Wooley v. State

• Decision Date: 29 September 1999
• Docket Number: No. 61S00-9806-CR-354.,61S00-9806-CR-354.
• Citation: 716 N.E.2d 919
• Parties: Larry D. WOOLEY, Appellant (Defendant below), v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee (Plaintiff below).
• Court: Indiana Supreme Court

716 N.E.2d 919

Larry D. WOOLEY, Appellant (Defendant below), v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee (Plaintiff below).

No. 61S00-9806-CR-354.

Supreme Court of Indiana.

September 29, 1999.

Rehearing Denied December 15, 1999.

Larry Crawford Thomas, Clinton, Indiana, Attorney for Appellant.

Jeffrey A. Modisett, Attorney General of Indiana, Randi E. Froug, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, Indiana, Attorneys for Appellee. BOEHM, Justice.

Larry Wooley was convicted of the murder of Claude "Bobby" Strow. The trial court sentenced Wooley to sixty-five years imprisonment. In this direct appeal Wooley argues that:

(1) he is entitled to discharge under Criminal Rule 4(C) or 4(D);

(2) the trial court erred when it modified his tendered instruction on self-defense;

(3) the trial court erred when it excluded portions of his expert's testimony;

(4) the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction based on two intervening causes;

(5) the State failed to disprove his claim of self-defense beyond a reasonable doubt; and

(6) his sentence of sixty-five years is manifestly unreasonable because it is not based on proper aggravating circumstances and the trial court improperly failed to find mitigating circumstances.

We affirm the conviction but remand for a new sentencing hearing.

Factual and Procedural Background

On August 20, 1996, Wooley, his brother Richard Wooley ("Richard"), Angela Hutson, and three others went to the home Strow shared with Rhonda Dalton. When they arrived, Dalton met them in the yard and told them that her legs were bleeding because Strow had hit her with a hose. All witnesses, including Wooley, agree that he and Richard went into the house with Dalton to talk to Strow shortly after they arrived and that Wooley returned to the house one or more times after an initial encounter with Strow. Strow did not survive, Richard did not testify and the three companions left shortly after the first incident. Wooley, Dalton and Hutson offered differing accounts of the day's events.

Wooley claims that he and his brother entered the house and spoke with Strow for several minutes before Strow pulled a knife from his pocket. Richard succeeded in kicking the knife out of Strow's hand and punched Strow in the face, resulting in a bloody nose. Wooley then kicked Strow in the face. After this altercation, Wooley and Richard went back outside to drink beer while Dalton attended to Strow. Wooley returned to the house¹ sometime after the first incident and Strow asked him to shake hands. When he approached Strow, Strow pulled a knife. Wooley hit Strow in the forehead several times and as the two struggled the knife went into Strow's neck. When Wooley left the house, Hutson gave him a white jug and told him to pour the liquid on the porches of the house which he did. He and Hutson then left in one of Strow's trucks.

According to Dalton, after she told Wooley and Richard that Strow hit her with a hose, the two brothers wanted to go into the house and "kick [Strow's] ass" and "teach him a lesson." She followed Wooley and Richard into the house and saw Strow pull his cigarette lighter, not a knife, from his front pocket during the first encounter. She saw Richard and Wooley each kick Strow and then leave the house. Dalton eventually returned to the group outside where she heard Wooley threaten to "finish off" Strow. When Wooley returned to the house, Richard held Dalton on the ground and kicked and choked her. After Richard released her, Dalton went into the house and discovered Strow on the couch bleeding from the neck. Strow told her that Wooley had "killed" him and asked her to get help. While she was still in the house, Dalton saw Wooley pouring liquid on the porches of the house and then leaving with Hutson in one of Strow's trucks.

According to Hutson, soon after Wooley went into the house the second time he called for her. She went to the door of the house and saw Wooley kicking Strow and hitting him on the head with a mason jar while complaining "he won't die." At that point Wooley told Hutson to tell Richard to kill Dalton. After Hutson relayed this message she observed Wooley lift a knife over his head and bring it down on Strow. Hutson testified that she could not see where Wooley stabbed Strow because Wooley was between her and Strow, but she knew it was near Strow's face. After Wooley stabbed Strow, he told Hutson to go to the shed to get a gasoline can, which she did. Wooley then poured the contents on the porches and the walls of the house and attempted unsuccessfully to ignite it before Hutson and Wooley left in one of Strow's trucks.

