Woodward v. State

• Decision Date: 06 March 2003
• Docket Number: No. 1999-DR-00618-SCT.,1999-DR-00618-SCT.
• Parties: Paul Everette WOODWARD v. STATE of Mississippi.
• Court: Mississippi Supreme Court

843 So.2d 1

Paul Everette WOODWARD v. STATE of Mississippi.

No. 1999-DR-00618-SCT.

Supreme Court of Mississippi.

March 6, 2003.

Rehearing Denied May 1, 2003.

William B. Kirksey, Nathan H. Elmore, Jackson, attorneys for appellant.

Office of the Attorney General, by Marvin L. White, Jr., and Jeffrey A. Klingfuss, attorneys for appellee.

EN BANC.

EASLEY, J., for the Court.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

¶ 1. Paul Everette Woodward was convicted of the crimes of capital murder (with the underlying crime of rape), kidnapping and sexual battery of Rhonda Crane and sentenced to death in 1987. Woodward's conviction and sentence were affirmed by this Court in Woodward v. State, 533 So.2d 418 (Miss.1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1028, 109 S.Ct. 1767, 104 L.Ed.2d 202 (1989), reh'g denied, 490 U.S. 1117, 109 S.Ct. 3179, 104 L.Ed.2d 1041 (1989). In 1993 this Court granted Woodward's motion for post-conviction relief and remanded the case for re-sentencing on the capital murder charge. Woodward v. State, 635 So.2d 805 (Miss.1993). On remand, the circuit court again imposed the death sentence. Woodward's second death sentence was affirmed by this Court in Woodward v. State, 726 So.2d 524 (Miss. 1997), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1041, 119 S.Ct. 1338, 143 L.Ed.2d 502 (1999).

¶ 2. Woodward filed his Pro Se Petition for Post-Conviction Relief on April 7, 1999. On December 3, 2001, appointed counsel filed an Application for Leave to File Motion to Vacate Death Sentence, which is presently before the Court. The State has filed its response to the application.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶ 3. Around noon on July 23, 1986, Rhonda Crane, age twenty-four, was traveling on Mississippi Highway 29 south of New Augusta in Perry County, Mississippi to join her parents on a camping trip. A white male driving a white log truck forced her car to stop in the middle of the road. The white male then exited the truck with a pistol in his hand and forced Crane to get into his truck. The man then drove the victim to an isolated area, forced her out of his truck and into the woods at gunpoint and forced her to have sexual relations with him. Rhonda Crane was shot in the back of her head and died.

¶ 4. Crane's automobile was left on the highway with the engine running, the driver's door open and her purse on the car seat. A motorist traveling in a vehicle on the same highway saw a white colored, unloaded, logging truck moving away from the Crane vehicle, and notified the authorities. Additionally, a housewife residing on a bluff along the highway at the location of the Crane car noted a logging truck with a white cab stop in front of her driveway. A white male exited and walked toward the back of his truck and returned with a blonde haired woman wearing yellow clothing. As he held her by her arm, the male yelled sufficiently loud for the housewife to hear the words "get in, get in," and forced the blonde woman into the driver's door of the truck and then drove off. The housewife investigated the scene on the highway in front of her house, discovered the abandoned Crane car, and notified the authorities.

¶ 5. Law enforcement officers began an investigation to locate Crane. The officers discovered that Paul Everette Woodward unloaded logs at a pulp mill and departed the yard at 11:36 a.m. in a white Mack log truck. Woodward arrived at his wood yard at approximately 12:45 to 1:00 p.m. The yard manager noted that he was late arriving at the yard and was wet from sweating. A drive from the mill to the wood yard takes approximately thirty minutes. A sheriff's deputy stopped Woodward, who was driving a white Mack logging truck, around 2:00 p.m. on the afternoon of July 23, to ask if he had seen anything that would assist in the investigation of Rhonda Crane's disappearance. Woodward replied that he had not seen anything. Through the investigation, it was ascertained that Woodward was the only driver of a white logging truck operating at the nearby timber yards on that date. On the following day, Crane's body was located in the nearby wooded area by her father and a friend.

¶ 6. Woodward was arrested, and ultimately he made both written and videotaped confessions. Woodward also confessed to his employer over the telephone. He was charged under a multi-count indictment with three charges: capital murder with an underlying crime of rape; kidnapping; and oral sexual battery. Upon a motion for change of venue, Woodward was tried before a jury in Hinds County and convicted of all three counts of the indictment. After a separate sentencing hearing, the jury sentenced Woodward to death. On direct appeal, Woodward raised numerous issues regarding the guilt/innocence phase and the sentencing phase of his first trial. This Court affirmed the conviction and sentence. Woodward v. State, 533 So.2d 418 (Miss.1988) (hereinafter Woodward I), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1028, 109 S.Ct. 1767, 104 L.Ed.2d 202 (1989), reh'g denied, 490 U.S. 1117, 109 S.Ct. 3179, 104 L.Ed.2d 1041 (1989).

