Woodward v. Epps

• Decision Date: 21 August 2009
• Docket Number: No. 06-70053.,06-70053.
• Citation: 580 F.3d 318
• Parties: Paul Everette WOODWARD, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Christopher B. EPPS, Commissioner, Mississippi Department of Corrections, Respondent-Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

580 F.3d 318

Paul Everette WOODWARD, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Christopher B. EPPS, Commissioner, Mississippi Department of Corrections, Respondent-Appellee.

No. 06-70053.

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

August 21, 2009.

C. Jackson Williams (argued) (Court-Appointed), Oxford, MS, Nathan Henry Elmore (Court-Appointed), Jackson, MS, for Woodward.

Marvin L. White, Jr. (argued), Jackson, MS, for Epps.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi.

Before BARKSDALE, STEWART and PRADO, Circuit Judges.

CARL E. STEWART, Circuit Judge:

Paul Woodward was convicted of capital murder and sentenced to death. After exhausting state court proceedings, Woodward filed a petition for habeas relief in the federal district court. The district court denied the requested relief, but it issued a certificate of appealability ("COA") as to three issues: whether Woodward's constitutional rights were violated (i) when his trial counsel conceded guilt to the jury without first securing Woodward's consent; (ii) by his attorney's failure to object to the State's use of other bad acts in its closing arguments; and (iii) by the trial court's refusal to provide Woodward with funds to secure an independent psychiatrist to (a) help prepare a mitigation defense and (b) help prepare defense counsel for cross-examination of the state's mental health experts. The district court denied, but this court granted, Woodward's request for a COA on a fourth issue, whether the State's use of peremptory challenges at Woodward's resentencing violated his Fourteenth Amendment right to equal protection under Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986).¹ For the foregoing reasons, we affirm.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On appeal, Woodward does not dispute the facts of the crime as recounted by the Mississippi Supreme Court in Woodward v. State, 843 So.2d 1 (Miss.2003) ("Woodward IV"):

Around noon on July 23, 1986, Rhonda Crane, age twenty-four, was traveling on Mississippi Highway 29 south of New Augusta in Perry County, Mississippi to join her parents on a camping trip. A white male driving a white log truck forced her car to stop in the middle of the road. The white male then exited the truck with a pistol in his hand and forced Crane to get into his truck. The man then drove the victim to an isolated area, forced her out of his truck and into the woods at gunpoint and forced her to have sexual relations with him. Rhonda Crane was shot in the back of her head and died.

Crane's automobile was left on the highway with the engine running, the driver's door open and her purse on the car seat. A motorist traveling in a vehicle on the same highway saw a white colored, unloaded, logging truck moving away from the Crane vehicle, and notified the authorities. Additionally, a housewife residing on a bluff along the highway at the location of the Crane car noted a logging truck with a white cab stop in front of her driveway. A white male exited and walked toward the back of his truck and returned with a blonde haired woman wearing yellow clothing. As he held her by her arm, the male yelled sufficiently loud for the housewife to hear the words "get in, get in," and forced the blonde woman into the driver's door of the truck and then drove off. The housewife investigated the scene on the highway in front of her house, discovered the abandoned Crane car, and notified the authorities.

Law enforcement officers began an investigation to locate Crane. The officers discovered that Paul Everette Woodward unloaded logs at a pulp mill and departed the yard at 11:36 a.m. in a white Mack log truck. Woodward arrived at his wood yard at approximately 12:45 to 1:00 p.m. The yard manager noted that he was late arriving at the yard and was wet from sweating. A drive from the mill to the wood yard takes approximately thirty minutes. A sheriff's deputy stopped Woodward, who was driving a white Mack logging truck, around 2:00 p.m. on the afternoon of July 23, to ask if he had seen anything that would assist in the investigation of Rhonda Crane's disappearance. Woodward replied that he had not seen anything. Through the investigation, it was ascertained that Woodward was the only driver of a white logging truck operating at the nearby timber yards on that date. On the following day, Crane's body was located in the nearby wooded area by her father and a friend.

Woodward was arrested, and ultimately he made both written and videotaped confessions. Woodward also confessed to his employer over the telephone.