The State charged Wooley with murder, attempted murder and attempted arson. At trial Wooley argued that two intervening causes relieved him of responsibility for the murder. First, he contended that after he stabbed Strow in the neck Dalton attacked Strow, stabbed Strow in the same place that Wooley had stabbed him, and hit Strow on the head with several objects. In support of this theory Wooley offered evidence that Strow had been hit on the head with a mason jar and a telephone receiver, that only Dalton's fingerprints were found on the mason jar, and that a knife with Strow's blood on it was found in Dalton's shorts. Second, Wooley asserted that Strow received "grossly negligent" medical treatment at the hospital. He offered the testimony of the emergency room nurse in support of this theory. Finally, Wooley claimed that he stabbed Strow in self-defense.

The jury found Wooley guilty of murder and not guilty of attempted murder and attempted arson. The trial court sentenced Wooley to sixty-five years imprisonment.

I. Discharge under Criminal Rule 4

Wooley contends that he should have been discharged because the State failed to bring him to trial within one year in violation of Criminal Rule 4(C). Wooley is correct that the time limitations found in Criminal Rule 4 protect a defendant's right to a speedy trial as guaranteed by Article I, Section 12, of the Indiana Constitution.² A defendant who is not brought to trial within twelve months must be discharged and the charge must be dismissed. Ind. Crim. Rule 4(C); see also Bates v. State, 520 N.E.2d 129, 131 (Ind.Ct.App.1988)

. However, if a defendant "seeks or acquiesces in any delay which results in a later trial date, the time limitations of the rule are also extended by the length of those delays." Isaacs v. State, 673 N.E.2d 757, 762 (Ind.1996); see also Crim. R. 4(F).

Wooley was arraigned on August 22, 1996, and trial was set for December 17, 1996. On December 12, 1996, Wooley moved for a continuance alleging that the State had failed to comply with discovery requests. The court reset the trial for May 13, 1997. On May 12, 1997, Wooley again filed for a continuance, again alleging failure of the State to provide evidence. The court reset the trial for June 24, 1997. On June 12, 1997, Wooley moved for a continuance, in part based on an illness in defense counsel's family. The court reset the trial for November 6, 1997, and stated that the delay was attributable to the defendant. On October 27, 1997, Wooley again moved for a continuance. The court reset the trial for January 6, 1998, by an order, to which there was no objection, finding that Wooley "acknowledges he understands the delay in the trial will be attributable to [him], thereby waiving any objection to the trial setting at a later date."

The first 117 days between the arraignment and the December 17, trial date count toward the one year allotted to the State to bring Wooley to trial. Wooley does not dispute that the time from June 24, 1997, to January 6, 1998, serves as an extension of the one-year period. See Isaacs, 673 N.E.2d at 762

; Crim. R. 4(F) (when a continuance is had on the motion of the defendant any time limitation contained in this rule shall be extended by the amount of the delay). Wooley argues that the delays between these two periods, i.e., from December 17, 1996, until June 24, 1997, although based on his motions to continue, are properly attributed to the State because it was the State's failure to comply with discovery requests that prompted his motions. Even if we accept Wooley's argument that the 189 day delay from December 17, 1996, to June 24, 1997, did not extend the one-year period because of the State's failure to comply with discovery requests, only 306 days before January 6, 1998, are attributable to the State.

On January 6, 1998, the State moved to continue the trial under Criminal Rule 4(D), which permits extension of the time limits for witness unavailability under certain conditions. The trial court granted the motion and found that:

Angela Hutson is a material witness to the State of Indiana. The court is satisfied that there is evidence for the State which cannot be had and that reasonable efforts have been made to procure the same and there is just ground to believe that such evidence can be had within ninety (90) days.

The court then set the trial for March 24, 1998 and warned the State that Wooley may be discharged if he was not brought to trial on March 24. Wooley contends that the seventy-seven day delay of his trial from January 6, 1998, to March 24, 1998, resulted in his being held for 383 days in violation of Criminal Rule 4(C). However, the Rule 4(D) ninety day period extends the one-year time period found in Criminal Rule 4(C). See Crim. R. 4(D); Woodson v. State, 466 N.E.2d 432, 433-34 (Ind.1984); Sims v. State, 267 Ind. 215, 220, 368 N.E.2d 1352, 1354 (1977).

Wooley claims that the trial court erred in granting the State's Rule 4(D) motion because the State had not made a "reasonable effort" to secure Hutson's attendance on January 6. This claim is based on the admission by the officer who served the subpoena on the witness "that he did not follow the proper procedure for service" and because there was "a possibility that Hutson would be there to testify on January 9th the date set out in the...