fishing expeditions and the trial court was within its discretion to prevent defense counsel from asking them.20 The trial court did not abuse its discretion in preventing a similar fishing expedition in the instant case. Points of error sixteen and seventeen are overruled.
In points of error seven and eight, the appellant argues that the trial court improperly prevented him from cross-examining the State's witness Brian Young about his prison sentence and his prospects for parole. At the time of the appellant's trial, Young was serving a sentence for aggravated assault. Prior to calling Young to testify, the prosecutor made an oral motion in limine seeking to bar defense counsel from questioning Young about the fact that he was currently in custody and about the length of his sentence. The trial court granted the motion in limine and permitted defense counsel to question Young about the specifics of his conviction outside the presence of the jury for purposes of the record. In response to defense counsel's questions, Young testified that he had served nearly eight months of his two-year sentence and that he was aware of the possibility that he could be placed on parole, but that no one promised him anything in exchange for his testimony. When defense counsel asked Young if he expected "some kind of favorable treatment or good time" in exchange for his testimony, he responded: "From my understanding, my case does not merit good time because it is an aggravated charge, and as for the rest of that, I have absolutely no idea." The following exchange took place after defense counsel finished questioning Young:
The appellant argues on appeal that the limitation on his cross-examination of Young violated his rights under the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment and Rule 613(b) of the Texas Rules of Evidence.
The proponent of evidence to show bias must show that the evidence is relevant. The proponent does this by demonstrating that a nexus, or logical connection, exists between the witness's testimony and the witness's potential motive to testify in favor of the other party.21 We have found a nexus when a witness has been indicted or is serving a period of...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Johnson v. State
...the standard. (Br. at 37.) "[T]he better practice is to give no definition of reasonable doubt at all to the jury." Woods v. State, 152 S.W.3d 105, 115 (Tex.Crim.App.2004) (quoting Paulson v. State, 28 S.W.3d 570, 573 (Tex. Crim.App.2000)). Voir-dire examination may not "suggest to" a venir......
-
State v. Staten
...[the victim] intended to confront him if he continued" was not testimonial. The Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas, in Woods v. State, 152 S.W.3d 105 (Tex.Crim.App.2004), analyzed the co-defendant's out-of-court statements to two acquaintances, indicating his involvement in murders with the......
-
State v. Davis
...found it unlikely that Weeks made the statements under the reasonable belief that they would be used prosecutorially. Woods v. State, 152 S.W.3d 105 (Tex.Crim.App.2004), found incriminating statements made by a co-defendant to acquaintances at a coffee shop were nontestimonial. The statemen......
-
Franklin v. State
...277 Ga. 724, 595 S.E.2d 76, 80 (2004) (holding that an excited utterance made to a friend was not testimonial); Woods v. State, 152 S.W.3d 105, 114 (Tex. Crim.App.2004) (holding that a codefendant's spontaneous statements to two different third-party acquaintances were not testimonial becau......
-
Evidence
...ref’d ). The courts instead look to applicable hearsay rules to review the admissibility of non-testimonial statements. Woods v. State, 152 S.W.3d 105, 113 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004). EVIDENCE §16:71 Texas Criminal Lawyer’s Handbook 16-88 However, at least one court has held that if the hearsay......
-
Evidence
...ref’d ). The courts instead look to applicable hearsay rules to review the admissibility of non-testimonial statements. Woods v. State, 152 S.W.3d 105, 113 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004). However, at least one court has held that if the hearsay evidence sought to be admitted is nontestimonial hears......
-
Evidence
...ref’d ). The courts instead look to applicable hearsay rules to review the admissibility of non-testimonial statements. Woods v. State, 152 S.W.3d 105, 113 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004). However, at least one court has held that if the hearsay evidence sought to be admitted is non-testimonial hear......
-
Evidence
...ref’d ). The courts instead look to applicable hearsay rules to review the admissibility of non-testimonial statements. Woods v. State, 152 S.W.3d 105, 113 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004). However, at least one court has held that if the hearsay evidence sought to be admitted is non-testimonial hear......