Woodward v. Woodward

• Decision Date: 09 May 1889
• Citation: 11 S.W. 892,87 Tenn. 644
• Parties: WOODWARD v. WOODWARD.
• Court: Tennessee Supreme Court

11 S.W. 892

87 Tenn. 644

WOODWARD v. WOODWARD.

Supreme Court of Tennessee.

May 9, 1889

Error to probate court, Shelby county; J. S. GALLOWAY, Judge.

Petition for an accounting by Rosa P. Woodward against Emmet Woodward as her guardian. Petition dismissed, and petitioner brings error.

FOLKES J.

This is a petition by Rosa P. Woodward, filed in the probate court of Shelby county, against her guardian, Emmet Woodward, in which she seeks to have a settlement of his guardian accounts, and to have the balance in his hands found due paid over to her. She alleges her domicile and residence in the state of Louisiana, and sets up and exhibits with her petition certified copies of the proceedings had in that state, whereby she has been emancipated from the disabilities of infancy, under and in pursuance of the statute of the state authorizing, in certain cases, the emancipation of persons who have attained the age of 18. The petition alleges that, in consequence of such decree, she is, under the laws of the state of Louisiana, of full age, and as such entitled to demand and receive her estate. It is shown that both her parents are dead; that her father died with yellow fever, intestate, in 1873, leaving several children, all of whom are now over 21 years of age except petitioner, and have received from their guardian their share of their father's estate; that defendant, Emmet Woodward, was appointed guardian for herself and brothers and sisters by the probate court of Shelby county shortly after her father's death; that there is now in his hands about $8,000 belonging to her, which he holds as such guardian; that shortly after her father's death, by proceedings duly had in the probate court of Shelby county, petitioner was adopted by C. Dickman, the husband of her maternal aunt, under and pursuant of the statutes of Tennessee in such cases made and provided; that such adoption was with the consent and approval of the defendant, Emmet Woodward, her regular guardian; that several years thereafter C. Dickman removed from the state of Tennessee to the state of Louisiana with the view of taking up his permanent abode there, and has ever since resided and still does reside there, the state of Louisiana being the state of his domicile; that petitioner, after her adoption, became a member of the family of C. Dickman, her adoptive father, and did remove with him and his family to the state of Louisiana and has ever since resided there; that Louisiana is the state of her domicile, and was at the time of the judicial proceedings therein resulting in her emancipation. She alleges in her petition that it is her desire, and to her interest, to have and receive the estate coming to her from her said father as aforesaid, by reason of the fact that it is now in the hands of her guardian, only yielding her a revenue of 6 per cent., charged with the commissions expenses, and costs incident to such guardianship, while she can readily obtain a permanent 8 per cent. investment of her funds in the state of Louisiana, where that rate of interest is legal, freed from costs and expenses of guardianship. She insists that the state of Tennessee will recognize her majority as determined and fixed by judicial decree in the state of her domicile, and would recognize as valid any receipt, discharge, or acquittance that she might execute to her guardian for her estate now in his hands, and that the probate court will order and direct a settlement of accounts, and the paying over to her the balance found to be due, so that the said guardian, and his sureties on his official bond, may be discharged from all further liability.

To this petition the defendant interposed a demurrer, upon the ground that petitioner was still a minor under 21 years of age; that the proceedings had in the courts of Louisiana would have no extraterritorial effect by reason of the want of jurisdiction in said courts over the estate of the ward situated in Tennessee; that the proceedings had in Louisiana are unknown to the laws of Tennessee, and opposed to the policy of Tennessee law, and contrary to the interests of the citizens of Tennessee, and would therefore not be recognized in the courts of this state; that the said guardian is lawfully in possession of said funds under the laws of this state, and has been guilty of no breach of duty in relation thereto; and that said petitioner, being a minor, cannot maintain this action in her own name.

The probate judge sustained the demurrer, and dismissed the petition. Petitioner has filed the record for a writ of error in this court.

