Woodsmall v. Eclipse Mfg. Co., Inc.

Decision Date23 January 2002
Docket NumberNo. 1:01-CV-21.,1:01-CV-21.
Citation249 F.Supp.2d 918
PartiesDensel WOODSMALL, Plaintiff, v. ECLIPSE MANUFACTURING CO., INC., Defendant.
CourtU.S. District Court — Eastern District of Tennessee

Anita B. Hardeman, Harry F. Burnette, Burnette, Dobson & Hardeman, Chattanooga, TN, for plaintiff.

William H. Pickering, Chambliss, Banner & Stophel, PC, Chattanooga, TN, Alaric A. Henry, Melissa A. Moreau, Luther Anderson, PLLP, Chattanooga, TN, for defendant.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

EDGAR, Chief Judge.

Plaintiff Densel Woodsmall brings this action against his former employer, Eclipse Manufacturing Co., Inc. ("Eclipse"), pursuant to the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA"), 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634. Woodsmall claims that Eclipse fired him from his job as plant manager because of his age. Presently before the Court is Eclipse's motion for summary judgment. For the following reasons, this motion (Court File No. 23) shall be DENIED.

Standard of Review

FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c) provides that summary judgment will be rendered if there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The burden is on the moving party to conclusively show that no genuine issue of material fact exists, and the Court must view the facts and all inferences to be drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986); Morris v. Crete Carrier Corp., 105 F.3d 279, 280-81 (6th Cir.1997); White v. Turfway Park Racing Ass'n, Inc., 909 F.2d 941, 943 (6 Cir.1990); 60 Ivy Street Corp. v. Alexander, 822 F.2d 1432, 1435 (6th Cir.1987).

Once the moving party presents evidence sufficient to support a motion under Rule 56, the nonmoving party is not entitled to a trial merely on the basis of allegations. The nonmoving party is required to come forward with some significant probative evidence which makes it necessary to resolve the factual dispute at trial. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); White, 909 F.2d at 943-44; 60 Ivy Street, 822 F.2d at 1435. The moving party is entitled to summary judgment if the nonmoving party fails to make a sufficient showing on an essential element of the nonmoving party's case with respect to which the nonmoving party has the burden of proof. Celotex, All U.S. at 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548; Collyer v. Darling, 98 F.3d 211, 220 (6th Cir.1996).

The judge's function at the point of summary judgment is limited to determining whether sufficient evidence has been presented to make the issue of fact a proper jury question, and not to weigh the evidence, judge the credibility of witnesses, and determine the truth of the matter. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., All U.S. 242, 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); 60 Ivy Street, 822 F.2d at 1435-36. The standard for summary judgment mirrors the standard for directed verdict. The Court must determine "whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law." Anderson, All U.S. at 251-52, 106 S.Ct. 2505; see also Lapeer County, Mich. v. Montgomery County, Ohio, 108 F.3d 74, 78 (6th Cir.1997). There must be some probative evidence from which the jury could reasonably find for the nonmoving party. Anderson, All U.S. at 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505; Bailey v. Floyd County Bd. of Educ, 106 F.3d 135, 140 (6th Cir.1997). If the Court concludes that a fair-minded jury could not return a verdict in favor of the nonmoving party based on the evidence presented, it may enter a summary judgment. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 251-52, 106 S.Ct. 2505; University of Cincinnati v. Arkwright Mut. Ins. Co., 51 F.3d 1277, 1280 (6th Cir.1995); LaPointe v. UAW, Local 600, 8 F.3d 376, 378 (6th Cir.1993).

II Facts

For purposes of ruling on Eclipse's motion for summary judgment, the Court views the facts in the light most favorable to Woodsmall, the nonmoving party. The factual findings contained herein are made solely for the purpose of ruling on the present motion. Additional facts shall be discussed at relevant points in the Court's analysis below.

Eclipse manufactures component parts for a wide variety of customers in many types of industries. The company manufactures products such as lawn mower parts by metal stamping. The company's headquarters is in Sheboygan, Wisconsin.

During the 1980s Eclipse began considering the idea of opening a satellite manufacturing plant in the southeast. In 1988 Eclipse chose Pikeville, Tennessee for its new plant location. The satellite plant opened in 1989. Three employees worked in the new plant when it opened.

