Woodson v. Milwaukee & St. Paul Railway Co.

• Decision Date: 05 October 1874
• Citation: 21 Minn. 60
• Parties: MILTON J. WOODSON <I>vs.</I> MILWAUKEE AND ST. PAUL RAILWAY COMPANY.
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

21 Minn. 60

MILTON J. WOODSONvs.

MILWAUKEE AND ST. PAUL RAILWAY COMPANY.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

October 5, 1874.

This action was brought in the district court for Mower county, to recover damages for the destruction of a stack of hay, on land of the plaintiff adjoining the defendant's railroad, by fire alleged to have been caused by the defendant's negligence in operating its road. At the trial before Lord, J., the plaintiff having rested his case, the defendant moved for a dismissal, on the ground that plaintiff had failed to show any negligence, or to raise any presumption of negligence, on the part of the defendant; that he had failed to prove that the fire was caused by sparks or coals from defendant's engine; and that he had failed to prove that the defendant was a corporation, duly organized under the laws of this state, as alleged in the complaint, and, (as claimed by defendant,) denied in the answer. The motion was denied, and defendant excepted. The allegation of the complaint, and the denial in the answer as to defendant's incorporation, and the evidence introduced by plaintiff at the trial to show the origin of the fire, and the defendant's negligence, are stated in the opinion. The following instructions were asked by the defendant: "First. The mere fact that the fire was set by sparks or coals from defendant's engine, raises no such presumption of negligence as would entitle plaintiff to recover," which instruction the court refused, and defendant excepted. The court then gave the instruction, with the following qualification: "But such fact may be considered in connection with other facts and circumstances in this case.

"Second. If the jury find from the evidence that the engine which, it is claimed, set the fire, was constructed according to the most approved plans, and was in good condition, and was being operated and used by a skilful engineer and fireman in the customary manner, then they must find that there was no negligence on the part of the defendant;" which instruction was refused, and the defendant excepted.

The jury found a verdict for the plaintiff, upon which judgment was entered, and defendant appealed.

Gordon E. Cole and E. O. Wheeler, for appellant.

J. M. Greenman, for respondent.

YOUNG, J.

The complaint alleges that "the defendant, a corporation duly organized under the laws of this state, were the owners of a certain railroad," etc. The answer is as follows: "The defendant above named answers the complaint in this action as follows: First, defendant admits that at the time mentioned in said complaint, they were the owners of a certain railroad, etc., as stated in folio 1 of the complaint. Second, defendant denies each and every other allegation in said complaint contained," etc.

The admission of ownership of the railroad, "as stated in folio 1 of the complaint," might, perhaps, not unreasonably be held to be an express admission of ownership by defendant as a corporation, for such is in effect the allegation in the complaint. Moreover, the name by which the defendant is sued, and by which it answers, implies that it is a corporation, (Woolf v. City Steamboat Co., 7 C. B. 103,) and the language of the complaint and answer, in which both the singular and plural number are employed in referring to the defendant, implies that the defendant is not an individual, but is an aggregation or association of individuals under a common name. Such an association could not, unless incorporated, be the owner of a railway, which is real estate. German Land Association v. Scholler, 10 Minn. 331. The admission by the defendant of its existence under the name by which it is impleaded, and of its ownership of the railroad in that name, and as an association involves the admission that it is a corporation, not only for the purpose of owning a railroad, but for the purpose of being sued on liabilities growing out of its conduct as such owner; and this admission must control the general denial. The case is therefore clearly distinguishable from Gott v. Adams Express Co., 100 Mass. 320, relied upon by the defendant.

One of the plaintiff's witnesses testified that the fire broke out on the defendant's land, about fifteen feet from the end of the ties, immediately after the passing of the train. He found a few coals at that place. There was no wood, but only grass, where these coals were found. A high wind was blowing, and the season was dry. Other witnesses testified to the breaking out of other fires along the line...