Woonsocket Teachers' Guild Local Union 951, AFT v. Woonsocket School Committee

• Decision Date: 09 June 1997
• Docket Number: No. 96-22-A,96-22-A
• Citation: 694 A.2d 727
• Parties: 118 Ed. Law Rep. 1079 WOONSOCKET TEACHERS' GUILD LOCAL UNION 951, AFT et al. v. WOONSOCKET SCHOOL COMMITTEE. ppeal.
• Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court

Page 727

694 A.2d 727

118 Ed. Law Rep. 1079

WOONSOCKET TEACHERS' GUILD LOCAL UNION 951, AFT et al. v. WOONSOCKET SCHOOL COMMITTEE.

No. 96-22-Appeal.

Supreme Court of Rhode Island.

June 9, 1997.

Robert S. Parker, Richard A. Skolnik, Providence, for Plaintiff.

Richard R. Ackerman, Woonsocket, for Defendant.

Present: WEISBERGER, C.J., and LEDERBERG, BOURCIER, and FLANDERS, JJ.

OPINION

FLANDERS, Justice.

This case calls upon us to construe G.L.1956 § 9-1-31 ¹--a statute mandating that teachers assaulted at work receive their full salaries while they are absent from employment because of their injuries. However, if the resulting disability continues for a period of one year, the statute also requires the injured teacher to apply "to the Rhode Island employees retirement system for appropriate benefits for which that person is entitled." Section § 9-1-31(e). Accordingly we hold that a teacher's receipt of the full-salary benefit provided for by § 9-1-31(d) is burdened by the condition of applying to the retirement system in a timely manner for the appropriate benefits to which that teacher may be entitled. Consequently we reverse a declaratory judgment that allowed a disabled teacher to determine for herself that she was ineligible for such benefits and that she thus was not required to apply for them while continuing to receive her full salary for however long she remains disabled.

In December 1991 plaintiff Hanni Morin (Morin), a teacher in the Woonsocket School System and an employee of the defendant Woonsocket School Committee (committee), was injured in the course of her employment when she jerked her head away from a punch thrown by a student. Because of her disability Morin has been unable to work as a teacher. However, pursuant to § 9-1-31, she continues to receive her full salary, offset by her workers' compensation benefits. ² In January 1996 she also obtained a declaratory judgment in the Superior Court which declared, inter alia, that since § 9-1-31(e) does not impose any penalty for Morin's refusal to apply to the retirement system for "appropriate benefits," § 9-1-31(d) protected her right to continue receiving her full salary (with no deduction from her sick-leave account), notwithstanding her refusal to apply. It is from this judgment that the committee appeals.

A decision to grant a remedy under the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act is purely discretionary, see G.L.1956 § 9-30-6, and " 'should not be disturbed unless it clearly appears that such discretion has been improperly exercised or that there has been an abuse thereof.' " Vincent Co. v. First National Supermarkets, Inc., 683 A.2d 361, 362 (R.I.1996). Because the declaratory judgment under review contravenes the "shall apply" mandate of § 9-1-31(e), we believe that the trial justice improperly exercised his discretion in awarding Morin the declaratory relief she sought.

Section 9-1-31(e) states that a person injured in accordance with § 9-1-31(d) "shall, if such disability continues for a period of one year, apply to the Rhode Island employees retirement system for appropriate benefits for which that person is entitled." (Emphases added.) It is not disputed for purposes of this appeal that Morin was injured in accordance with § 9-1-31(d), that because of her injuries she has been unable to perform her normal teaching duties fully, and that her disability has continued for a period of one year (and beyond). Nonetheless Morin contends that she is not required to apply to the retirement system because, in her estimation, she would not be entitled to any benefits. Thus, if her argument were to carry the day, it would conveniently leave Morin in the position of receiving indefinitely the full-salary benefits afforded to her by § 9-1-31(d) without incurring the coincident burden imposed by § 9-1-31(e) of applying to the retirement system for whatever benefits may be appropriate to her situation. In our judgment the statute's mandatory "shall apply" language will not countenance such a result. Having suffered for a year under a disability sustained in accordance with § 9-1-31(d), Morin was required by law to apply to the retirement system pursuant to § 9-1-31(e) as a condition to her receipt of the full-salary benefits provided for by § 9-1-31(...