As the plant grew, Eclipse determined that a plant manager was needed in Pikeville. Densel Woodsmall was the only applicant for the position. Although Woodsmall lacked prior experience in the metal stamping business, he had vast experience working as a plant manager in an industrial setting. Richard Leicht, Jr., Eclipse's president, and Jeffrey Leicht ("Leicht"), Eclipse's vice president in charge of operations, decided to hire plaintiff. Woodsmall became the Pikeville facility's plant manager in 1992. At that time he was fifty years old.

Under Woodsmall's guidance, the Pikeville plant grew from between fifteen and twenty-five employees to more than eighty. The physical plant expanded from 11,000 square feet to 65,000 square feet. The plant increased the number of presses it ran from three to fifteen. When Woodsmall started his job as plant manager, the plant ran for one shift during the day. Over time, it began running three continuous shifts and requiring overtime work to meet production needs.

Woodsmall received a raise in pay and a bonus each year he worked as plant manager with the exception of his final year of employment, during which the company froze all wages. He enjoyed excellent customer ratings and rapport. All of his performance evaluations through 1997 were positive. Part of Woodsmall's written job description required him to "[a]ttract the new, young persons into technical training positions within the company." (Plaintiffs Ex. A). Woodsmall contends that Leicht continually instructed him to recruit young technical personnel.

During Woodsmall's 1997 performance review, Leicht expressly noted that Woodsmall had ten years to go before he reached retirement age. (Plaintiffs Ex. D). He told Woodsmall that he didn't realize plaintiff was "that old." Leicht stated that "[w]e don't need someone here waiting to retire." Leicht's own deposition testimony acknowledges that he could have made this statement. Plaintiff contends that his relationship with Leicht then began to deteriorate.

Around this time, Woodsmall began thinking ahead toward retirement. In the latter part of 1998, at the age of fifty-seven, Woodsmall inquired about the retirement benefits for which he would be eligible at the age of sixty-two. Woodsmall wanted to compare those benefits with those he would be eligible for at the age of sixty-five. Lynne Keene, a senior benefits administrator, provided this information on or about August 13, 1998. (Plaintiffs Ex. E).

Sometime in 1998 or 1999, Leicht appointed Jim Morgan, who Woodsmall had hired as a part-time production worker, as a "corporate trainer." Morgan watched Woodsmall's management of the plant and reported all perceived negative occurrences to the Leichts. (Morgan aff.).

Also around this time Terri Dempsey complained to Eclipse that Woodsmall had been sexually harassing her. She stated that Woodsmall occasionally rubbed her shoulder when she sat at her computer, placed his hand on her pants-clad knee a couple of times while he showed her how to perform a task, seemed to brush close to her as he passed by, and sometimes complimented her on her appearance. Dempsey also told Eclipse management that she believed that Woodsmall wanted to kiss her on one occasion. These complaints were never formalized or investigated. Woodsmall was never made aware of any complaints during his employment with Eclipse. Leicht chose not to discuss the matter with Woodsmall because he "absolutely" believed Dempsey. (Leicht depo., p. 85). Woodsmall denies that he sexually harassed Dempsey at any time.

In 1999, Eclipse decided to reorganize the Pikeville plant. The responsibility of placing order information into the computer system was taken from Woodsmall and given to Dempsey. Eclipse disregarded the fact that Dempsey was recognized as being immature in her work habits, attributing that problem to her age. Dempsey was under thirty years old. (Plaintiffs Ex. F). Woodsmall had already experienced problems with Dempsey's absenteeism and performance errors. He asserts that her poor habits continued to undermine his performance as plant manager in 1999.

Although 1999 was one of Pikeville's most profitable years, Woodsmall's summer performance evaluation was negative. During the performance review, Leicht repeated that he did not want people waiting around to retire. He admitted that the decision to terminate Woodsmall had already been made for all intents and purposes, but that Eclipse was waiting for the most opportune time to carry out the inevitable. Leicht admitted that it would be easier and better for Eclipse if Woodsmall chose to resign.

In January 2000, Leicht called Woodsmall into his office and terminated his employment. His termination letter stated that the termination was due to profitability, communication, and compliance. The letter did not mention Dempsey's sexual harassment complaint. Woodsmall was fifty-nine at the time of his termination.

Beginning on the day Woodsmall was fired, Leicht began acting as the plant manager. Eclipse did not search for a new plant manager, planning to transition Morgan into that position. When Morgan proved to be the wrong choice, Eclipse hired Donald Schomisch i...

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