Wooley v. Sterrett

• Decision Date: 19 February 1965
• Docket Number: No. 16546,16546
• Citation: 387 S.W.2d 734
• Parties: Neal WOOLEY et al., Appellants, v. W. L. STERRETT, County Judge, et al., Appellees.
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals

Page 734

387 S.W.2d 734

Neal WOOLEY et al., Appellants, v. W. L. STERRETT, County Judge, et al., Appellees.

No. 16546.

Court of Civil Appeals of Texas, Dallas.

Feb. 19, 1965.

Gibbs & Hooks, Dallas, for appellants.

Franklin E. Spafford, Richard S. Geiger, Henry Wade, Dist. Atty., and Don R Stodghill, Asst. Dist. Atty., Dallas, for appellees.

WILLIAMS, Justice.

By authority of Art. 9.17, Election Code, V.A.C.S., appellants appeal from the judgment of the district court denying their relief in an election contest. The Seagoville Independent School District was what is commonly called a 'county line' school district, a portion of the properties thereof being situated within an area in the southern portion of Dallas County, Texas, and a smaller portion of said district being situated in a northern area of Kaufman County, Texas. Pursuant to authority contained in Art. 2767, Vernon's Ann.Civ.St., the Honorable W. L. Sterrett, County Judge of Dallas County, Texas, did on July 28, 1964, enter an order in the Commissioners Court minutes calling for an election, designating the date of the election to be August 13, 1964 in the Seagoville Independent School District, and stating the purpose of such election to be to determine the following proposition: 'Shall the Seagoville Independent School District be abolished?' Pursuant to such order, the voting machines to be used in such election were prepared and the sole proposition was placed upon the machine bllot, worded as follows:

'FOR ABOLISHING OF SEAGOVILLE INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT'

'AGAINST ABOLISHING OF SEAGOVILLE INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT'

The election was held on August 13, 1964 and at the conclusion thereof a certificate of election was duly made by the presiding judge, various clerks, judges and watchers. This certificate stated that 622 voted for the proposition and 565 voted against the proposition. It was also recited that 1,276 was the total number of votes cast. Thereafter, on August 14, 1964, County Judge W. L. Sterrett entered an order declaring results of election, said order reciting that 622 votes were counted for abolishing the district and 565 votes counted against abolishing he district. The order then states:

'3. That it is hereby found, determined and declared to be the result of said election that the said Proposition so submitted has received a favorable majority vote and has carried.

'4. That in accordance with the result of said election the Seagoville Independent School District is hereby abolished.'

On August 20, 1964, pursuant to authority of Art. 2992-18, V.A.C.S. the County Board of School Trustees of Dallas County passed an order annexing to Dallas Independent School District of Dallas County, Texas that portion of the area of the former Seagoville Independent School District which was situated in Dallas County, Texas.

On August 18, 1964 Neal Wooley and others, being tax payers and qualified voters within the former Seagoville Independent School District, brought this action in the nature of an election contest, as authorized by Art. 5, Sec. 8, of the Constitution of the State of Texas, Vernon's Ann.St. and Art. 9.01, et seq., Election Code, V.A.C.S., naming County Judge W. L. Sterrett, and other officials, defendants, and therein contending that the vote for abolishing the Seagoville Independent School District had not carried by a majority of votes cast in the election. Contestants alleged, inter alia, that at said election 'many people were disfranchised and such disfranchised voters were in sufficient numbers to have materially changed the result of such election and the election official and his judges exercised undue influence and so conducted themselves as officials of the election that many voters were intimidated and did not cast their ballots as a free exercise of their discretion.' Contestants also allege that the election judges and officials violated Art. 8.13, Election Code, V.A.C.S., by giving unauthorized aid to voters and by exercising undue influence on many voters. Contestants requested and were given a temporary restraining order, restraining respondents from taking any further action relating to the abolishment of such school district pending final hearing of the litigation. This restraining order was dissolved by agreement of the parties on August 19, 1964, and at that time, upon agreement of counsel, the contest was set down for hearing on its merits for August 26, 1964. The court, without a jury, heard the case on its merits on August 26, and 27, 1964 and then entered a judgment denying contestants the relief sought. This appeal followed.

