Woolley v. Washington Township of Marion County Small Claims Court

• Decision Date: 03 March 2004
• Docket Number: No. 49A05-0309-CV-485.,49A05-0309-CV-485.
• Citation: 804 N.E.2d 761
• Parties: Joshua H. WOOLLEY, Appellant-Plaintiff, v. WASHINGTON TOWNSHIP OF MARION COUNTY SMALL CLAIMS COURT, Appellee-Defendant.
• Court: Indiana Appellate Court

804 N.E.2d 761

Joshua H. WOOLLEY, Appellant-Plaintiff, v. WASHINGTON TOWNSHIP OF MARION COUNTY SMALL CLAIMS COURT, Appellee-Defendant.

No. 49A05-0309-CV-485.

Court of Appeals of Indiana.

March 3, 2004.

Brandi A. Haggard, Southward & Haggard, Clifford W. Shepard, Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Appellant.

James S. Stephenson, Wayne E. Uhl, Stephenson, Daly, Morow & Semler, Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Appellee.

OPINION

BAKER, Judge.

Appellant-plaintiff Joshua Woolley appeals the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of appellee-defendant Washington Township of Marion County Small Claims Court (WTSCC). Specifically, Woolley contends that the trial court erred in finding that an affidavit signed by Judge Lynda Huppert, then judge of the WTSSC, was not a public record and that Woolley had no substantive relief available to him through the Indiana Access to Public Records Act (APRA).¹ The WTSCC also asserts that Woolley's action became moot when the federal lawsuit for which the affidavit was prepared was settled and dismissed. Finding that the action is not moot, that the affidavit is not a public record, and that Woolley has no relief available to him, we affirm.

FACTS

On October 9, 2001, a federal lawsuit was filed by attorney Clifford W. Shepard, representing Timothy W. Skaggs and others. The defendants included the law firm of Sheeks, Ittenbach & Johnson. In the latter part of 2001, attorney Charles Sheeks asked Judge Huppert to sign an affidavit that had been prepared by him or by attorney John Ittenbach in connection with the Skaggs case. The affidavit concerned the procedure for filing claims in the WTSCC, and it confirmed her policy that no complaint tendered for filing in her court would be rejected by the clerical staff for lack of attachments, as required by Small Claims Rule 2(B)(4). Judge Huppert read the affidavit, signed it, and returned it to Sheeks. It is undisputed that she did not retain a copy of the affidavit.

In January and February 2002, Woolley, an employee of attorney Shepard, reviewed materials involving the Skaggs case and learned that the attorney defendants in the case contended that the WTSCC had exempted them from compliance with Small Claims Rule 2(B)(4) and that Judge Huppert had signed an affidavit confirming this contention. On April 2, 2002, Woolley went to the WTSCC during regular business hours and verbally requested a copy of the affidavit. The WTSCC denied this request. Woolley then hand-delivered a letter to the WTSCC requesting permission to inspect and copy a number of documents, including the affidavit. On April 8, 2002, Judge Huppert wrote a letter to Woolley stating that the affidavit was not a public record of the WTSCC and would not be provided. However, she pointed out that he could obtain the affidavit from Sheeks, Ittenbach, or Shepard.

On April 10, 2002, Woolley sent a letter to the Indiana Public Access Counselor describing his attempts to inspect the documents he sought. The Public Access Counselor contacted Woolley on the same day, and she informed him that she had spoken to the WTSCC, and that he would be allowed to inspect and copy the documents he requested on April 2, 2002. On April 12, 2002, Woolley went to the WTSCC to inspect and copy the documents. At that time he was given Judge Huppert's April 8 response, which Woolley then attached to another letter to the Public Access Counselor. In that letter, Woolley stated his disagreement with Judge Huppert's position that the affidavit was not a public record of the WTSCC and that it was "unacceptable" to obtain the affidavit from the attorneys because "some of the attorneys have been sued for various torts and none of the attorneys would have a duty to produce the Affidavit if I requested the same. I do not want to obtain a copy of a document I have never seen from people who are alleged tort feasors [sic]." Appellant's Br. p. 4.

On April 26, 2002, Woolley filed suit against the WTSCC under the Indiana Access to Public Records Act (APRA) to compel the WTSCC to allow him to inspect and copy the affidavit. On December 20, 2002, the parties to the Skaggs case filed a stipulation of dismissal with prejudice pursuant to a settlement agreement. The WTSCC moved for summary judgment on May 23, 2003, arguing that the affidavit was not a record of the WTSCC, that there was no copy of the affidavit to produce, and that the dismissal of the Skaggs case rendered this matter moot. Woolley filed a cross-motion for summary judgment pursuant to Indiana Trial Rule 56(B). After a hearing, the trial court granted the WTSCC's motion and denied Woolley's motion on August 26, 2003, finding that, as a matter of law, the affidavit was not a record of the WTSCC and that the trial court could not provide Woolley any relief inasmuch as the WTSCC did not have a copy of the affidavit to produce. Woolley now appeals.

