Woolbright v. Hensley, 69857

Decision Date22 April 1985
Docket NumberNo. 69857,69857
Citation330 S.E.2d 812,174 Ga.App. 615
PartiesWOOLBRIGHT v. HENSLEY et al.
CourtGeorgia Court of Appeals

Douglas E. Cobb, Norcross, for appellant.

Charles D. Read, Decatur, for appellees.

BENHAM, Judge.

In a suit brought by appellant seeking damages for the action of appellees in building a fence which obstructed access to appellant's property, appellees filed a counterclaim, alleging in essence that appellant's suit had no merit and was brought for the purpose of harassing them and causing them anguish, worry, anxiety, and expense. We granted appellant's application for interlocutory review of the trial court's order denying appellant's motion for judgment on the pleadings.

1. The trial court's order denying appellant's motion for judgment on the pleadings recited that appellees' counterclaim stated a cause of action, but the order does not identify that cause of action; it merely cited Ga. Power Co. v. Johnson, 155 Ga.App. 862, 274 S.E.2d 17 (1980). We agree with appellant that Johnson does not support the trial court's decision. Appellees' counterclaim accuses appellant of no conduct more egregious than filing a lawsuit against them. That basis for an action for intentional infliction of emotional distress was specifically rejected in Johnson. It follows that the trial court's order in this case is not sustainable on that theory.

2. Our review of the pleadings in this case does not convince us that appellees' counterclaim should have withstood appellant's motion for judgment on the pleadings for any other reason. A counterclaim for malicious use of process is inappropriate because one of the elements necessary in such an action is a termination of the action favorable to the complainant, a situation which cannot exist in the context of a counterclaim. See Lane Co. v. Taylor, 174 Ga.App. 355, 330 S.E.2d 112 (1985). Although there are circumstances in which a counterclaim for malicious abuse of process may be viable (id.), allegations that a plaintiff wrongfully brought and continued a suit will not, without more, state a claim for malicious abuse of process. Medoc Corp. v. Keel, 152 Ga.App. 684, 263 S.E.2d 543 (1979).

Since, as appellees point out, there is nothing in the record of this case other than the pleadings and since the counterclaim does not state a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress or for malicious abuse or use of process, the trial court's denial of appellant's motion for judgment on the pleadings with regard to...

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3 cases
  • Ostroff v. Coyner
    • United States
    • Georgia Court of Appeals
    • April 27, 1988
    ...wrongfully brought and continued a suit will not, without more, state a claim for malicious abuse of process." Woolbright v. Hensley, 174 Ga.App. 615(2), 330 S.E.2d 812; accord Medoc, supra 152 Ga.App. at 685, 263 S.E.2d 543. Here, Ostroff caused his action to remain pending against Coyner ......
  • Torok v. Yost, 70544
    • United States
    • Georgia Court of Appeals
    • September 5, 1985
    ...lawsuit in favor of the present plaintiff (to prove that there was no probable cause to bring the lawsuit), see Woolbright v. Hensley, 174 Ga.App. 615(2), 330 S.E.2d 812 (1985), malicious abuse relates to perversion of the civil process to an unlawful use after it has issued, an improper em......
  • Lewis v. State
    • United States
    • Georgia Court of Appeals
    • April 22, 1985

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