Woodson v. Porter Brown Limestone Co., Inc.

• Decision Date: 14 February 1996
• Citation: 64 USLW 2569,916 S.W.2d 896
• Parties: Bennie WOODSON, as Administrator of the Estate of Elizabeth W. Terrell, Deceased, and as Administrator of the Estate of John Thomas Woodson, Deceased, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. PORTER BROWN LIMESTONE COMPANY, INC., and Felix Ewing Morris, Defendants/Appellees.
• Court: Tennessee Supreme Court

Page 896

916 S.W.2d 896

64 USLW 2569

Bennie WOODSON, as Administrator of the Estate of Elizabeth W. Terrell, Deceased, and as Administrator of the Estate of John Thomas Woodson, Deceased Plaintiff-Appellant, v. PORTER BROWN LIMESTONE COMPANY, INC., and Felix Ewing Morris, Defendants/Appellees.

Supreme Court of Tennessee at Nashville.

Feb. 14, 1996.

Appeal from the Circuit Court, Cheatham County; Robert E. Burch, Judge.

Ann Buntin Steiner and Frank Steiner, Steiner & Steiner, Nashville, for Plaintiff/Appellant.

Robert E. Hoehn and John B. Carlson, Watkins, McGugin, McNeilly & Rowan, Nashville, for Defendants/Appellees.

OPINION

WHITE, Justice.

In this appeal from the Cheatham County Circuit Court, we are confronted by a unique aberration of the rules of law announced by the United States Supreme Court in Batson v. Kentucky, Powers v. Ohio, and Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Company, Inc. In that series of cases, the United States Supreme Court recognized first, that the criminal defendant's rights are violated when race-based challenges exclude a juror from service, Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1985); second, that the exclusion likewise violates a juror's rights, Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 111 S.Ct. 1364, 113 L.Ed.2d 411 (1991); and third, that the juror's and litigant's rights are viable in civil, as well as criminal, cases. Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Company, Inc., 500 U.S. 614, 111 S.Ct. 2077, 114 L.Ed.2d 660 (1991). In the case before the Court we must consider the impact of these rules in a civil case in which the excluded minority juror declines to serve.

The parties view the issue before us differently. Plaintiff states the constitutional issue before the Court as follows:

Does a black litigant in a civil action have standing to contest a jury tainted by a racially based peremptory challenge of the sole black member of the jury panel?

Defendants, conversely, phrase the issue as whether the trial court properly determined that the juror waived his right by knowingly and voluntarily refusing to sit on the jury. For the reasons set forth below, we reverse the Court of Appeals' decision in this matter and remand the case for a new trial.

I. Facts

In this wrongful death action, plaintiff's decedents were killed when their car was struck by a gravel truck driven by defendant Felix Morris, an employee of defendant Porter Brown Limestone Company, Inc. Plaintiff's theory of the case was that defendant Morris had failed to see the automobile driven by plaintiff's decedent and had collided into the rear of the car killing the two occupants. Plaintiff also theorized that defendant Porter Brown was liable because of its negligent entrustment of the vehicle to defendant Morris knowing of his prior accident history and his failure to wear corrective lenses which plaintiff claimed had been prescribed. Defendants' theory of the case was that plaintiff's decedent, Elizabeth Terrell, who had stopped on the side of the road, pulled her vehicle into the path of Morris' truck and that he could not avoid hitting her. Though expert and eyewitness testimony supported both versions, the jury determined that plaintiff's decedent was one hundred percent responsible for the accident and, accordingly, rendered judgment for defendants.

During the jury selection, defendants exercised a peremptory challenge to exclude the sole black juror from the venire. ¹ The court excused the juror, and the others challenged peremptorily, but asked that they remain temporarily in the courtroom. ² Plaintiff's counsel requested permission to approach the bench and, in the bench conference that followed, objected to the challenge of the black juror. Upon hearing the objection, the court required each counsel to "detail the reasons for [the] challenges." After the written reasons were passed to the court, ³ the court, in the following manner, called the excluded juror to the bench and informed the juror that he had a right to serve on the jury:

With the law changing daily, it's my opinion that all that--in any situation where a member of the jury is excused, that is the juror's right as a member of the fair community, that he can continue to sit on the jury, but it is your right.

The juror responded: "I'd rather not exercise that right." The court thanked and excused the juror without further comment on the record.