¶ 7. In Woodward's first application for post-conviction relief he raised eleven issues. This Court considered the issue of ineffective assistance of counsel and the issues affecting the guilt portion of the trial. On October 7, 1993, citing Clemons v. Mississippi, 494 U.S. 738, 110 S.Ct. 1441, 108 L.Ed.2d 725 (1990), this Court granted Woodward's motion for post-conviction relief, and remanded the case for re-sentencing on the capital murder charge. This Court held that Woodward's death sentence was improper because the sentencing jury was incorrectly instructed regarding the "especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel" aggravating circumstance. Woodward v. State, 635 So.2d 805 (Miss. 1993) (hereinafter Woodward II). This Court additionally found that Woodward's trial counsel were ineffective during the sentencing phase of his trial because counsel failed to offer all of the evidence they had in mitigation. The ineffective counsel issue provided an independent reason to reverse the sentence and remand it for a new trial on sentencing. Id. at 810. However, this Court further found that Woodward could not meet the prejudice prong of the Strickland test as to the guilt phase of his trial. Woodward II, 635 So.2d at 809.

¶ 8. On remand for re-sentencing on the capital murder charge, the trial judge granted Woodward's motion to withdraw the motion for change of venue. The case was originally set for trial on September 19, 1994, however, due to the disqualification of several jurors, the court was unable to seat a jury. The case was reset and, on September 20, 1995, the jury rendered its verdict that Woodward be sentenced to death. On direct appeal, this Court affirmed. Woodward v. State, 726 So.2d 524 (Miss.1997) (hereinafter Woodward III), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1041, 119 S.Ct. 1338, 143 L.Ed.2d 502 (1999).

¶ 9. Woodward filed his Pro Se Petition for Post-Conviction Relief on April 7, 1999. On December 3, 2001, appointed counsel filed an Application for Leave to File Motion to Vacate Death Sentence, which is presently before the Court. The State has filed its response to the application. ¶ 10. In his pro se petition, Woodward raises four claims:

I. Ineffective assistance of counsel at trial in culpability phase.

II. Ineffective assistance of counsel at trial in sentencing phase.

III. Ineffective assistance of counsel on appeal.

IV. The defense did not receive all the material that the State should have provided in discovery. The defense did not receive all exculpatory material.

¶ 11. Woodward's attorneys raise the following eleven contentions in the Application for Leave to File Motion to Vacate Death Sentence:

I. Woodward's defense counsel failed to prevent the jury from hearing about the prior convictions, arrests and bad acts of the Defendant.

II. Woodward's counsel failed to make sure the Court's written orders reflected the rulings from the bench.

III. The trial court erred in denying Defendant's motion to compel disclosure of information regarding mitigating circumstances.

IV. The State's expert witness Dr. Charlton Stanley was unqualified to render an opinion on the mental state of Paul Woodward.

V. The State failed to disclose the opinions of Dr. Stanley.

VI. Trial Counsel was ineffective for failing to send Woodward to Whitfield State Hospital for a competency hearing.

VII. Defense expert Dr. Clarence Thurman was ineffective.

VIII. Defense Counsel erred in withdrawing their motion for change of venue.

IX. Defense Counsel failed to properly investigate the case.

X. Defense Counsel failed to admit medical records substantiating Woodward's claim that he was shot in the back of the head.

XI. The Court erred in instructing the jury that it should not be influenced by sympathy.

ANALYSIS

¶ 12. In his pro se petition, Woodward asserts that his counsel did not provide adequate representation at the time of trial, during the sentencing proceeding, and on appeal. Woodward contends that, but for these inadequacies, the outcome of the culpability phase, sentencing phase, and appeal would have been different. Woodward also contends that the State did not provide all material it should have in discovery. Woodward does not refer to any facts and does not cite any authority in his pro se petition.

¶ 13. The matter before this Court relates only to the second sentencing trial. This Court has considered numerous issues raised in Woodward's two direct appeals and his earlier post-conviction-relief petition. "The doctrine of res judicata shall apply to all issues, both factual and legal, decided at trial and on direct appeal." Miss.Code Ann. § 99-39-21(3) (Supp.2002). Additionally, any claim raised in this application which was considered by this Court in Woodward's first post-conviction-relief petition would constitute a second petition and is barred as a successive writ. Id. § 99-39-27(9).

¶ 14. Rex K. Jones and Jeff Bradley represented Woodward during his first trial in 1987 and during his appeal of...