Id. at 4-5.

Woodward was charged with kidnapping, oral sexual battery, and capital murder with an underlying crime of rape. He was tried before a jury and convicted of all counts. In a separate sentencing hearing, the jury sentenced Woodward to death for the capital murder conviction.² Woodward appealed, raising numerous issues regarding the guilt-innocence phase and the sentencing phase of the trial. The Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed the conviction and sentence. Woodward v. State, 533 So.2d 418 (Miss.1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1028, 109 S.Ct. 1767, 104 L.Ed.2d 202 (1989), reh'g denied, 490 U.S. 1117, 109 S.Ct. 3179, 104 L.Ed.2d 1041 (1989) ("Woodward I").

Woodward then filed his first application for post-conviction relief to the Mississippi Supreme Court, and the court vacated his death sentence and remanded for a new sentencing. See Woodward v. State, 635 So.2d 805 (Miss.1993) ("Woodward II"). On remand, the court again imposed the death sentence, which was affirmed on direct appeal. Woodward v. State, 726 So.2d 524 (Miss.1997), cert. denied 526 U.S. 1041, 119 S.Ct. 1338, 143 L.Ed.2d 502 (1999) ("Woodward III"). Woodward filed another petition for post-conviction relief, which the Mississippi Supreme Court denied. Woodward IV, 843 So.2d at 21.

Woodward filed his federal habeas petition in March 2004, and the district court denied relief. Woodward sought a COA on four issues, relating to (1) his counsel's concession of guilt without securing his consent; (2) his counsel's failure to object to the introduction of other bad acts; (3) the trial court's refusal to fund an independent psychiatrist on re-sentencing; and (4) an alleged violation of Batson, based on the State's use of peremptory challenges to strike every black juror. The district court granted a COA on issues 1, 2, and 3, and denied a COA for issue 4; and we granted a COA for that issue: whether Woodward was entitled to habeas relief under Batson.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act ("AEDPA") controls our review in this case. See Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782, 792, 121 S.Ct. 1910, 150 L.Ed.2d 9 (2001); Wood v. Quarterman, 491 F.3d 196, 201 (5th Cir.2007). 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) prohibits a federal court from granting a petition for a writ of habeas corpus with respect to a claim adjudicated on the merits in state court unless that adjudication

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)-(2); see Penry, 532 U.S. at 792, 121 S.Ct. 1910. The state court's decision is contrary to the Supreme Court's clearly established precedent if the state court either "applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in [Supreme Court] cases," or "confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a decision of [the Supreme Court] and nevertheless arrives at a [different result]." Penry, 532 U.S. at 792, 121 S.Ct. 1910 (internal quotations and citations omitted). The state court's decision is an unreasonable application of the Supreme Court's clearly established precedent if it "correctly identifies the governing legal rule but applies it unreasonably to the facts of a particular prisoner's case." Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted).

"We must presume that the state court's factual findings are correct unless [Woodward] meets his burden of rebutting that presumption by clear and convincing evidence." Reed v. Quarterman, 555 F.3d 364, 368 (5th Cir.2009) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1)). "In reviewing the district court's application of § 2254(d) to the state court decision, the district court's findings of fact are reviewed for clear error; [the district court's] conclusions of law, de novo." Pondexter v. Quarterman, 537 F.3d 511, 519 (5th Cir.2008) (citing Foster v. Johnson, 293 F.3d 766, 776 (5th Cir. 2002)).

III. DISCUSSION

A. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel: Concession of Guilt

"In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence." U.S. CONST. amend VI. Under the well-established Strickland test, Woodward must show (1) that his counsel's performance was deficient, and (2) that the deficient performance prejudiced his defense. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689-94, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). Under the first prong, "[t]o establish deficient performance, a petitioner must demonstrate that counsel's representation `fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.'" Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 521, 123 S.Ct. 2527, 156 L.Ed.2d 471 (2003) (citation omitted). Counsel "is strongly presumed to have rendered adequate assistance and made all significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional judgment." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690, 104 S.Ct. 2052.

"[T]o establish prejudice, a defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different." Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 534, 123 S.Ct. 2527 (citation omitted). There are, however, "some egregious...