An all-white jury was seated. During the plaintiff's case in chief, plaintiff offered evidence of defendant Morris' driving record to establish that defendant Porter Brown had negligently entrusted the responsibility of operating the truck to defendant Morris. Plaintiff proffered that since 1981, defendant Morris had been involved in nine accidents, at least two of which involved rear-end collisions. The court disallowed the evidence, finding that its admission would be more prejudicial than probative. After defendants offered evidence that Morris was conscientious about his truck's condition and that he and other drivers were routinely advised to be careful, plaintiff again attempted to introduce the evidence of the prior accidents. The court disallowed the introduction in rebuttal as well.

On appeal, plaintiff attacks the exclusion of the juror and the evidence and alleges that both entitle plaintiff to a new trial. Plaintiff also contends that the venue of the new trial should be transferred. The Court of Appeals disagreed with plaintiff on each issue and affirmed the trial court's judgment for defendants.

On the first issue, the intermediate court enumerated the three interests implicated in the Supreme Court cases: the juror's equal protection rights; the litigant's equal protection rights; and the judicial system's interest in maintaining public confidence. In affirming, the appellate court held that:

1. the trial court protected the juror's right by offering him the right to serve;

2. a civil litigant's right to a jury chosen in a nondiscriminatory manner is less compelling than a criminal defendant's whose liberty interests are implicated; ⁴

3. the judicial process was not affected since the judge offered the juror the opportunity to serve.

Finally, the court held that the trial judge had not abused his discretion in offering the juror the choice of serving or not serving on the jury. On the evidentiary issue, the court likewise affirmed the trial judge.

We have granted review to consider this important constitutional issue and to discuss the appropriate procedures for trial judges faced with juror challenges which may run afoul of the constitution. While we agree with the Court of Appeals' enumeration of the three competing interests involved in these cases, we disagree with their conclusions. First, we note that in Tennessee, jury service is a legal responsibility as well as a right. Secondly, we disagree that the constitutional principle of equal protection is subject to stricter standards in criminal cases. Finally, we disagree that the judicial process was not affected by the court's "offer" to allow the juror to serve in this case. For those reasons and the others set forth, we reverse and remand for a new trial. As a result of the remand of this case for a new trial, we will address the evidentiary issues as well.

II. Issues

A. Excluded Juror

Since as early as 1880, it has consistently been recognized that racially-based juror exclusions affect and injure the integrity of the justice system. See e.g., Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 25 L.Ed. 664 (1880); Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587, 55 S.Ct. 579, 79 L.Ed. 1074 (1935); Hollins v. Oklahoma, 295 U.S. 394, 55 S.Ct. 784, 79 L.Ed. 1500 (1935) (per curiam); Ballard v. United States, 329 U.S. 187, 67 S.Ct. 261, 91 L.Ed. 181 (1946); Carter v. Jury Comm'n of Greene County, 396 U.S. 320, 90 S.Ct. 518, 24 L.Ed.2d 549 (1970). For over one hundred years, discrimination in the jury selection process has constituted a federal criminal offense. 18 U.S.C. § 243 (1969). More recently, in a series of cases, the United States Supreme Court has recognized that the injury inherent in discriminatory juror selection taints the judicial process and "extends beyond that inflicted on the [litigant] and the excluded juror to touch the entire community." Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 87, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 1718, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986). The exclusion "undermine[s] public confidence in the fairness of our system of justice." Id. at 87, 106 S.Ct. at 1718.

Thus, in Batson v. Kentucky, the Court held that a criminal defendant could challenge the exclusion of racial minorities on equal protection grounds. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986). There a black criminal defendant challenged the prosecution's use of peremptory challenges to exclude all the black members of the venire. The United States Supreme Court held that the equal protection clause guarantees defendant that the State will not exclude members of defendant's race from the venire on account of race. Id. at 97-98, 106 S.Ct. at 1723-24.

The Batson Court outlined the appropriate procedure for raising the equal protection challenge. First, defendant must establish a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination. Defendant "may make out a prima facie case by showing that the totality of the relevant facts gives rise to an inference of discriminatory purpose." Id. at 94, 106 S.Ct. at 1721. This showing may include proof of systematic exclusion, substantial underrepresentation on the venire, or the selection methods and results solely in the present case. Id. at 95, 106 S.Ct. at 1722. ⁵ As to the purposeful requirement, defendant is entitled to rely on the nature of the peremptory challenge--that it permits " 'those to discriminate who are of a mind to discriminate.' " Id. at 96, 106 S.Ct. at 1723 (quoting Avery v. Georgia, 345 U.S. 559, 562, 73 S.Ct. 891, 892 97 L.Ed. 1244 (1953)). In the end, defendant must establish that a consideration of...