Woodworth v. Com.

• Citation: 353 Mass. 229,230 N.E.2d 814
• Parties: Ralph C. WOODWORTH, Individually and as Administrator et al. v. COMMONWEALTH.
• Decision Date: 02 November 1967
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts

Page 814

230 N.E.2d 814

353 Mass. 229

Ralph C. WOODWORTH, Individually and as Administrator et al. v. COMMONWEALTH.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Suffolk.

Argued Oct. 4, 1967.

Decided Nov. 2, 1967.

Floyd H. Gilbert, Brockton, for petitioners.

Elliot L. Richardson, Atty. Gen., Richard A. Hunt and Harold Putnam, Asst. Attys. Gen., for the Commonwealth.

Before WILKINS, C.J., and SPALDING, CUTTER, KIRK, and SPIEGEL, JJ.

WILKINS, Chief Justice.

This petition under G.L. c. 258 is to recover interest on an award in eminent domain proceedings. The case was heard on agreed facts, and from a finding for the respondent the petitioners appealed. The finding was in effect an order for judgment. National Cash Register Co. v. Warner, 335 Mass. 736, 142 N.E.2d 584.

A petition was brought by Roy C. Woodworth and Edith F. Woodworth, husband and wife, as tenants by the entirety, for assessment of damages for the taking of land and buildings in Attleboro for highway purposes. Entry by the Commonwealth was made on October 13, 1959. The petition was returnable on the first Monday of October, 1960, and service was made on the Commonwealth on September 1, 1960. Edith F. Woodworth died on February 15, 1962. On July 18, 1963, there was a finding in the sum of $50,000 for Roy C. Woodworth, individually and as administrator of the estate of Edith F. Woodworth. A certificate of judgment for the petitioners was sent to the Comptroller of the Commonwealth by the Superior Court, Bristol County, in the sum of $57,824.52, which included interest and costs to August 14, 1963, the date of judgment. On October 19, 1963, Roy C. Woodworth died intestate, leaving two sons, Newton C. Woodworth and Ralph C. Woodworth, who are the present petitioners. On December 10, 1963, the latter was appointed administrator of his father's estate. His appeal is individually and as administrator. The amount of the judgment was paid on March 19, 1964.

In 1953, in General Elec. Co. v. Commonwealth, 329 Mass. 661, 110 N.E.2d 101, it was held that in an eminent domain proceeding the Commonwealth could not be compelled to pay interest for the interval between the date of a judgment and the date of payment. That decision was largely based on an interpretation of G.L. c. 79 (relating to eminent domain), §§ 22, 37, and G.L. c. 258 (relating to claims against the Commonwealth), § 3. Subsequently there was enacted St.1964, c. 548, entitled, 'An Act providing for the payment of interest on judgments against the commonwealth and on settlements in eminent domain cases,' which amended c. 79, §§ 22, 37, and added to c. 258 a new § 3A. These amendments, so far as material, provide in substance that judgments against the Commonwealth under c. 79 should carry interest at six per cent from their date to the date of payment.

Statute 1964, c. 548, § 5, provides that that act take effect on January 1, 1965, and not apply to interest on judgments entered prior to that date. It, accordingly, does not apply to the case at bar.

The issues argued to us are whether the failure to award interest violates either art 10 of the Declaration of Rights or the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 239, 241, 17 S.Ct. 581, 41 L.Ed. 979. Compare Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 4, 84 S.Ct. 1489, 12 L.Ed.2d 653.

The material parts of these constitutional amendments are similar. Article 10: '(W)henever the public exigencies require that the property of any individual should be appropriated to public uses, he shall receive a reasonable compensation therefor.' The Fifth Amendment: '(N)or shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.'

Just compensation we construe to mean full compensation. Admittedly, nothing was paid for the period subsequent to August 14, 1963. To this extent the award was not just. Concededly no case in this Commonwealth has so held. Indeed the General Electric case holds to the contrary, although no constitutional issue was there raised.

There are, nevertheless, cases both in this Commonwealth and in the Supreme Court of the United States which contain broad language supporting our position.

In Parks v. City of Boston, 15 Pick. 198, 208, the opinion of the court by Chief Justice Shaw contains language which has been often quoted. '(An eminent domain taking) is the purchase of a public easement, the consideration for which is settled by such appraisement only because the parties are unable to agree upon it. The true rule would be, as in the case of other purchases, that the price is due and ought to be paid, at the moment the purchase is made, when credit is not specially agreed on. And if a pie-powder court could be called on the instant and on the spot, the true rule of justice for the public would be, to pay the compensation with one hand, whilst they apply the axe with the other; and this rule is departed from only because some time is necessary, by the forms of law, to conduct the inquiry; and this delay must be compensated by interest' (italics supplied).

In Nichols v. Commissioner of Corps. & Taxn., 314 Mass. 285, 300, 50 N.E.2d 76, 85, 147 A.L.R. 830, in the opinion of the court, Field, C.J., stated: '* * * it has been recognized that the 'reasonable compensation' to which a landowner is entitled for land taken under ...