DISCUSSION AND DECISION

I. Standard of Review

Initially, we note that when reviewing the grant or denial of a summary judgment motion, we apply the same legal standard as the trial court. Mattingly v. Warrick County Drainage Bd., 743 N.E.2d 1245, 1247 (Ind.Ct.App.2001). As we stated in Little Beverage Co., Inc. v. DePrez, 777 N.E.2d 74, 77-78 (Ind.Ct.App.2002):

[S]ummary judgment is appropriate when no designated genuine issues of material fact exist and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Our standard of review is not altered by cross motions for summary judgment on the same issues. A party appealing the denial of summary judgment carries the burden of persuading this court that the trial court's decision was erroneous. The movant must demonstrate the absence of any genuine issue of fact as to a determinative issue and only then is the non-movant required to come forward with contrary evidence. This court may not search the entire record but may only consider the evidence that has been specifically designated. All pleadings, affidavits, and testimony are construed liberally and in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party.

(citations omitted).

II. Mootness

Before we can address the merits of Woolley's arguments, we must first address the WTSCC's contention that Woolley's appeal is moot inasmuch as the Skaggs case was settled and dismissed. An issue becomes moot when it is no longer live and the parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the outcome or when no effective relief can be rendered to the parties. Indiana High School Athletic Ass'n v. Durham, 748 N.E.2d 404, 411 (Ind.Ct. App.2001). When the principal questions in issue have ceased to be matters of real controversy between the parties, the errors assigned become moot questions, and the court will not retain jurisdiction to decide them. Id.

The WTSCC argues that "[t]he link between this action and the federal lawsuit, Skaggs, is undeniable" inasmuch as Woolley worked for Shepard, who was the attorney for the plaintiffs in the case against Ittenbach, Sheeks and their firm, and the affidavit was part of the defense of the Skaggs lawsuit. Appellee's Br. p. 13. However, Woolley has maintained throughout the litigation that Shepard "did not ask, request nor direct me to obtain a copy of Judge Huppert's Affidavit." Appellant's App. p. 58. Woolley stated in an affidavit that he "wanted the document, and other documents, for my own purposes as a citizen of the State of Indiana." Appellant's App. p. 58. The WTSCC does not cite to, nor has our research uncovered, any case in which the dismissal of a lawsuit rendered moot a request for access to public records. Woolley was not required to state a reason for his request, and we will not now ascribe one to him in order to dismiss his appeal. There is still a live issue as to whether Woolley may rightfully have access to the affidavit, and, therefore, the WTSCC's argument must fail.

III. Public Record

Woolley first argues that the affidavit is a public record, which therefore must be produced so that he may inspect and copy it. Specifically, he contends that Judge Huppert received the affidavit in her official capacity as the elected judge of the WTSCC, which makes the affidavit a public record of the WTSCC.

A. Statutory Interpretation

Initially, we note that "it is the public policy of the state that all persons are entitled to full and complete information regarding the affairs of government and the official acts of those who represent them as public officials and employees." Ind.Code § 5-14-3-1. The APRA defines "public record" as follows:

"Public record" means any writing, paper, report, study, map, photograph, book, card, tape recording, or other material that is created, received, retained, maintained, used² or filed by or with a public agency and which is generated on paper, paper substitutes, photographic media, chemically based media, magnetic or machine readable media, electronically stored data, or any other material, regardless of form or characteristics.

I.C. § 5-14-3-2. Additionally, a "public agency" is "any board, commission, department, division, bureau, committee, agency, office, instrumentality, or authority, by whatever name designated, exercising any part of the executive, administrative, judicial, or legislative power of the state." Id. We agree with the trial court that the WTSCC is a public agency, inasmuch as it exercises the judicial power of the state. Moreover, the affidavit is clearly a writing. The question is whether the affidavit was "created, received, retained, maintained, used or filed by or with" the WTSCC. It is beyond dispute that the WTSCC did not create the affidavit; it was created by either Sheeks or Ittenbach. Nor can it reasonably be said that the WTSCC retained, maintained, or filed the affidavit inasmuch as it was in the WTSCC only long enough for Judge Huppert to read and sign it.

Woolley argues that Judge Huppert "received" the affidavit because it was in her possession "at some point," Appellee's Br. p....