Woodville v. Morrill

Decision Date18 June 1915
Docket Number19,211 - (134)
PartiesRHODERICK M. WOODVILLE v. FRANK H. MORRILL
CourtMinnesota Supreme Court

Rhoderick M. Woodville, a brother of the testator, filed objections in the probate court for Rice county to the allowance of the last will and testament of Robert W Woodville, deceased, presented to the court by Frank H Morrill, the executor named therein. From the order of the probate court admitting the will to probate, contestant appealed to the district court. The appeal was heard by Childress, J., who made findings and ordered judgment affirming the order of the probate court. From an order denying his motion for a new trial, contestant appealed. Affirmed.

SYLLABUS

Will -- when testator is presumed insane.

1. A person who has been adjudged insane and committed to an insane hospital, though at liberty on parole but not discharged, is presumed to be mentally incompetent to make a will. The presumption is not conclusive and may be rebutted by showing that the derangement of mind was not general, but limited, and had no necessary reference to the subject matter of the will.

Proof of undue influence.

2. Undue influence necessary to set aside a will, must appear from affirmative evidence and, apart from declarations of the testator, be of a character to destroy the free agency of the testator in the disposition of his property. In re Hess' Will, 48 Minn. 504, followed and applied.

Finding sustained by evidence.

3. The trial court found as facts that testator was of sound and disposing mind, and that the will in contest was not procured by fraud or undue influence. It is held that the findings are not clearly or manifestly against the evidence, within the rule guiding this court in the review of such questions.

J. W. LeCrone and Joseph Donaldson, for appellant.

Lucius A. Smith, Frank H. Morrill and Frank H. Castner, for respondent.

OPINION

BROWN, C.J.

Robert W. Woodville, a resident of Rice county, died on the seventeenth day of March, 1913, leaving what purported to be his last will and testament, in and by which he disposed of all and singular his property and effects. Subsequent to his death the will was duly presented to the probate court for allowance. Appellant, a brother of the testator, appeared and contested the allowance and probate of the will upon the grounds: (1) That the testator was of unsound mind and without testamentary capacity; and (2) that the will was procured by fraud, duress and undue influence. After hearing before the probate court, the grounds of contest were held not sustained by the evidence, and the will was allowed and duly admitted to probate. Contestant appealed to the district court, where the issues were tried before the court without a jury, and resulted in an affirmance of the order of the probate court; the district court having found that testator was of sound and disposing mind, and that the will was not procured by fraud or undue influence. Contestant appealed from an order denying a new trial.

The only question presented by the record is whether the evidence sufficiently supports the findings of the trial court. Upon that question our conclusion, after a somewhat full and careful consideration of the evidence, is that the findings cannot, within the rule guiding this court in the determination of such questions, be disturbed. If it be conceded that this court would not have reached the conclusion that testator was mentally competent at the time of the execution of the will, had the question originally been submitted here, that furnishes no sufficient reason for overturning the findings of the trial court. 1 Dunnell, Minn. Dig. § 415. To justify that result the findings must be clearly and manifestly against the evidence. 1 Dunnell, Minn. Dig. § 411. Buck v. Buck, 126 Minn. 275, 148 N.W. 117. We are unable to reach that conclusion in the case at bar.

1. Testator was a native of the state of Massachusetts, but removed to and took up his residence at or near Northfield, in this state, many years ago, where he remained until his death, living the life of a bachelor until of the age of about 76 years. He was eccentric, and singularly peculiar in his habits of life, yet industrious and accumulated considerable property, which at the time of his death was of the value of about $15,000. He had no children and his wife died prior to the execution of the will in question. He left surviving him a brother residing at Minneapolis, and two or more nieces and nephews. By his will he bequeathed to his brother, who is blind, and to the nieces and nephews the sum of ten cents each, and devised and bequeathed the remainder of his property to non-related persons who had befriended him, and to certain colleges, a charitable institution, and to the city of his residence. To the latter he gave $1,000 for the public library; $1,000 for the support of a rest room to be established by the city; to St. Olaf's College $1,000; to the Odd Fellows' Home, $1,000, and the residue to Carleton College. The colleges named, and also the Odd Fellows' Home, are located at Northfield, where testator resided for many years. One particularly significant feature of the will is the trivial bequest to his next of kin. In the year 1904, then of the age of 76, testator married a young woman, who died in March 1909, some four years later. Subsequent to her death testator's eccentric and peculiar characteristics became more conspicuous and noticeable. He was anxious for another wife and advertised for one in the newspapers. In response thereto several women applicants made visits to Northfield, and he presented them with gifts of money; to one he gave a diamond ring. In his efforts in this respect he spent considerable money, and expressed his willingness to turn all his property over to the woman who could "play the piano [was] morally and intellectually sound," and would marry him. His efforts were not successful. Lunacy proceedings were duly commenced in the probate court, and resulted on January 31, 1910, in his commitment to the hospital for the insane. In March following a guardian was appointed to control and manage his property. He complained bitterly of this commitment, and was released on parole after two months confinement, remaining at liberty until his death. After his release he applied to the probate court for an order removing his guardian, and the application was granted, but on appeal the order of the probate court was reversed, but for what reason does not appear from the record. The guardian continued to manage the property until testator died. His release from the asylum was procured by friends who believed that he was improperly committed, and on their assurance that he would be cared for, and not because of a conclusion on the part of the asylum authorities that he had been cured of his mental infirmity. The will was signed and executed on June 21, 1911, over a year after testator's release, and he died on March 17, 1913, at the age of 84. The evidence shows, and of this there is no controversy, that at about the date of the will testator procured the services of an attorney, residing in Minneapolis, to draw the same, who proceeded to the residence of testator for that purpose. The evidence also tends to show that the terms of the will were dictated by testator without suggestion from any source. His attention was called to his relatives, but he indicated an adverse feeling toward them, and a purpose not to leave any of his property to them, and the will was drawn accordingly. He subsequently stated to several persons that he had executed his will, and made some extravagant statements as to the terms and provisions thereof, particularly to his guardian, many of which were without foundation.

The rules of law applied in this state upon questions of testamentary capacity are well summed up in 3 Dunnell, Minn Dig. § 10208, and need not here be repeated. Reference will however be made to some of the authorities. The adjudication of insanity and the commitment of testator to the asylum raised a presumption of mental incapacity to make the will, and the presumption continued, notwithstanding testator had been released on parole, there being no formal discharge from the asylum. 28 Am. & Eng. Enc. (2d ed.) 94; ...

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