Bates v. State
| Decision Date | 24 March 1988 |
| Docket Number | No. 79A02-8610-CR-377,79A02-8610-CR-377 |
| Citation | 520 N.E.2d 129 |
| Parties | William R. BATES, Defendant-Appellant, v. STATE of Indiana, Plaintiff-Appellee. |
| Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
Susan K. Carpenter, Public Defender, M.E. Tuke, Deputy Public Defender, Indianapolis, for defendant-appellant.
Linley E. Pearson, Atty. Gen., Mary Dreyer, Deputy Atty. Gen., Indianapolis, for plaintiff-appellee.
Appellant William Bates appeals from his conviction for (5) counts of dealing in cocaine, a Class C felony. He was given five 5 year sentences, one of which is to run consecutive to the other four which are to run concurrently. We affirm.
Bates raises four issues for our review:
1. Did the trial court err by granting a motion to continue the trial filed by the state on February 25, 1986?
2. Did the trial court err by denying Bates' motion for discharge which resulted in Bates being brought to trial over one year from the date he was charged?
3. Did the trial court err by denying Bates his right to confront witnesses when it foreclosed cross examination of a witness regarding ongoing criminal investigations?
4. Were the audio tape recordings offered into evidence by the state so insufficiently clear, incomplete, garbled and confusing as to be prejudicial to Bates?
Bates contends that it was error for the trial judge to grant the state's motion for continuance which was made on February 25, 1986. On that date the prosecution moved for a continuance because they had determined only that morning that a key witness did not reside in Indianapolis but in Michigan and the subpoena process would not get that witness to court in time for the trial. Further, the state's motion for continuance alleged that the state could not locate another material witness because he had changed jobs. The trial judge granted that motion and continued the trial from February 25 to March 25.
Bates alleges that the granting of the motion for continuance was error because the state's motion did not comply with the requirements of IC 35-36-7-2. IC 35-36-7-2 concerns when the state may be entitled to a continuance because of the absence of a witness. The statute does not restrict the court's discretionary powers. Instead it merely compels the granting of a continuance under certain clearly delineated circumstances. In general, when such a motion for continuance is not based upon statutory grounds or is not made in compliance with the statute, the granting of a continuance lies within the broad discretion of the trial court and will not be reversed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion prejudicing the complaining party. Gregory v. State (1972), 259 Ind. 295, 286 N.E.2d 666, 668; Hoy v. State (1983), Ind.App., 448 N.E.2d 31, 34.
Bates contends that reversal is required in this case under an abuse of discretion standard of review because of the alleged failure of the state to use due diligence in preparing its case. Bates, however, has failed to show how this alleged failure prejudiced him in this case. There was no error in granting the state's motion for continuance.
Bates contends that it was error for the trial court to deny his motion for discharge. He argues that he was brought to trial 497 days after he was formally charged. He argues that only 49 days of that 497 days are attributable to his own motions for continuance and that because the 448 days left exceed the 365 day limit set by Indiana Rules of Procedure, Criminal Rule 4(C) that he was entitled to discharge.
Under CR 4(C) the state has an affirmative duty to bring a criminal defendant to trial within one year and that one-year limit commences to run automatically with the later of either the filing of charges against the defendant or his arrest. The one-year period is extended by any delay arising from any continuance had on defendant's motion, by any delay caused by defendant's act, and by congestion of the court's calendar. State v. Smith (1986), Ind.App., 495 N.E.2d 539, 541; CR 4(C). The absence of a key witness through no fault of the state is also good cause for extending the time period requirements for early trial under CR 4(D). Woodson v. State (1984), Ind., 466 N.E.2d 432, 434. In order to determine the exact period during which a defendant must be brought to trial or else be entitled to discharge we must add to one year the length of any delays for which the rule makes exception. Walker v. State (1984), Ind.App., 467 N.E.2d 1248, 1250.
In this case the record indicates that the trial date was continued four times. Bates was formally charged by information on November 13, 1984. In August 1985 the trial was postponed until November 19 due to failure of defense counsel to appear and court congestion. 1 In November the trial was continued until January 14, 1986, again due to court calendar congestion. In January 1986 the defense moved for and obtained over the prosecution's objection a continuance of the trial until February 25. In February the state moved for and obtained a continuance of the trial until March 25 due to the unavailability of a key witness through no fault of its own. All four continuances which postponed the trial from August 1985 until late March 1986 are excusable delays which add to the time in which the state must bring the defendant to trial. The delays totaled approximately seven months. Hence the state had approximately seven months from November 13, 1985 in which to bring appellant to trial. March 25, 1986, the day the trial began, was well within this time frame. Bates' CR 4(C) rights were not violated. There was no error in denying his motion for discharge.
Bates argues that, as a result of the trial court's foreclosure of cross-examination of Scott Knox, an informant, with regard to the full scope of Knox's drug dealing, he was not able to explore relevant evidence of Knox's bias and was denied his Sixth Amendment right to confrontation of witnesses. We disagree.
The Sixth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States guarantees to a criminal defendant the right to confrontation with the witnesses against him. The primary interest secured by the right to confrontation is the right of cross-examination. Davis v. Alaska (1974), 415 U.S. 308, 94 S.Ct. 1105, 1110, 39 L.Ed.2d 347. Generally, the trial court is allowed broad discretion in controlling the conduct of cross-examination, and will be reversed only for an abuse of discretion. However, evidence of bias, prejudice, or ulterior motives is always relevant on the issue of the credibility or weight of the witness' testimony. Sweet v. State (1986), Ind., 498 N.E.2d 924, 927-28; Williams...
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