Before determination and disposition of appellants' (contestants) points we deem it desirable and appropriate to direct attention to and discuss the character of the proceedings before us. An election contest does not partake of the usual characteristics of the ordinary case in law or in equity. While the Constitution and laws of the state specifically confer jurisdiction of election contests on district courts, and specifically provide for appeals in such cases to the Court of Civil Appeals, such contests involve political questions, rather than judicial questions, and therefore lack the elements of a civil suit. 21 Tex.Jur.2d Sec. 152, pp. 405, 406; Adamson v. Connally, Tex.Civ.App., 112 S.W.2d 287; Gibson v. Templeton, 62 Tex. 555. Our courts have repeatedly said that an election contest is not a civil suit in the true sense of that term. Williamson v. Lane, 52 Tex. 335; Ladd v. Yett, Tex.Civ.App., 273 S.W. 1006; Maddox v. Commissioners Court of Palo Pinto County, Tex.Civ.App., 222 S.W.2d 475. It is said that election contests are political proceedings, legislative proceedings, quasi-judicial proceedings, and other such designations. Duncan v. Willis, 157 Tex. 316, 302 S.W.2d 627; Wright v. Fawcett, 42 Tex. 203; Dickson v. Strickland, 114 Tex. 176, 265 S.W. 1012; Robinson v. Hays, Tex.Civ.App., 62 S.W.2d 1007; Adamson v. Connally, supra. All courts are in accord in holding that an election contest is a statutory proceeding in which statutory requirements must be met and the contest can only be maintained when all of such statutory requirements have been completely satisfied. 21 Tex.Jur.2d, Sec. 152, p. 407; Maddox v. Commissioners Court of Palo Pinto County, supra; Gonzalez v. Rodriguez, Tex.Civ.App., 250 S.W.2d 253; Horine v. Kellam, Tex.Civ.App., 123 S.W.2d 439; Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Jackson County Water Control & Improvement Dist. No. 1, Tex.Civ.App., 290 S.W.2d 310; Christy v. Williams, Tex.Civ.App., 292 S.W.2d 348.

Moreover, it is important to bear in mind that election contests may not be conducted as a matter of private right. 15-B Tex.Jur., Sec. 143, p. 515; Dickson v. Strickland, supra.

With these broad principles in mind we approach the question of scope of review of an election contest. What is the ultimate test of the validity of an election? Shall the election laws be given a strict or a liberal construction?

The answer to the first question is given by Justice Roberts of our early Supreme Court in McKinney v. O'Connor, 26 Tex. 5 (1861), wherein he said:

'* * * rules prescribing the manner in which the qualified electors shall hold the election, at the time and place designated, and those prescribing the manner in which their act, when done, shall be authenticated, so as to import verity on its face, are directory. Irregularities in their observance will not vitiate an election unless they be such that the true result of the ballot cannot be arrived at with reasonable certainty. The ultimate test of the validity of an election is involved in the questions: Did the qualified electors, at the time and place designated, acting in concert, either actively or by acquiescence, hold an election and cast their votes in the ballot box; and his it been done in a manner sufficiently conformable to the directions of the law, as that the true result can be arrived at with reasonable certainty?' (Emphasis supplied.)

As to the application of a liberal or strict construction of election laws we are told by Justice Gaines in Davis v. State ex rel. Wren, 75 Tex. 420, 12 S.W. 957:

'The main design of all election laws is, or should be, to secure a fair expression of the popular will, in the speediest and most convenient manner; and we think a failure to comply with provisions not essential to attain that object should not avoid the election, in the absence of language clearly showing that such was the legislative intent.'

The Supreme Court in Thomas v. Groebl, 147 Tex. 70, 212 S.W.2d 625, said:

'The right to vote is so fundamental in our form of government that it should be as zealously safeguarded as are our natural rights. It has been said that 'laws abridging the natural right of the citizen should be restrained by rigorous constructions within their narrowest limits.' It is sufficient, however, that we apply here the less extreme and well established rule of construction that statutes regulating the right to vote should be given a liberal interpretation in favor of that right.'

In Ramsay v. Wilhelm, Tex.Civ.App., 52 S.W.2d 757, the Court said:

'But to enforce a strict observance of all of the directory provisions of the statute, absent proof of unfairness or dishonesty, would more often defeat than effectuate the popular will; and it is probable that but few elections would stand such a scrupulous test.' (Emphasis supplied.)

The right to free exercise of intelligent choice by a citizen at the polls is surely one of the most treasured of all American heritages guaranteed by the Constitution and Bill of Rights. We do not believe it can be said that the free exercise of this right is to be unreasonably curtailed or restricted by judicial decree which places a narrow or strict construction on legislative rules. Mitchell v. Jones, Tex.Civ.App., 361 S.W.2d 224.

Finally, it is appropriate to observe that in this unique type of action time is of...