There are certain general principles which control the disposition of this case. They are, in the main, well settled; the difficulty lies in their application to the particular facts of the case in hand. It is elementary that "every state has an undoubted right to determine the status, or domestic and social condition, of the persons domiciled within its territory, except in so far as the powers of the states in this respect are restrained, or duties and obligations imposed upon them by the constitution of the United States." Strader v. Graham, 10 How. 93. Again, the civil status is governed universally by one single principle, namely, that of domicile, which is the criterion established by law for the purpose of determining the civil status; for it is on this basis that the personal rights of a party,--that is to say, the law which determines his majority or minority, his marriage, succession, testacy, or intestacy,--must depend. Udny v. Udny, L. R. 1 H. L. Sc. 457.

It is not seriously controverted by counsel for defendant that the judicial decree under which the disabilities of minority were removed in Louisiana had the same effect as though, by direct statute, the age of majority had been fixed at 18, so far as the status of minors domiciled in that state is concerned; the main contention in this connection being that, the domicile or origin of petitioner having been in Tennessee, petitioner has acquired, and could acquire, no domicile in Louisiana by reason of her removal to that state by her adoptive father.

Before considering the question of removal, and of the right of the adoptive father to acquire for his adopted child a new domicile, or, what is the same thing, the right or privilege of the adopted child to acquire a new domicile with her adoptive father, let us settle, if we can, what would be the proper disposition of the case had the petitioner been born, and ever after domiciled, in the state of Louisiana. In such cases we regard it as well settled that, under unquestionable principles of private international law, one state will recognize and give force and effect in its own tribunals to the legislation of another state in so far as it fixes the status and capacity of married women and minors. This is frequently spoken of as a principle of comity, and, while it doubtless has its origin in considerations of comity, it has been so repeatedly and emphatically recognized by the courts of all civilized countries that it is now thoroughly crystallized into rules and principles of private international law. It is said in Ross v. Ross, 129 Mass. 243, in the elaborate discussion of the subject by Chief Justice GRAY: "The status or condition of any person with the inherent capacity of succession or inheritance, is to be ascertained by the law of the domicile which creates the status, at least when the status is one which may exist under the laws of the state in which it is called in question, and when there is nothing in those laws to prohibit giving full effect to the status and capacity acquired in the state of the domicile. * * * We are not aware of any case, in England or America, in which a change of status in the country of the domicile, with the formalities prescribed by its laws, has not been allowed full effect, as to the capacity thereby created, of succeeding to and inheriting property * * * in any other country the laws of which allow a like change of status in a like manner, with a like effect, under like circumstances." This principle is illustrated by the decree made in Re Da Cunha, 1 Hagg, Ecc. 237, where administration was granted in England, limited to the receipt of the dividend of a sum of English stock to a Portuguese lady, who, by the laws of her domicile, was emancipated from the disabilities of minority, but was, by the English law, still a minor. It was held that she was entitled to receive and receipt for the dividend on said stock in England.

It is true, as insisted by counsel for defendant, that there is no elaboration of decision and of discussion made by the judges in the disposition of this case; but this fact in no manner detracts from its force and effect as authority. It does settle and determine that a person of full age by the law of her domicile, though a minor by the laws of England, is entitled to receive and give a a valid acquittance for property to which she is entitled to England; and such receipt, though confined to the dividend on the stock, is as conclusive of her right to act as a major as though she had received the corpus of the property; the dividend being all that she was, under the circumstances, entitled to. In rule 32 of Dilcey we find it stated that the capacity of a person for the alienation of movables depends, so far as the question of infancy or majority is concerned, on the law of that person's domicile. So in Re Hellmann's Will, (reported in L. R. 2 Eq. 363,) Lord ROMILLY, the master of the rolls, authorized the payment of a legacy to a minor aged 18, because she was of age according to the laws of Hamburg, where she was domiciled. The case is stated thus "Hellmann, being domiciled in England, by his will bequeathed the sum of 250 pounds...